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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses the current range of legal and economic 
problems related to the insolvency of cross border banking 
groups. The first aim is to show how the actual structure and 
internal organisation of such groups make them «too big to 
fail» institutions. Their funding preferences, their soft budgets 
constraints and their presence in different member States 
increase the likelihood of contagion and the adverse systemic 
impact of their failure. A great role is played also by the time 
inconsistency of States’ “no bail out policies”.  
The second aim is to prove how the lack of a formal EU regime 
on the matter, which is left to Mou’s agreements and poor 
enforcement authority, is completely inefficient. In fact, the 
existent legal and operational differences between Member 
States and the agency conflicts among competent Authorities 
give raise to serious coordination problems, ring fencing and 
sub-optimal crisis management.  
To ensure a better outcome, a proposal on the design of ex ante 
tools and the different contents, role and timeframe for action 
of burden sharing agreements, intra-group transfers and 
“living wills” (i.e., recovery and resolution plans) is spelt out. 
Lastly, despite European efforts to mediate such conflicts and 
create a level playing field, when those crises occurs member 
States resolve them with ad hoc measures and on a case-by-case 
basis.  In the shed of the current economic crisis Member States 
intervened with plans to sustain the sector. However the final 
outcome of such measures would be a new financial structure 
where competition may be hindered. Further, those plans do 
not avoid moral hazard, do not envision state exit neither bank 
repayments nor minimize big banks’ incentive to behave. 
  
 
 
 
 1  
Introduction 
 
 
The insolvency of cross border banking groups has received 
increasing attention from regulators of both sides of the Ocean. 
This was mainly due to the financial turmoil of 2007-2009 
where the financial system worldwide was about to collapse 
were it not for Central Banks’, Finance Ministers’ and 
Supervisory Authorities’ intervention.   
Obviously this is just the last in time episode, since financial 
crises date back to the last century: one may think at the 1930’s 
Great Depression, at the Asian crisis, at the Mexican crisis, and 
so on. More recently we have observed cross border failures of 
banks at micro levels, the most cited being the BCCI’s collapse. 
It is a common wisdom that banking crises arise globally but 
are solved locally. This is far from optimal since banking 
groups’ activities have reached a global dimension as well as 
their liability structure is as such that their failure carries 
negative externalities in all involved countries. Further, the 
functions performed by banks are critical for the financial 
system and the real economy (so called specialty of banks) so 
the slump in the financial health of one bank may cause severe 
disruption to the whole system.  
But it is not only the global aspect that worries observers and 
policymakers, what is utmost noticeable is the explosive 
growth of the dimensions of these groups. This, coupled with 
the growth of the financial intermediation sector –notably the 
wholesale money market and the inter-bank exposures –the 
growth in leverage of those groups and their increased 
exposure to high risky assets of uncertain liquidity as well as 
banks’ reciprocal dependency, makes those players as 
institutions too big to fail. 
Since 1984 we observed the pursuance of a formal public 
policy aimed at not allow these big banks to fail. The main 
justification is, as it is always been, that financial stability is a 
public good and that the negative outputs a default may have 
on depositors, public confidence and the real economy are 
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worth to be avoided.  
Which may be true, but it contributed to the creation of a 
vicious circle that has lead to the current situation whereby 
financial players are capable of acting above the thresholds 
that public regulation imposed on them.    
This phenomenon is known as moral hazard that, in the cross 
border case, is amplified by the inability of the Authorities to 
efficiently coordinate their actions and monitoring and by 
asymmetries in monetary policies. In fact banks can implicitly 
rely upon central bank’s interventions to stop price falls and to 
adequate interest rates. Further they can rely on supervisory 
forbearance and on the time inconsistency of more recent “we 
are not going to bail out banks” policies. The following steps 
taken by regulators after the Lehman Brothers collapse even 
reinforced this hazardous attitude. 
The problem is that banks shall be allowed to fail.  
This is necessary for the maintaining of a certain incentive for 
the players to behave and to respect the rules because they 
know that they will otherwise be out of the market. 
Competition would benefit as well and taxpayers would not 
bear the consequences of behaviors they are not responsible of.  
The problem is on the designing of an efficient cross border 
framework. 
Supervisors’ different powers, objectives, triggers for 
intervention and available tools add layers of complexity to the 
matter. Although a certain degree of homogeneity stems from 
some provisions of the Capital Requirements Directive, these 
are not yet sufficient.  
Clarification is needed on the concept of “crisis”: nowadays the 
lack of a well defined set of triggers for intervention and for 
resolution is as such that “being insolvent” is a hybrid concept, 
positively correlated to regulators’ intents and discretion on 
keep the bank afloat or liquidate it.  
What seems clear though is that the matter cannot be left to 
rules applicable to non financial companies, since bank 
insolvency law shall pursue a broader and different set of 
objectives:  depositor protection and public confidence in the 
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system, maintenance of financial stability, preserving of critical 
banking functions and protection of competition. Furthermore 
the setting should be designed in a way to mimimise the 
overall resolution costs, the actual cost for taxpayers and to 
avoid moral hazard. 
Today, the crisis of a cross border group would be seen as the 
crisis of each single entity (subsidiaries) part of the group, 
because they will be treated accordingly to their legal 
independency and not to their economic dependency from the 
parent. Hence the possibility to treat the group on a wide basis 
is left to government’s decisions to ring fence assets or instead 
to collaborate and take coordinated steps. 
In this regard, agency conflicts and regulatory culture 
differences play a great role, both from an ex ante and from an 
ex post perspective. 
In fact, Authorities, that supervise the group on the basis of a 
home country control principle, may be reticent to share 
information on the supervised entity because of threefold 
reason: i) supervisors’ incentive to obtain and give information 
is a function of their responsibilities; ii) they may find 
advantageous not to share information with other regulators; 
and iii) they may have poor or no incentive to take cross 
border externalities into account: to sum up, supervisors will 
not take cross border contagion effects into account if they are 
accountable only to their jurisdiction. Furthermore they may 
want not to disclose their supervisory forbearance. 
This is the case because each State is responsible for depositor 
protection, lender of last resort tools and the overall financial 
stability of its system. 
We must also acknowledge however that supervisory 
difficulties in the monitoring of cross border banking groups’ 
activities and behavior is also due to their internal 
organization.  
In fact large banks tend to be organized into “hub and spoke” 
models: spokes are responsible for risk management within 
business lines, whereas hubs provide centralized oversight of 
risk and capital at the group level. The main shortfall is that it 
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may question the effectiveness of host country supervision of 
liquidity risk in branches and subsidiaries. In fact, host 
supervisor may not be able to control how the liquidity is 
managed by the parent company as well as centralized 
liquidity management may weaken the legal protection arising 
from the subsidiary structure, since it may create features that 
make the group resemble one with a branch structure. 
Likewise, business lines (e.g. retail banking, merchant banking 
and so on), creates an implicit transfer of decision powers from 
the national entity of the group to a centralized business-line 
manager who will not necessary be in the home country. This 
cross border business line integration implies that there may be 
a higher possibility of intra group, cross border contagion that 
may not be caught in due time by the responsible supervisor. 
When banks centralize operational function, the host 
supervisor may well be unable to supervise those functions as 
well as it may be unable to assist a sound subsidiary if the 
parent company that houses the key operational functions goes 
bankrupt. This is also why we state that living wills should 
contain provisions on the resiliency and functioning of those 
infrastructure systems. 
Memoranda of Understanding between single countries may 
provide to be useful in handling the crisis management, 
although there is widespread mistrust on their utility.  
Our in depth analysis, showed instead that their provisions are 
actually complete and fairly precise: the thing is that they are 
neither enforceable nor binding. In fact none of them has been 
taken into consideration in the recent crisis.  
However, the lack of coordination and the inability of the 
Authority to timely solve the problem have lead to sub optimal 
resolutions. To give some example, take the Fortis case. 
Fortis was a Belgian/Dutch financial conglomerate with 
substantial subsidiaries chartered in Belgium, Holland and 
Luxembourg. In September 2008 it was at the peak of its crisis, 
which actually stated time before. The Dutch government 
acquired part of its subsidiaries as did the Luxemburg 
government with its own, whereas the Belgian government 
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raised its participation into one relevant Belgian subsidiary to 
99% and agreed to sell a 75% interest to BNP Paribas in return 
for BNP shares. BNP also bought the Belgian insurance 
activities of Fortis and took a majority stake in Fortis Bank in 
Luxemburg. A portfolio of assets was transferred to a financial 
vehicle owned by the Belgian state, BNP and Fortis.  
However, on December 12, 2008 the Court of Appeal of 
Brussels suspended the sale to BNP, and decided that the 
finalized sale to the Dutch State and to the Belgian State as well 
as the subsequent to BNP had to be submitted for approval by 
the general assembly of shareholders of Fortis Holding, in 
order for the three sales to be valid under Belgian law. 
On their side shareholders initially rejected some transaction, 
then after renegotiated and modified some aspects of others. 
The Banking Committee (2009) said: «despite a long-standing 
relationship in on going supervision and information sharing 
the Dutch and the Belgian Authorities assessed the situation 
differently. Differences in the assessment of available 
information and the sense of urgency complicated the 
resolution». The problem is defined also by the Commission 
(2010): «The Fortis case is a clear illustration of many of the 
problems which can arise during a cross border banking crisis. 
It shows the tendency of authorities to adopt territorial 
approaches in crisis resolution and how the consequent 
competition for assets can lead to sub-optimal results. Absence 
of complete information, exacerbated by the complex business 
structure of Fortis, compromised the early burden sharing 
arrangement, and ultimately resulted in the splitting of the 
group. The misalignment of responsibilities between 
authorities gave rise to tensions which further compromised 
cooperation. The absence of a clear legal framework under 
which resolution measures could be taken resulted in legal 
challenges from shareholders which created a protracted 
period of legal uncertainty».  
At stage, there are several initiatives in place to create a 
European common set of tools to handle these crises (see for 
instance EU Communication proposal 2009). Furthermore 
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suggestions come from institutions promoting common 
standards and policies, such as the Banking committee for 
Banking Supervision, the IMF or the Financial Stability Board. 
The red line that links those initiatives is the need to focus on 
tools that can avoid getting that much into troubles, by giving 
more attention to ex ante resolution mechanisms and recovery 
planning. Duty of cooperation between authorities is of course 
advocated.     
However, they do not seem to go at the very core of the issue: 
any voluntary cooperation agreement, whether it is called 
burden sharing or memorandum of understanding is not 
currently thought to be enforceable and binding. The same 
may be true for living wills. 
The crisis of border banking groups can be seen from many 
standpoints. 
One can look at the ex post decisions to be taken: the study of 
resolution plans is particularly appealing since it involves a 
reflection on how to eliminate or reduce taxpayers costs. This 
may be obtained maybe by changing the way the bank is 
structured, or adopt ad hoc laws whereby taxpayers support is 
not required or maybe increasing bank’s capital and liquidity 
requirements in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy. 
One may investigate resolution methods as well: capital 
injection; share transfer order; bridge bank set up; liquidation; 
nationalization, to figure out a cost benefit and a RIA analysis.  
One interested in private international law may want to look at 
the treatment of assets and their collateral, their legal 
qualification under different regulatory regimes (intangible 
goods?) and at the cherry picking problem. The analysis of 
creditors’ satisfaction means and conflict of interests among 
them is interesting too as the design of an ad hoc directive on 
resolution: shall it be based on a territoriality or on a 
universality principle? 
However, to conclude the reasoning done so far, the latest 
issues are outside the scope of my research. 
In fact my focus is on the role and design of ex ante resolution 
mechanisms to confine to the minimum the possible state 
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intervention. 
To this end I would suggest to make current MOU’s binding, 
coupled with the existence of burden sharing agreements.  
In fact, a form of burden sharing must be realized because 
collective costs and stability treats are effectively existent, 
because we cannot deny that if a crisis explodes it is partly 
because who had to supervise failed to do it and because the 
legal personality principle cannot pose such high barriers to 
impede a global consideration of the group and global 
responsibilities among all the interested parties. We need to 
pierce the veil. 
However the agreements shall be of a “soft” type, in the sense 
that they shall not regulate the fiscal responsibility of each 
member state involved to share the net budgetary costs of the 
resolution, but the idea is that Member states should ex ante 
formally commit themselves to participate in a certain burden 
sharing agreement whenever an identified banking group 
would face financial difficulties and only if and when a private 
or internal solution has not proven to be valid. Their aid 
should be confined to the minimum to avoid taxpayers’ 
burdens and moral hazard. Beside, public authorities should 
take a more extensive approach of art. 123-126 Eu Treaty (ex 
art. 101-104). 
To tackle what we identified above as the very core issue, the 
way by which States commit themselves shall fulfill some 
preconditions: mutual trust, legal recognition, enforceability, 
commonly agreed assessment of the best policy option. Once 
done so, the analysis focuses on the triggers for intervention 
and the to be enacted policy. 
In this respect, these burden sharing must contain reference on 
the transfer of assets within the group before it gets insolvent 
as a way to avoid state’s intervention. 
However, the efficiency of this option may be hindered by 
insolvency, banking and company law obstacles. To this end, 
within the solution proposed, I suggest to consider in the 
company’s bylaw the possibility of suspending some 
shareholders rights in crisis situation. The Fortis case is a clear 
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example of the conflicting tension of shareholders’ interests 
and the need to maintain financial stability and avoid a 
disruptive bankruptcy. 
Other legal differences must be taken into account that may 
limit the incentive and the possibility of making such transfers: 
differences in directors’ liability regime, supervisor’ or 
shareholders prior approval, subjection of some transfers to 
certain rules, arm’s length principle and so on. 
In fact, national laws tend, rightly enough, to protect both 
subsidiaries and stakeholders. The first from the unduly 
influence of the parent that may affect subsidiary’s 
independence of assets and independent decision making, and 
the stakeholders are protected from unfair decisions taken by 
the board of directors; minority shareholders from majority 
shareholders decisions; creditors from the development of an 
imbalance between the creditors of the transferor and those of 
the receiver. The idea is trying to find a way that satisfies both 
stability and stakeholders’ protection. 
Further the thesis shifts its attention towards the resolution 
and recovery plans (living wills). 
The living wills idea is fairly new and derives from the 
necessity to make the banks being liable for their failure and 
not to spread the cost to taxpayers. 
Further they may help reducing the complexity of the group 
and consider subsidiaries as independent entities to be wound 
up singularly. 
However the big issue with those plans is their actual shape 
and their contents.  
In absence of any neither practical examples nor specific 
regulations yet in place, I tried try to figure their features, 
taking into account their intermediate and final goals. 
They shall contain provision in relation to the bank’s outside 
funding option, how they may raise additional capital, and if 
the consideration of selling business lines or some assets may 
find legal obstacles. 
Resolution plans instead shall be directed to supervisors and 
their aim would be give them the possibility of having a clear 
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cut representation of bank’s internal mechanisms and 
infrastructures to help them to choose among the resolution 
options in consideration. 
To conclude, solutions are possible to the crisis of a cross 
border banking group. However to allow for the safe 
resolution or recovery of the bank, a great role is played by the 
State in its ability to strongly force banks to find a private 
sector solution and to intervene only and according to the 
boundaries it has previously committed itself to. 
Furthermore, States shall avoid any national-interests based 
attitude and cooperate and collaborate ex ante to reach a 
productive and cost-effective sharing of responsibility. 
Time inconsistent policies cannot be admitted anymore.  
 10  
Chapter 2 
 
Cross border banking groups as «too big to 
fail» institutions? 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
There is a variety of reasons behind the failure of a bank.  
The first one refers to endogenous causes: wrong business 
decisions, risk assumptions, misalignment of interests, hence 
mismanagement, which is usually followed by fraud, as has 
been the case for BCCI and Banco Ambrosiano.  
The second one is related to exogenous events: 
greater/increased level of competition, change in the levels of 
demand, alteration of market conditions. Furthermore, among 
the macro and micro causes identified by the economic 
literature the most significant may be 1) instability of financial 
markets; 2) irrational behavior of depositors due to a loss of 
confidence in the bank's ability to pay its debts; 3) contagion 
effect; 4) long run unsustainable macro economic and 
monetary policy; 5) credit booms; 6) large capital inflows 
combined with currency imbalances1.  
Rather, greater consensus is on the precondition of a crisis, 
which usually stems from 1) a long period of calm condition 
with intense competition between financial institutions; 2) 
increasing and concentrated debt accumulation at low risk 
premiums; 3) financial innovation and declining capital ratios2. 
However, this ideal condition cannot hold for long and 
                                                 
1 See Lindgren C.-J., Gillian G., Saal M., Bank soundness and Macroeconomic 
policies, IMF working paper, 1996; Collyns C., Kincaid G. R., Managing 
Financial Crisis: Recent Experience and Lessons from Latin America, IMF 
occasional paper, n. 217, 2003.  
2  See the seminal work by Davis, 1995, p 198-199.  
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therefore at a certain point a shock arises that compel the 
stability of the system. The triggering event may vary 
according to the actual situation, but it may generally be 
caused by the tightening of monetary policies or the 
unexpected asset devaluation.    
Whatever the cause is, the crisis of a bank carries negative 
externalities that in turn may affect the real economy. The way 
in which those externalities –stemming basically from credit 
losses and liquidity problems -impact depositors, creditors and 
other market sectors depends heavily on how the crisis is 
resolved, how long does it take to depositors to give access to 
funds and how long does it take to other claimants and 
creditors (i.e. banks that acted as lenders in the inter-banking 
system) to receive their money back.  
Another important shortcoming of a run is the ability of the 
crisis to spill over other credit institutions and affect the system 
as a whole, even across geographical boundaries. In fact, 
systemic risk can be broadly defined as the “propagation of an 
agent's economic distress to other agents linked to that agent 
through financial transactions”3. Those financial transactions 
are commonly known as inter-bank deposits and loans and 
may take the form of “intraday debits on payment system, 
overnight and term inter-bank lending in the central banks 
fund markets and contingent claims such as interest rates and 
exchange rate derivatives in OTC markets”4. It is easy to image 
that the freezing of such transactions, the most important case 
being failures in the payment settlement system, can lead to 
the so called contagion effect which means widespread 
liquidity problems among different institutions, panic fire-sale 
and clearing failures. Furthermore, when a banking panic 
occurs, the economic ability to “channel funds with productive 
investment opportunities may be severely hampered, leading 
to a full scale financial crisis and a large decline in investment 
                                                 
3 See, ROCHET J.-C., TIROLE J., Interbank lending and systemic risk, in Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, n. 4, Part. 2, Nov. 1996, 733-762. 
4 See, ROCHET-TIROLE (1996), 733. 
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and output”5.  
However, in case of an individual ailing bank the mentioned 
effects may not reveal, since the supervisory authority could be 
able to contain the side effects and resolve the crisis in an 
orderly manner. This happens usually when the institution 
does not have a high degree of interdependence with other 
banks, or in other terms, is not considered as “too big to fail” 
(TBTF). This latter case arises usually in presence of a group, or 
a bank that is so large and complex that its failure may have a 
systemic impact on the whole economy, (the so called large and 
complex banking organizations, LCBO's). De Nicolo and Kwast 
(2001) have indeed demonstrated the positive relationship 
between banks consolidation and systemic importance6.  
This issue gains complexity when the group presents cross 
border aspects. In fact, the usual tools authorities apply to 
manage systemic risk (i.e. capital regulation), to solve the crisis 
(i.e. winding up, reorganization, liquidation) and to protect 
involved parties (depositors, shareholders, other claimants) 
cannot apply smoothly to those organizations basically 
because there is no common legal framework in place, which 
means that among European Member states there is:  
• diversity in legal, regulatory and supervisory systems; 
• different legal tools authorities can dispose;  
                                                 
5 See, MISHKIN F. S., How big a problem is too big to fail? A review of Gary 
Stern and Ron Feldman's Too Big To Fail: the hazards of bank bail outs, in 
Journal of Economic literature, Vol XLIV, Dec. 2006, 988-1004; Fore a more 
detailed analysis, see also, Demirguç-Kunt A., Detragiache E., Gupta P., 
Inside the crisis: an empirical analysis of banking systems in distress, in 
Journal of International economic finance, Issue 25, 2006, 702-718; Kaminsky 
G.L., Reinhart C., The twin crisis: the casues of banking and balance of 
payments problems, in American Economic Review, Issue 90 (3), 1999, 473-
500; Gupta P., Aftermath of banking crisis: effects on real and monetary 
variables, in Journal of International Money and Finance, Issue 24, 2005, 
675-691; Dell'Ariccia G., Detragiache E., Rajan R., The real effect of banking 
crisis, in Journal of financial intermediation, Issue 17, 2008, 89-112 
6 See DE NICOLO G., KWAST MYRON L., Systemic Risk and Financial 
Consolidation: Are they related?, in www.bankofengland.co.uk 
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• unclear division of labor between home and host 
authority in presence of subsidiaries;  
• different deposit insurance mechanisms; and  
• different grounds for intervention,  
 
in relation to the crisis of a cross border banking group having 
subsidiaries incorporated in different member States. 
 
Scope of this chapter would be first the definition of a banking 
group, when it can be considered insolvent and then its 
qualification as a “too big to fail” institution. We then analyse 
the main determinants of a TBTF crisis, namely its funding 
structure and its interlinkages with other financial institutions 
and finally we will go through the associated systemic and 
contagion risk that derives in case of crisis. 
  
 
2.2. Some definitions 
 
Before going through the main problems posed by a large and 
complex organization as a cross border group, we must first 
define what the actual shape of such group is and then try to 
identify the cases where it can be considered insolvent, hence 
when supervisory intervention is needed. 
The first attempt is relatively easy.  
Although at European level there is no clear definition of 
“banking group7”, using a backward induction/reasoning we 
can first identify the existence of a group through its basics -the 
notions of participation and of consolidated accounts -and then 
determine the credit activity. 
Article 17 of the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC8, defines  
“participating interest” as “rights in the capital of other 
                                                 
7 For a definition of “group”, see infra 
8 Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on article 54 (3) (g) of the 
Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, in OJ L 222, 
14.8.1978. 
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undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, 
which, by creating a durable link with those undertakings, are 
intended to contribute to the companies' activities”, whereas 
art. 2 (11), Directive 2002/87/EC9 specifies the meaning of 
participation as the “direct or indirect ownership of 20% or 
more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking”.  
 
At the very basis of a group hence is the concept of 
participation which in order for our analysis to be relevant 
must give the “holding” company the ability to exercise a 
relevant/dominant influence on the controlled entities. This 
influence may be obtained by many means, the first is the 
ownership of the great majority of votes in the general 
assembly (namely the 50%+1 of capital of the controlled 
company), the second is the ownership of a x percentage of 
voting rights that allow the parent company to take the main 
decision in the assembly, the third is the ability of the parent to 
influence another company by virtue of contractual 
relationships. Actually a dominant influence over a certain 
company may be obtained even in presence of other 
agreements between shareholders that give one of them the 
power of appointing directors, or of transmitting losses or 
profits within them, or to cooperate with other companies 
under a common management, or to give more powers then 
what would be proportional to the participation and 
eventually when a third party other than those entitled to 
exercise such power, is given powers over the choice of the 
board of directors or auditors10.  
Furthermore, the conditions for the preparation of 
                                                 
9 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 2002, on the supplementary supervision of credit 
institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 
79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and 
Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, in OJ L 35, 11.2.2003. 
10  Those definitions draw heavily on art. 2359 of the Italian Civil Code and 
art. 23 of the Italian consolidated banking bill.  
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consolidated accounts encompass and widen even more the 
concept of participation identified thus far. 
In fact, according to art. 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC11, 
consolidated accounts and a consolidated annual report are 
required to an undertaking, considered as a “parent 
undertaking”, when it: 
1) has a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting 
rights in another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking); or 
2) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the 
members of the administrative, management or supervisory 
body of another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) and is 
at the same time a shareholder in or member of that 
undertaking; or 
3) has the right to exercise a dominant influence over an 
undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) of which it is a 
shareholder of member, pursuant to a contract entered into 
with that undertaking or to a provision in its memorandum or 
article of association where the law governing that subsidiary 
undertaking permits its being subject to such contract or 
provisions (…); or 
4) is a shareholder in or member of an undertaking and: 
5) (aa) a majority of the members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of that undertaking (…) 
have been appointed solely as a result of the exercise of its 
voting rights 
6) (bb) controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other 
shareholders in or member of that undertaking (a subsidiary 
undertaking) a majority of shareholders' or members' voting 
rights in that undertaking”. 
Furthermore the duty to prepare consolidated accounts arises 
also when a parent undertaking holds a participating interest 
in a subsidiary undertaking and a) it actually exercise a 
dominant influence over it, or b) it and the subsidiary 
undertaking are managed on a unified basis by the parent 
                                                 
11 Seventh council directive 83/349/EEC of 13 june 1983 based on the article 
54(3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, in OJ L193, 18.7.1983. 
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undertaking.  
We can then infer that a parent undertaking is a company that 
is able to exercise a dominant influence over another 
undertaking and that a subsidiary is a company that is 
effectively subjected to that influence12.   
However, we must not overlap the concept of “participation” 
and the definition of group. In fact, not every time a company 
controls another a group exists. The latter verifies only in 
presence of a uniform direction from the parent company that 
coordinates the management and the businesses of the 
subsidiaries, following a common economic scope. 
 
To sum up a group could be identified as a set of legally 
distinct companies (subsidiaries) all subject to the direct or 
indirect control of a single leadership (an individual, a 
coalition of individuals, or a government body), as Bianco, 
Bianchi and Enriques13 define it, or as art. 2(12), Directive 
2002/87/EC puts it: “group shall mean a group of undertakings, 
which consists of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries and the 
entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries 
hold a participation, as well as undertakings linked to each 
other by a relationship within the meaning of Article 12(1) of 
Directive 83/349/EEC;” 
The above entails also that, whatever the actual shape a group 
                                                 
12   From the above derives also a peculiar aspect of the relationships 
within a group, namely the disproportion of responsibility and power. 
In fact, the decisions a holding can take are greater than what it would 
normally be if based only on its share participation in the subsidiary 
(“power without responsibility”). Whereas subsidiaries’ shareholders 
hold a risk uncorrelated to the decision making power of their board of 
directors that is subjected to the holding’s directions (“responsibility 
without power”). See,  COSTI R., Le relazioni di potere nell’ambito dei gruppi 
bancari, in Giur. Comm., 1995, 886. 
13  See BIANCHI M., BIANCO M., ENRIQUES L., Pyramidal Groups and the 
separation between ownership and control in Italy, 1997, p.4 in 
http://www.tcgf.org/research/control_europe/documents/italy.pdf, also 
in The control of corporate union, eds by Barca and Brecht, 2001, OUP, p. 
154. 
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can have - pyramidal, hierarchic, chain, horizontal and so on -
in any event subsidiary undertakings of subsidiary 
undertakings shall also be considered as subsidiary 
undertakings of the parent company. 
 
We now have to define when such organization can be 
considered as having banking nature. We could define it in a 
positive sense.  
A banking group is a conglomerate whose relevant business is 
“to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public 
and to grant credits for its own account”14. Namely a group 
that is primarily engaged in credit activities, such as mortgage 
and consumer credit, factoring, financing of commercial 
transactions, as well as guarantees and commitments, money 
transmission services, issuance and administration of means of 
payment, trading for own account or for account of customers 
in money markets instruments, in financial instruments, 
options and transferable securities, portfolio managment, 
activities related to the above and other activities that are 
ancillary to the banking services15.  
Nonetheless, within the group other businesses are possible, 
such as financial16 and insurance activities, but the weight of 
the credit businesses over the consolidated account must be 
greater then the others17.  
                                                 
14 As defined by art. 1, First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 
1977 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions, in OJ L 322 17/12/77.  
15 See Annex I, Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006, related to the taking up and pursuit of credit 
institutions, in OJ L 177, 30.6.2006.  
16 Financial activity means granting credit facilities (including guarantees) 
to acquire participations or to make investments, according to art. 1 of 
Council Directive 83/350/EEC of 13 June 1983 on the supervision of 
credit institutions on a consolidated basis, in OJ L 193, 18.7.1983 
17 As far as the participation in a credit institutions is concerned, Article 1 
of Council directive 83/350/EEC defines “participation” as “the 
ownership by a credit institution, directly or indirectly of 25% or more of 
the capital of another credit or financial institution”. Directive Council 
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This is why, in order to avoid any confusion, we must clarify 
even more the above definition. We must in fact distinguish, 
where possible, the financial conglomerate identified by 
Directive 2002/87 and the banking group relevant for our 
purposes. Although the two's tend to overlap, a financial 
conglomerate must carry a combination of banking, insurance 
and financial activity18. It is identified by the ratios expressed 
in the Conglomerate Directive19 and it is subjected to a 
supplementary supervisory regime leaded by a coordinator, 
which takes particular care to the supervision of risk 
concentration, capital adequacy, intra-group transactions, 
internal control mechanisms and risk management processes, 
though without prejudice to the specific sectoral rules. Hence, 
for the purposes of our analysis, we would consider as a 
banking group the financial conglomerate that fells into the 
above thresholds –under the condition that it operates mainly 
in the banking sector –as well as the organization to whom the 
conditions laid down in the Conglomerate Directive do not 
apply but nevertheless it can be considered a banking group20. 
                                                                                                                 
directive 2000/12/EC related to the taking up and pursuit of the business 
of credit institutions, in OJ L 126/1, 26.5.2000, gives the definition 
accepted in the text  
18 Theoretically, this means that we can have a financial conglomerate that 
does not carry banking activity at all. 
19   Considering that a financial sector can be a banking sector, an 
insurance sector and an investment services sector, according to art 3 (1) 
(2) of the Directive, “for the purposes of determining whether the 
activities of a group mainly occur in the financial sector, the ratio of the 
balance sheet total of the regulated and non regulated financial sector 
entities in the group to the balance sheet total of the group as a whole 
should exceed 40%. For the purposes of determining whether activities 
in different financial sectors are significant for each financial sector the 
average of the ratio of the balance sheet total of the financial sector 
entities in the group and the ratio of the solvency requirements of the 
same financial sector to the total solvency requirements of the financial 
sector entities in the group should exceed 10%”. 
20  We are perfectly aware of the fact that the above distinction may not 
hold since the borderline between the two’s is really tiny, but it seemed 
necessary to specify that it is not in the scope of this paper the analysis 
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Less easy would be the definition of crisis.  
When a group can be considered insolvent? 
The 2003 Basel capital accord gives an implicit definition of 
insolvency by fixing the ratios between bank exposures and 
own fund. Such solvency ratio is the amount of capital a bank 
must hold to be considered solvent, and it is given by the ratio 
between bank’s own funds and on-and-off balance sheet 
commitments weighted according to their rated degree of risk: 
the resulting value should be 8%. Hence, we could argue that a 
bank whose capital falls below this minimum risk weighted 
ratio should be considered insolvent. However, the recent 
banking crisis has shown that a bank can be unviable even 
when its own funds fulfill the above threshold. 
Moreover neither from a legal point of view nor from an 
economic standpoint there is common consensus over the 
definition of bank insolvency. In fact the Winding up 
Directive21 that regulates the insolvency proceedings of credit 
institution does not specify its meaning but only define the 
“reorganisation measures”22 and “winding up proceedings”23. 
Consequently, we should borrow the agreed definitions of 
bankruptcy of commercial firms.  
Those definitions polarize over two situations: 1) failure to 
fulfill obligation when they fall due regardless of the value of 
                                                                                                                 
of a financial conglomerate as regulated by Directive 2002/87/EC.  
21 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
April 2001, on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, 
in OJ L 125 of 5.5.2001 
22 As “measures which are intended to preserve or to restore the financial 
situation of a credit institution and which could affect third parties' 
preexisting rights, including measures involving the possibility of a 
suspension of payments, suspension of enforcement measures or 
reduction of claims”. Art. 2. 
23 As “collective proceedings opened and monitored by the administrative 
or judicial authorities of a Member State with the aim of realising assets 
under the supervision of those authorities, including where the 
proceedings are terminated by a composition or other similar measure”. 
Art. 2 
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assets and liabilities and/or 2) the total value of liabilities is 
greater than the assets. 
In such cases corporate creditors can start judicial proceedings 
to liquidate the firm24. 
However, banking crisis are different under many 
perspectives. The first is that they can realize even in absence 
of equity or balance sheet problems, since a run can be caused 
simply by the loss of confidence faced by depositors, maybe 
due to mismanagement or liquidity problems’ rumors. 
According to Calomiris and Gordon (1991) “a banking panics 
occur when debt holders at all or many banks in the banking 
system suddenly demand that banks convert their debts claims 
into cash to such an extent that the banks suspend 
convertibility of their debt into cash”. Second, an economically 
insolvent bank may not be considered as such by the 
responsible Authority and may be offered financial assistance25 
to be kept afloat. Third, Authorities may be allowed by 
national legislations to intervene even before a problem occurs, 
notwithstanding if it could be a managerial or a liquidity 
matter. 
Forth, to avoid being insolvent, banks must pay the due 
attention not only to credit risk treats but also to liquidity and 
funding problems.  
Lastly, although we could agree upon the fact that a bank may 
become insolvent when its “going concern” value equals the 
                                                 
24  By general definition. National laws give creditors different powers. For 
a more detailed analysis of some member states bankruptcy laws, see 
DAVYDENKO S. A., FRANKS J. R., Do bankruptcy codes matters? A study of 
defaults in France, Germany and the UK, London Business School Working 
Paper, August 2005. For the differences between corporate and banking 
insolvency regimes in the US, see BLISS R., KAUFMAN G., A comparison 
between US corporate and bank insolvency resolution, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago Working Paper, 2006.  See also ARMOUR J., The law and 
economics of corporate insolvency: A review, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research Working Paper, University of Cambridge, 2001.    
25  See Lastra R.M., Cross border bank insolvency: legal implication in the case of 
banks operating in different jurisdiction in Latin America, in Journal of 
International Economic Law, 2003, 79-110 (81). 
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expected values of its liabilities, it is a fact that most of the 
times the legal insolvency of a bank is an exogenous variable 
that depends on the decision of the competent authority to 
withdraw the license, rather than give financial aid to the bank 
to restore its activities or to sell it to a private purchaser or to 
winding it up. In other words, as far as banking crisis is 
concerned, we could differentiate between the failure of a bank 
and its insolvency. The latter has been explained as yet, the 
former being a situation where regulatory/legal intervention is 
needed either to close or to restore the bank’s viability. 
 
The last attempt would be the identification of the cross border 
nature of the group, which is the easiest.  
A group can be considered cross border when some of its 
subsidiaries are incorporated in States different from the 
parent’s one.  
By virtue of simplification, our analysis will be focused only on 
European groups, namely those organizations whose 
subsidiaries are incorporated in EU member states only, 
because our investigation will consider the European 
normative framework. 
 
 
2.3. The “Too big to fail” doctrine 
 
The exercise conducted thus far has helped us to understand 
when a set of legally independent undertakings can be 
considered as part of a banking group. Though it has been 
conducted in a simplified way, it gave a glimpse of the main 
issues behind a LCBO that will be better investigated forward. 
As a matter of fact, the actual structure of those groups is so 
complex that they become very difficult to perfectly supervise 
and nearly impossible to liquidate. Such impossibility has been 
widely investigated from the supporters of the so called “too 
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big to fail doctrine”26, a theory in a sense interconnected with 
the systemic threat posed by the failure of a large institution27, 
that will be treated further as well.  
We must preface though, that a TBTF institution seems to be 
nothing but the result of two assumptions economic in nature: 
1) economies of scale and 2) global net between financial 
players. It is the combination of the two's that determines the 
most worrying effect of their failure: the propagation of the 
financial meltdown within the financial system as a whole.  
Economies of scale have always been considered as a positive 
feature for undertakings: from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall 
specialisation and division of labour have been considered as a 
way to facilitate the acquisition of maximum return with 
minimum costs through a reduction in the investment of 
money and time and an increase in the return of production28.  
Those economies could be divided into internal and external: 
the latter are defined in terms of increase of the rate of 
production and a general fall in the industry level expenses 
and with an automatic decrease in the total expenses of the  
firm due to a development of scopes for varied industry 
activities. Internal economies of scale on the other hand strive 
to decrease costs and increase production within the “four 
walls of a company”29. As Stigler (1958) puts it, “the theory of 
economies of scale is the theory of the relationship between the 
scale of use of a properly chosen combination of all productive 
services and the rate of output of the enterprise”30. 
Unfortunately, however, those savings are of little help to cover 
the losses when those banks are failing. 
                                                 
26 This is the term most in fashion. We can list few variations such as “too 
interconnected to fail”, “too many to fail”, “too big to bear”, “too 
political to fail ” ... 
27 See Taleb N., Tapiero C., Too big to fail, Too big to bear and risk externalities, 
2009, in www.ssrn.com, for an empirical model establishing a condition 
for a firm to be to big to fail.  
28 Smith A., An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 
London, Strahan and Cadell, 1776. 
29 Marshall A., Principi di Economia, Torino, UTET, 1972. 
30 Stigler G. J., The ecomies of scale, in J.L. & Ec on, Issue 1, 54, 1958 
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Financial networks on the other hand are driven by the above 
mentioned financial transaction31 as well as by the 
development of risk management techniques based upon 
derivative instruments which involve networks of multiple 
claims among financial institutions and by the common use by 
many participants of the same technological means to clear 
and settle their multilateral claims.  
 
 
The term TBTF appears for the first time as a consequence of 
the difficulties faced by the Comptroller of the Currency in the 
US, to liquidate the economically insolvent Continental Illinois 
National Bank of Chicago, in 198432.  
Continental bank was one of the largest US banks at the time 
and was the “largest correspondent bank having interbank 
deposit and Fed funds relationships with more than 2.200 
other banks”33; although its financial difficulties had been 
announced by newspaper and appeared also to the competent 
authorities through the examination reports, its insolvency 
“caught the regulators unprepared”34. The way the Authorities 
decided to handle the problem differed dramatically from the 
decisions taken until then in similar cases: here they de facto 
nationalized the bank.  
In fact, instead of appointing a receiver of the assets, withdraw 
the authorisation, sell the assets, pass through uninsured 
depositors to another bank and let them and the uninsured 
creditors share any losses, the FDIC injected some fresh money 
to the holding company by purchasing newly issued preferred 
shares. The holding downstreamed the received money as 
equity capital to its subsidiary with the clear effect to  
“recapitalise the bank and, by having the bank upstream 
                                                 
31 See above, p. 2 
32 This description is based upon, Kaufman G., Too big to fail in U.S. 
Banking: quo vadis?, in Quarterly review of economic and finance,  2002, 423-
436. 
33 See Kaufman (2002), 423. 
34 Kaufman (2002), 423. 
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dividends to its parent, permitted the holding company to pay 
interest on its debt and to stay out of bankruptcy”35. The FDIC 
purchased also billions of bad loans from the ailing bank at 
adjusted value. The explanations given by the officials at the 
time were focused on the inherent risks of adverse effects to 
other banks, to creditors and depositors, given the large size 
and the interconnection with other banks of Continental.  
During the hearings that followed, the Comptroller of the 
currency, questioned, did not deny that the regulators were 
ever going to let a big bank the size of Continental Illinois fail. 
Hence the last statement of the Chairmen had been “let us not 
bandy words. We have a new kind of bank. It is called too big 
to fail. TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank”36, also, the day after 
the Wall Street Journal headlined “U.S Won't let 11 biggest 
banks in Nation fail”37. There it is.  
Therefore, the too big to fail doctrine seems to add another 
justification for public intervention in banking crisis: in fact, 
from the consideration of an institution as TBTF derives that it 
would have 100% of deposits covered and that may be granted 
public financial support when economic difficulties arise. 
Those safety nets should actually be considered together with 
the reasons that justify the particular care handled by 
regulators in banking crisis. In fact banks are “special”38 under 
many respects:  
 
1. their funding structure.  
In fact the main source of liquidity a bank holds is given by 
                                                 
35 Ibidem, 424. 
36 Ibidem, Appendix I. 
37 See Carrington T., U.S Won't let 11 biggest banks in Nation fail, in The Wall 
Street Journal, 20 September 1984, 2. 
38  See, Kelley E. W. Jr, Are banks still special?, in Banking soundness and 
monetary policy 263, eds Charles Enoch ,John H green, 1997; Corrigan 
G. E., Are banks special?, in Federal reserve bank of minneapolis annual 
report, 1982, in www.minneapolisfed.org; Hupkes E., Insolvency, why a 
special regime for banks?, in current developments in monetary and 
financial law, vol 3, 2003. for a more positive approach over the failure of 
a bank, see Lindgren et al, 1996, 114-115. 
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deposits which are actually a liability of the bank and can be 
withdrawn at par on demand. On the other hand the main 
assets of a bank are given by long term loans that are difficult 
to realise or sell or borrow against on short notice39. Under 
normal circumstances the maturity mismatch would not pose 
great problems since the deposit withdraw would be covered 
by the ongoing principal payments of the loans, the capital 
regulatory requirements would cover the risk of loan losses 
and a cushion of liquid assets would in any event ensure the 
bank’s ability to repay deposits on demand. Besides, banks do 
securitize their loans to get fresh money to invest in other 
financial instruments. Unfortunately, should a shock realise, 
banks may not be able to repay the likely massive withdraw of 
deposits as well as if their funding channels frozen up they 
may incur in an immediate liquidity crisis that may have 
negative effects on their assets/liabilities maturity mismatch40. 
 
2. the nature of financial services provided. 
We said that basically banks take on household savings and 
give loans and guarantees to the general public. Despite the 
existence of other credit intermediaries, banking activities shall 
still be considered as the primary source of capital for 
undertakings, families, consumers and even public bodies. 
                                                 
39  This would be true if the system worked as it should. However banks 
tend to borrow against or to sell those long run liabilities through 
securitisation procedures.  Which however have the same effect since 
they are needed to provide fresh money to be used in the medium term. 
Once a shock occurs, this medium term financing would desappear 
leaving the bank in pain. See the text. 
40  Keynes described this situation as “veil of money”. He wrote: “A 
considerable part of this financing (of the economy nda) takes place 
through the banking system, which interposes its guarantee between its 
depositors who lend it money and its borrowing customers to whom it 
loans money wherewith to finance the purchase of real assets. The 
interposition of this veil of money between the real assets and the wealth 
owner is an especially marked characteristic of the modern world.” See 
Keynes J. M., Essays in persuasion. The collected writings of J. M. Keynes, vol 
IX, MacMillan, London, 1972, 158. 
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Furthermore banks are the only institution that can provide 
simoultaneously both banking and financial services.  
 
3. banks constitute the “transmission belt”41 for monetary 
policy. 
In fact, they are the mean through which monetary policy 
choices (i.e. interest rate) are put into the economy. 
 
Moreover, as said before, banks are particularly vulnerable to 
the, grounded or ungrounded, loss of public confidence that, 
once interested one bank, could spin on the others without 
apparent reasons and out of any control. Technological 
progress makes the transmission of the loss spreading even 
faster. 
From those and the abovementioned linkages between 
institutions, we could deduct that banks can easily act as 
amplifiers of shock in the financial system, thus transmit the 
crisis to many other market players and eventually to the final 
consumer. As a consequence, for long time banks have been 
considered as pursuing public functions and financial stability 
has been considered, yet it still is, a public good. 
In spite of that, in our opinion the interconnections and 
stability issues are not sufficient per se to justify a public 
intervention. The very problem is that if handled on time, 
namely if supervisors would be able to identify the problem 
before it occurs and if they are able to properly manage the 
foreseeable consumers’ behavior, a crisis may not have the 
enormous consequences it usually has. 
Public intervention would be needed only where the social cost 
of the run or of the irrational behavior by consumers would be 
much higher then the costs borne by the bank and its 
shareholders if allowed to fail. The measure of this ratio 
obviously depends upon the size and the degree of penetration 
of the bank in different countries. 
However those implicit guarantees have serious consequences 
                                                 
41  See Hupkes E., 2003. 
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over many fronts: they decrease market discipline because of 
the perception that the internalization of losses would not be 
borne by the market; alter the market’s perception of the 
riskyness of TBTF organisatons; affect the degree of 
competition in the sector, because large banks take on risky 
decisions more easily, hence tend to “catch it all”; give rise to 
hazardous choices by the management because they would not 
borne the consequences of wrong choices.  
To be more specific, according to Feldman and Stern (2004)42, 
the embarkment on excessive risky projects and the less 
responsibly behavior would be the combined consequence of 
both the awareness that the government would bail them out 
and the reduced monitoring exercised by creditors. Those 
indeed, given the expectation of the government protection 
over their loans, would have little incentive to monitor bank 
behavior or to select relationships with banks that are prudent 
in their decisions43. Nonetheless those findings may be 
                                                 
42  See, Feldman R. J., Stern G. H., Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts, 
the Brooking Institutions, 2004. 
43  In our opinion, however, this interpretation is too simplified and needs 
to be better defined. In fact, the Authors seem to sweep over the fact that 
monitoring is typically exercised by shareholders. Those, on the 
contrary, do exercise control especially since they represent the holding 
company. However their monitoring seems to be more focused on the 
application of parent’s instruction rather that on the kind of risks the 
subsidiary is embarking into. As far as the creditors is concerned, they 
are of two types: depositors and other counterparties. The former, tend 
actually not to monitor at all because they are unable to do it and 
because they are not informed, not even on the existence of depositor 
protection mechanisms. The latter is able to monitor de facto only their 
bilateral/MUTUAL exposure, but not the overall vulnerability of the 
bank in the market.  So who could be able to monitor banks’ managers? 
Non executive together with the whole board of directors, firstly, and 
supervisors secondly. In fact, empirical findings show that there is a 
positive correlation between though supervision and reduction of risky 
behavior. See Buch C. M., DeLong G., Do weak supervisory systems 
encourage bank risk taking?, at Journal of Financial Stability, Issue 4, 2008, 
23-39. Furthermore today market signals, such as bond-yields spreads 
are good indicators of bank’s stability. 
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contradicted by empirical studies44 
But first and foremost they alter the banks’ behaviors. In fact, if 
a bank considers itself as TBTF, its propensity to assume risks, 
especially in the short run, seems greater as well as its 
propensity to assume unsustainable leverage risks increases; 
credit risk would be mispriced and the overall resource 
allocation would be distorted. The likely intervention of the 
State to bailing out the bank in financial distress would 
eventually change its budget constraints. In a world without 
distortions, in fact, a credit institution would be subjected to 
hard budget constraints given the disciplinary effect that 
market would exercise: if a firm is not viable or makes wrong 
investment of financing decisions it goes out of the market. 
Nonetheless because a bank knows it is TBTF, its budget 
constraints would soften and furthermore it would not be able 
to commit to a safer funding scheme45. 
Lastly a TBTF bank may tend to abuse of its market power and 
set prices uncorrelated to their actual cost for the bank46. 
 
So the question would now be why they do arise and why 
                                                 
44  See Cihak M. et al., Who disciplines banks’ managers?, IMF working paper 
n. 272, 2009, in www.imf.org 
45 Colombo E., Valentinyi A., Subsidies, Soft budget constraints and financial 
market imperfections, 2002, working paper available at 
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/pdf/pubblicazioni/Wp50_02.pdf, 
consider rather the impossibility to commit to “a specified financing 
scheme”. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), consider the SBC problem as 
endogenous to specified institutions, such as Sate owned enterprises and 
banks, and as a dynamic incentive problem where a funding source (a 
government or a bank) cannot commit to keep an enterprise to a fixed 
initial budget. See Dewatripont M., Maskin E., Credit efficiency in 
centralized and decentralized economies, in Review of economic studies, 
issue 35, 1995, 541-555. Their model has been further developed by 
Dewatripont M., Roland G., Soft budget constraint, transition and financial 
system, 1999,  in www.ssrn.com. The idea of soft budget constraints as a 
problem of refinancing loss making enterprises has been first coined and 
applied to socialist economies by Kornai J., Resource-constrained versus 
demand-constrained systems, in Econometrica, issue 47, 1979, 801-819.  
46  See Taleb, 2009 
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regulators made this happen.  
The first answer is very simple (as the second though): this 
structure allow them to amplify their profits, to regulatory 
arbitrate, to exploit more favorable taxation system and tax 
loopholes as well as to exploit the benefits of limited liability of 
each company. 
But foremost they can at the same time consolidate as well as 
diversify their activities. In fact, bank diversification is usually 
advocated in financial intermediation theories as a way to 
increase loans monitoring as well as it enables the bank to 
finance illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. However, 
discrepancy between the theory of financial intermediation 
and empirical findings must be acknowledged47 
As Avgouleas et al. (2010) said: «banks try to have the best of 
both of words: exploiting the benefits of the legal structure and 
exploiting the synergies of operating as an integrated group»48  
So now we come at the second question: Why regulators make 
this happen? 
This may be mainly attributed on the one hand to economic 
and entrepreneurial freedom but on the other to political 
economy reasons. In fact States commitment not to bail out big 
banks lacks of credibility.  
This lack of credibility is just the other side of the spectrum of 
what Prescott and Kydland called the time inconsistency 
problem49.  
                                                 
47
 As Cerasi and Daltung did. Their explanation to the discrepancy is 
explained by the fact that thory does not consider the issue of banks’ 
intenrnal organisations: since there is a limit to the number of projects 
one person can monitor, monitoring more loans entails overload costs. 
See, Cerasi V., Daltung S., The optimal size of a bank: costs and benefits of 
diversification, in «European Economic Review», 44, 2000, 1701-1726. 
48
 And their conclusion is that «faced with a complex and opaque structure, 
Authorities have little choice but to rescue the whole bank if it is 
needed». See Avgouleas et al., Living wills as a catalyst for action, DSF 
Policy Paper, May 2010, available at www.ssrn.com 
49 See Kydland F., Prescott E., Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency 
of optimal plans, in «Journal of political econom»y,  85, 1977, 473-492 
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The problem States face with banks, can be considered similar 
to what faced by governments when dealing with terrorists. 
Let’s recall a brilliant example from Mankiw’ class notes about 
negotiating with terrorists over the release of hostages.  
The announced policy of many nations is that they will not 
negotiate over hostages. Such an announcement is intended to 
deter terrorists: if there is nothing to be gained from 
kidnapping hostages, rational terrorists won't kidnap any.  
In other words, the purpose of the announcement is to 
influence the expectations of terrorists and thereby their 
behavior. 
 
But, in fact, unless the policymakers are credibly committed to 
the policy, the announcement has little effect. Terrorists know 
that once hostages are taken, policymakers face an 
overwhelming temptation to make some concession to obtain 
the hostages' release. The only way to deter rational terrorists 
is to take away the discretion of policymakers and commit 
them to a rule of never negotiating. If policymakers were truly 
unable to make concessions, the incentive for terrorists to take 
hostages would be largely eliminated50. 
In our case, despite best governments’ efforts, when a big bank 
is about to fail, the treat of systemic risks and depositors 
consequences may persuade States to intervene. 
On their side, uninsured creditors and shareholders 
understand that policymakers have incentive to renege and 
thus will not monitor banks’ behavior adequately, contributing 
to the TBTF vicious circle.   
 
 
2.4. The (ab)use of leverage by TBTF institutions. Some 
insights over banks' funding preferences 
 
In the last decades the seminal theorem by Modigliani and 
                                                 
50Available at http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/04/time-
inconsistency.html 
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Miller51 has been used to explain why, under certain 
conditions, the choice between debt rather than equity in the 
funding structure of a firm would be indifferent. The theorem 
is the result of four layers of analysis, the first stating that 
basically a firm's debt-equity ratio does not affect its market 
value, the second saying that a firm's leverage has no effect on 
its weighted average cost of capital, the third that a firm 
market value is independent on its dividend policy and lastly 
that equity holders are indifferent about the firm's financial 
policy52. 
The conditions under which those conclusions hold are that: 
1. taxation system is neutral; 2) there are no frictions in the 
market (e.g. no transaction and bankruptcy costs); 3) there is 
symmetric access to credit markets; 4) there are no information 
asymmetries and finally 5) firms can be included into risky 
classes.  
Actually, the taxation issue has been reviewed by the Authors 
admitting that under a certain taxation code, the optimal 
capital structure could be complete debt finance, however, they 
argue, higher taxes on interest payments than on equity 
returns reduce or eliminate the advantage of debt finance to 
the firms.  Therefore the indifference between equity and debt 
remains unfold.  
Those assumptions have given rise to a maze of studies of 
economic scholars, such as the trade off and pecking order 
theories, focused on the investigation of the optimal capital 
structure, agency costs, complete or incomplete contracting 
possibilities, dividend policy, and methods of capital finance, 
whether lease or buy.  
 
                                                 
51 Modigliani F., Miller M. H., The cost of capital, corporate finance and the 
theory of investment, in American Economic Review, issue 48, 1958, 261-
297 
52 See Modigliani-Miller (1958); Modigliani F., Miller M.H., Corporate 
income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction, in American Economic 
Review, issue 53, 1963, 433-443; Miller M. H., Debt and Taxes, in Journal 
of finance, issue 32, 1977, 261-275. 
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Nonetheless the “even footedness”53, or the frictionless world, 
of the M-M theorem cannot hold for LCBO.   
Banks in fact, do care about getting funded by debt rather then 
equities. The choice is indeed influenced by bankruptcy costs, 
agency costs and taxes. Furthermore banks' liability structure 
is highly regulated through capital adequacy standards, hence 
the choice between the two's may be driven by considerations 
related to the eligibility of those instruments into their core 
capital. 
Furthermore, most recent economic theories explain that the 
banks' capital structure affects its liquidity creation, its credit 
creation functions and its stability54. However, according to Du 
and Li (2007)55, banks also rescue enterprises that are on the 
verge of bankruptcy. This in turn gives State even more 
incentive to intervene and regulate banks’ capital to avoid 
them being financially unviable.  
Consequently, the capital structure should be a trade off 
between the effects that banking capital has in relation to 
depositors, borrowers and bank's liquidity, namely should 
consider that more capital increases the rent absorbed by the 
banker, increases the buffers against shocks and changes the 
amount that can be extracted from borrowers, plus should take 
into account government's choices over capital regulation56.  
 
So, what are the determinants that influence large banks to 
choose their optimal level of funding?  
First and foremost are regulatory considerations. 
In facts worldwide banks should fulfill the requirements on the 
constituents of capital and on their risk weighted approach 
                                                 
53 See, Villamil A. P., The Modigliani Miller Theorem, in the New Palgrave 
dictionary of economic, Palgrave MacMillan, second edition, 2008,  
54 See Diamond D. W., Rajan R., A theory of bank capital, at Journal of 
Finance, vol. LV, issue 6, 2000, 2431-2465  
55  Du J., Li D. D., The soft budget constraint of banks, at Journal of 
Comparative economics, issue 35, 2007, 108-135.  
56 Nonetheless the same SBC faced by banks give raise to moral hazard 
problems. 
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established by the Basel Committee of Banking supervision, a 
committee comprising the representatives of the major banking 
supervisory authorities and central banks57.   
The Basel accord divides capital into two main classes, plus a 
discretionary one: tier 1, tier 2 and tier 3.  
Great emphasis is given to equity capital and disclosed 
reserves. According to Basel’s promoters/extensors this capital 
is “the only element common to all countries’ banking systems; 
it is wholly visible in the published accounts and is the basis 
on which most market judgments of capital adequacy are 
made and it has a crucial bearing on profit margins and a 
bank’s ability to compete.”58   
Eligible tier 1 capital must therefore make up at least 50% of 
total capital –is comprised essentially of shareholder equity 
and published reserves from post-tax retained earnings. Tier 2 
capital admits a variety of forms of term subordinated debt 
and hybrid capital instruments (though according to their 
actual shape and national legislations’ provisions they can be 
considered as tier 1 as well), and undisclosed reserves, 
revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan loss 
reserves: those elements will be admitted into tier 2 limited to 
100% of Tier 1  
Lastly, tier 3 capital –whose prevision is left to national 
regulators’ discretion –is given basically by short term 
subordinated debt covering market risk for the sole purpose of 
meeting a proportion of the capital requirements for market 
risk under certain conditions, namely: i) it shall be use only to 
cover market risks in addition to tier 1 and tier 2; ii) it will be 
limited to 250% of a bank’s Tier 1 capital that is required to 
support market risks. This means that a minimum of about 
28½% of market risks needs to be supported by tier 1 capital 
                                                 
57  From Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
58  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence 
of capital measurement and capital standards. A revised framework-
Comprehensive Version, June 2006, p. 14, in www.bis.org  
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that is not required to support risks in the remainder of the 
book. 
To be eligible, instruments have to fulfill supervisory rules 
regarding their characteristics and are subjected to limits 
concerning the amount that can be admitted as regulatory 
capital. As a matter of example, tier 1 instruments must contain 
provisions for cancellation of dividend payments, deferred 
dividends should be non cumulative, should be subordinated 
to all debt, and they should not be of fixed maturity. There is 
not a maximum threshold of tier 1 capital, however if banks 
want to consider their preferred stocks as redeemable, those 
stocks can be used only up to 15% of total capital.  
In order for tier 2 instruments to be loss absorbing, their 
payments should be deferrable and principal and interest 
should be written down, -the instruments fulfilling those 
characteristics have been called “upper tier 2” and need to be 
subordinated to all debt. Whereas, what has been called “lower 
tier 2” includes fixed maturity subordinated debt with a 
minimum initial maturity of 5 years and that is generally 
amortised in its final five years of maturity. This lower tier 2 
cannot exceed 50% of tier 1 capital. 
Tier 3 capital has minimum maturity of 2 years, cannot be 
amortised and ranks pari passu with lower tier 2. Tier 2 and tier 
3 capital cannot exceed 100% of tier 1. Finally tier 1 must reach 
at least 4% of the risk weighted approach and the total capital 
base must reach 8%59. 
Furthermore loans, and more general banks’ obligations, are 
grouped into baskets according to their risk classifications and 
are given a weight to the underlying risk, which must be taken 
into account when calculating the solvency ratio. The same is 
done for off balance sheet obligations that are grouped into 
baskets with different conversion factors. 
Given that the Basel accord is applicable worldwide, we must 
                                                 
59  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Markets for bank 
subordinated debt and equity in Basel Committee member countries, BIS 
working paper n. 12, 2003, in www.bis.org, p. 4-6, 
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consider this piece of regulation as the first constraint banks 
face when dealing with funding decisions.  
Nonetheless, once banks have fulfilled those obligations, and 
generally they hold even more capital than the specified 
thresholds, the Basel accord leaves banks room for maneuver 
to manage their balance sheet as they wish.  
One portion of this management can be considered as an 
unintended consequence of such regulatory requirements, 
because under the Basel accord banks may have incentive to 
bring part of their liabilities off balance. Another portion of 
such procedure is due in response to changes in anticipated 
risk and asset prices which are allowed by the mark-to-market 
valuation of assets60. Furthermore, according to the Basel 
accord banks may be approved by national supervisors to use 
VaR models (Value at Risk)61 to estimate price volatility of their 
exposures62: such models –which give the institution’s worst 
case loss estimate –seem to allow for great management of the 
balance sheet63.    
                                                 
60  The Basel accord defines this accounting procedure as “at least the daily 
valuation of positions at readily available close out prices that are 
sourced independently. Examples of readily available close out prices 
include exchange prices, screen prices, or quotes from several 
independent reputable brokers. Banks must mark-to-market as much as 
possible. The more prudent side of bid/offer must be used unless the 
institution is a significant market maker in a particular position type and 
it can close out at mid market”. See Basel Committee, (2006), sec. 693. 
61  According to the agreed definition of Value at Risk, it corresponds, 
within a determined time horizon T to the smallest non-negative 
number V such that the estimated probability that a bank’s loss is greater 
than V is less than some benchmark probability p. See Panetta et al., The 
recent behavior of financial market volatility, BIS working paper n. 29, 2006. 
In clearer terms, VaR is the maximum potential loss that would result 
from a price change with a given probability over a specified time 
horizon. 
62  See Basel Committee, (2006), sec. 178.  
63  Interestingly enough, the introduction of VaR models stems from the 
October 1987 crisis and comes from the private sector. In 1989 Dennis 
Weatherstone, JP Morgan’s chairman at the time, called for a report 
which combined all of the firm’s data on market risk in one place and 
was able to answer the following question: “how much could JPM lose if 
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The overall consequence is the banks’ ability to “play with 
leverage”, namely to transform their liabilities into new 
sources of (short term) funding either passing them to a Special 
Purpose Vehicle or creating new fancy financial instruments by 
decomposing liabilities and rebuilding together the different 
slices of the original loans. This process however requires 
banks to give loans to more borrowers and has as a side effect 
an increase in the size of the bank. It is a vicious circle. 
Let us explain the leverage effect in greater details64. 
By definition leverage is the ratio between bank’s total assets 
and bank’s book equity (given by the difference between debts 
and assets, namely its net worth) and allows banks to borrow 
money against the expected value of their liabilities. The main 
features of leverage are its procyclicality and its correlation to 
balance sheet size. This means that the balance sheet 
adjustments increase or decrease the leverage value according 
to the economic cycle: in other words, leverage effect is high 
(i.e. banks can borrow more money) during booms (because 
their adjusted balance sheet values are high) and low during 
busts (because of the decreased value of their balance sheet 
hence of the collateral they borrow against in the market). 
                                                                                                                 
tomorrow turns out to be a relatively bad day?”. Not surprisingly JPM 
was the earliest developer and earliest adopter of the VaR. As referred 
by Aldane G. H., Why banks failed the stress test, speech given at the 
Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress Testing, 13 february 2009, available 
at www.bankofengland.co.uk: «by 1996 they had published their 
methodology and the detail of the parameterization of their risk models. 
In 1998 RiskMetrics Group, an independent for-profit business, spun off 
the JP Morgan methodology and began offering consultancy services to 
the risk management community». From then onwards it has been 
widely accepted even in the “regulatory community”.  
64  This explanation is based upon: Lang L. et al., Leverage, investment and 
firm growth, Stern school of business working paper, no. FD 94-41, 1994; 
Greenlaw D. et al., Leverage losses, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Report n. 328, 2008, in www.nyfed.us; Inderst R., Mueller H. M., 
Bank capital structure and credit decisions, in Journal of financial 
intermediation, issue 7, 2008, 295-314; Adrian T., Shin H. S., Liquidity and 
leverage, in Journal of financial intermediation, in press, corrected proof, 
2010  
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Accordingly, leverage is negatively correlated with VaR 
models, since when they signal an increase in the worst cases 
losses, banks’ ability to get new funds decreases, whereas 
leverage effect is high when values at measured risks are low.  
The above has a very simple meaning: leverage acts as a 
financial accelerator mechanism of a given situation in the 
market; however it affects the system at aggregate level, 
namely impacts all the bank’s counterparties. 
The body of literature that has dealt with the subject always 
considers the following example, which is based on the 
assumption that a bank aims at maintaining a constant level of 
leverage65: 
take a bank with assets 100 and liabilities 90, its net worth 
would be 10 and its leverage would be: 
 
L= (Total assets/net worth) 100/10=10 
 
Suppose now an increase in the price of securities by 1, 
bringing total assets value to 101, in such a case our example 
becomes: assets 101, liabilities 90, net value 11, leverage: 
 
L 101/11=9.18 
 
Which means that if the bank wants to keep the above leverage 
value it should get more funds (D) to purchase securities –
funds that will obtain because its net value is increased, but 
how much should the bank borrow? 
 
 
L= (101+D)/11=10  
where D  (101+D)/11 x 11= 10x11 
101+D= 110 
D=110-101 
D=9 
                                                 
65  It is outside the scope of the example introduce a deleveraging effect 
indeed. 
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Hence the institution needs to take additional debt by 9 to 
restore its initial level of leverage. But you can already grasp 
the dangerous uncorrelation between 1 unit of extra assets 
against 9 units of extra debt66. 
If we carry on with the exercise we see that the demand curve 
is upward sloping67. 
 
Conversely, the opposite case leads to analogous results: 
consider a shock negatively affecting initial assets prices by 1. 
We have total assets 99, liabilities 90, net value 9 but the 
leverage becomes:  
 
L 99/9= 11 
 
which is now too high, forcing the bank to sell assets (by 9) to 
get back to the old value, having its initial capital decreased of 
roughly 10%: now bank would have assets 90, liabilities 
decreased because of the transaction 81, the total value 
diminished  to 9 and finally  
 
L 90/9=10 
 
If we carry on we see that the supply curve is downward 
sloping 
 
The overall example implies basically that once an event 
occurs, leverage drives the institution to take extra actions that 
                                                 
66  Of course bank could issue new equities to get funded, but the observed 
tendency is rather on taking over new debt, maybe because the former 
may be more costly than the latter and because it would dilute the value 
of shares of existing shareholders. On the contrary however debt holders 
may ask for specific rights, but this does not seem a great problem since 
the institution has plenty of debt instruments to issue that do not 
actually carry any right rather than capital reimbursement.    
67  See Greenlaw D. et al., (2008), 39. 
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amplify the effect of the event because of the linkages between 
shock and asset dynamics, causing a chain reaction.  
In fact, assuming both that the shock itself is procyclical and 
that banks want to have a constant level of leverage, when 
banks are highly leveraged, a shock as a reduction in asset 
prices induce massive asset liquidation, accentuating the price 
fall and possibly starting a vicious circle. In principle, the 
mechanism is symmetrical: an initial positive shock may lead 
to a broad rise in asset prices and hence to an expansion of 
intermediaries’ balance sheets, starting a positive circle.  
In other words, because banks make large use of leverage (and 
a TBTF institution makes even greater use of it) their lending 
are positively correlated to their credit losses because they 
need to restore their balance sheet. This means that in presence 
of a shock they may need to heavily engage in debt 
transactions, increasing their vulnerability to financial distress. 
Lastly, the greater the institution is the biggest would be the 
leverage-amplifying effects, even because leverage is strictly 
interwined with other factors, all present in a TBTF 
institutions, such as network externalities, strategic behavior of 
large players, contagion in the interbank markets and within 
the same institution and so on and so forth68.  
 
Though some empirical evidence may question                                                        
the actual high level of leverage banks hold, it is a fact that 
                                                 
68  In fact, due to the recent financial turmoil, the Bank for international 
Settlement has issues a consultative document wherein it proposes to 
introduce a capital ratio requirement that “put a floor under the build 
up of leverage (…) thus helping to mitigate the risk of the destabilizing 
deleveraging processes” and “introduce additional safeguards against 
model risk and measurement error by supplementing the risk based 
measure with a simple, transparent, independent measure of risk that is 
based on gross exposures”. According to the document, “the leverage 
ratio will be calculated in a comparable manner across jurisdictions 
adjusting for any remaining differences in accounting standards, (…). 
There will be appropriate testing of its interaction with the risk based 
measure”. See BIS, Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector, 
Consultative document, December 2009, 6. 
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they do use leverage69. In fact, not only the indebtedness of 
such institutions is much greater than their own capital but the 
use they make of such debt capital may lead to their final 
instability. 
This consequence has been clearly explained by Minsky 
(1993)70, who also provides such a plain definition of leverage 
that is worth to be mentioned, though he doesn’t actually even 
call it leverage. He says:  
 
              “The capital development of a capitalist economy is 
accompanied by exchanges of present money for future money. 
The present money pays for resources that go into the 
production of investment output, whereas the future money is 
the “profits” which will accrue to the capital assets owning 
firms (...). As a result of the process by which investment is 
financed the control over items in the capital stock by 
production unit is financed by liabilities ---these are 
commitments to pay money at dates specified or at conditions 
arise. For each economic unit, the liabilities on its balance sheet 
determine a time series of prior payment commitments, even 
as the assets generate a time series of conjuctured cash 
receipts”.  
 
 
Its financial instability hypothesis is therefore a theory of the 
impact of debt on system behavior and also incorporates the 
manner in which debt is validated. To this end, he classifies 
economic institutions in three classes of debtors, according to 
their income/debt balance sheet structure: hedge, speculative 
                                                 
69 Lang L., Ofek E., Stulz R., (1994), seem to establish a positive correlation 
between leverage and growth for firms with good investment 
opportunities. See Lang et al., Leverage, Investment and Firm Growth, April 
1994, at 
http://archive.nyu.edu/fda/bitstream/2451/27272/2/wpa94041.pdf 
70  See Minsky H.P., The financial instability hypothesis, in Handbook of 
Radical Political Economy, eds. by Arestis P. and Sawyer M., Edward 
Elgar, Aldershot, 1993.   
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and Ponzi finance.   
Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their 
contractual relationships by their cash flow; speculative 
finance units are units that can meet their payment 
commitments on “income accounts” on their liabilities, even as 
they cannot repay the principle out of income cash flow: such 
units need to roll over their liabilities (e.g. issue new debt to 
meet commitments on maturing debt), and finally Ponzi unit 
are those units whose cash flows from operations are not 
sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the 
interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flow from 
operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow to pay interest, 
however both operations would led to a decline of the equity 
value of a unit even as it would increase liabilities and the 
prior commitment of future incomes. A unit that Ponzi finances 
lowers the margin of safety that it offers the holders of its 
debts. 
It is unquestionable that current characteristics/models of 
banking intermediation made those institutions and other 
similar players closer to speculative and Ponzi units rather 
than hedging units, as it would have been the case in the last 
decades. However, as Minsky puts it, the greater the weight of 
speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that 
the economy is a deviation amplifying system.  
Such particular financing regime of the economy makes the 
system unstable.  
 
 
2.5 Systemic risk and cross border externalities: a new 
paradigm 
 
From what explained thus far stem the main channels for 
contagion in case of crisis within the group: financial and non 
financial exposures, common ownership, payment settlement, 
money market disruption affecting banks’ funding structure.  
Theoretically, in case of crisis those features may stay at group 
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level, may not spread to other market participants and may be 
resolved accordingly. In fact, because of regulatory constraints 
there are maximum levels of mutual exposures banks can have 
(and that are relatively small compared to their balance sheet) 
and if the risk is idiosyncratic in nature it should not cause the 
failure of the LCBO’s counterparties71. Furthermore, empirical 
studies show that in order for an ailing bank to be the direct 
and immediate consequence of other banking crisis the shock 
must be of implausible magnitude72.  
Nonetheless, historically contagion has always been explained 
as the possibility that a shock affecting one institution spreads 
over other banks because of the funding structure of the 
financial players. In fact, in its simplest scheme, bank A borrow 
money from bank B which in turn borrow money from bank C 
and so on: 
 
 
Table 1: Interbank Loans 
 
                                                 
71 As explained by Helwege A., Financial firm bankruptcy and systemic risk, 
August 2009, in www.psu.edu  
72 Also, must initially involve a large bank, must have caused a large 
decline in the value of its assets and eventually the losses imposed on 
creditors must be a large fraction of their assets. See Helwege (2009), p. 
15. See also Jorion P., Zhang G., Credit contagion from counterparty risk, in 
Journal of Finance, 2009, 2053-2087. 
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Should bank C 
experience a hit on its balance sheet, it may want to withdraw 
its credits from bank B, both to remain solvent and to comply 
with capital regulatory requirements. From bank B 
perspective, the payment to C may decrease its liquidity and 
may give bank B incentive to withdraw its lending to bank A. 
The same reasoning applies to bank A and to the overall 
system that may be induced to think at the existence of a 
problem somewhere in the net and may shrink its lending 
activities to other players. The consequence of a somewhat 
prudent behavior from a bank may be at best a funding 
liquidity crisis. 
However this model seems to be somehow too simple, so we 
want to go beyond it, to have a more complete and extensive 
framework to understand what the main determinants of 
contagion between banks (also known as systemic risk73) 
                                                 
73 However before proceeding we must warn the reader that the  
definition of systemic risk is still somehow unsettled. In fact there seems to 
be no clear consensus over, e.g., which event can be considered systemic, or 
when a negative externality can be considered as such, or whether the 
trigger should affect the market as a whole or only financial players. For 
example, systemic risk has been defined as “the probability that cumulative 
losses will occur from an event that ignites a series of successive losses 
along a chain of financial institutions or markets comprising a system” 
(Kaufman 1996) or as “the potential for a modest economic shock to induce 
substantial volatility in asset prices, significant reductions in corporate 
liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency losses” (Kupiec, Nickerson, 
2004), or “the risk that a default from one market participant will have 
repercussions on other participants due to the interlocking nature of 
financial markets” (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2008), as 
pointed out by Schwarcz S. L., Systemic Risk, Duke Law School Research 
Paper n. 163, 2008, in www.ssrn.com, or lately as “the joint failure risk 
arising from the correlation of returns on asset side of banks balance sheet”, 
(Acharya V. V., A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential regulation, at 
Journal of Financial Stability, issue 5, 2009, 224-255) or as a default 
correlation (Rampini A., Default Correlation, Northwestern University 
Working Paper, 1999). Nonetheless, the proposed definitions have 
something in common, that would be our starting point, namely the 
correlation of a trigger event to bad economic consequences.  Furthermore 
we must recall that a run can occur even if the bank is fundamentally 
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actually are.  
Hence, we must first recall banks funding structure, than 
understand why liquidity issues are as important as systemic 
concerns, and then surveying models of financial contagion to 
understand whether they do actually take into account some 
distinctive features of banks balance sheet, namely mark-to-
market and VaR models. We will finally get back to our TBTF 
institutions to understand whether they are more “special” 
then other banks and lastly see if the usual model of systemic 
risk is suited to cross border institutions.  
 
As we said in the previous sections, banks suffer of maturity 
mismatches, tend to make great use of liabilities, can have a 
“dynamic balance sheet” adjustable according to changes in 
market values, their leverage acts as an amplifier of any event 
(boom or bust) and its prociclicality can have an adverse 
impact over funding decisions. 
Here we must add the concepts of margins/haircuts and 
liquidity shortage.  When banks purchase assets, they use 
those as collateral to get short term money, which however 
cannot be entirely funded by the purchased assets, but should 
be marginally financed by bank's own equity. Those 
margins/haircuts are hence given by the difference between the 
amount borrowed and the amount covered by the collateral's 
value. Such haircuts are particularly sensitive to shocks, even if 
short term, because if banks cannot get more short term 
money, the whole previously borrowed amount becomes 
margin or better, should be completely payed back (rolled 
over) with banks' own equities.  
If the problem shows up in the different funding channels of 
the bank, the latter may run out of liquidity since it had to use 
its available money to roll over its debts. Consequently, for 
banks heavily relying on short term transactions, a liquidity 
                                                                                                                 
solvent as a run occurring in anticipation of a run, as explained by 
Calomiris C., Mason J., Contagion and bank failures during the Great 
Depression: the June 1932 Chicago Banking panic, at American Economic 
Review, issue 87, 1997, 863-883. 
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shortage may arise when the hit involves different funding 
channels (as happened to Northern Rock for example),  is too 
costly for the bank to borrow money elsewhere and is not 
convenient selling off its assets due to a possible 
underestimation (fire sales). Besides, the same asset sale would 
be of little help because it would possibly happen in already 
illiquid markets: in fact liquidity shortages do not happen in a 
vacuum but involve many institutions, and -also because of 
mark to market adjustments -the shortage may thus have as a 
primary consequence a severe deterioration in the bank's 
balance sheet.  
This is why some attribute the risk of funding liquidity to 
maturity mismatches and say that “it can take three forms: 1) 
margin/haircut funding risk, or the risk that margin/haircut 
will change; 2) rollover risk, or the risk that it will be more 
costly or impossible to roll over short term borrowings; and 3) 
redemption risk , or the risk that demand depositors of banks 
or even equity holders withdraw funds. All three incarnations 
of funding liquidity risk are only detrimental when assets must 
be sold only at fire-sale prices that is, when market liquidity is 
low.”74   
The above explanation hence takes indirectly account of one 
important channel for contagion: counterparty risk. In fact, we 
have explained thus far anything but the impact of a negative 
event over bank's accounts. What we need to understand now 
is how this impact would affect other institutions and the 
consequence of such transmission on the system as a whole. 
Before, however, we still have to define the kind of risk that 
may be relevant for our purposes.  
In fact not any event may be systemic, as having knock on 
effects on other players: only those having shocks and 
propagation elements in itself have some relevance for the 
study of contagion effects. We would not consider, for 
example, failures confined to single institutions or to single 
                                                 
74 See Brunnermeier et al., The fundamental principles of Financial regulation, 
ICMB eds, at www.cepr.org, p. 12  
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market fragments that do not impact badly the market or other 
institutions, as well as we are not interested in those events 
that -although may be seen as systemic -have weak effects (no 
failures or crashes) on the system. 
According to De Bandt and Hartmann (2000)75, the definition 
of systemic events can have a narrow and a broad meaning: the 
narrow sense comprises the cases where “the release of bad 
news about a financial institution, or even its failure, or the 
crash of a financial market leads in a sequential fashion to 
considerable adverse effects on one or several other financial 
institutions or markets”76 e.g. crashes or failures, whereas the 
broad meaning includes “not only the events described above 
but also simultaneous adverse effects on a large number of 
institutions or markets as a consequence of severe and 
widespread shock”77. 
Besides, corporate finance teaches us that shocks can be 
idiosyncratic or systematic. We anticipated the meaning of the 
former, as an event that affects the single institution or the 
price of a single asset category, whereas the latter is a shock 
that impact the financial system as a whole78. Usually, 
idiosyncratic shocks may be covered by a sort of insurance by 
the bank e.g. via asset or counterparties diversification, 
whereas systemic shocks are more difficult to insure. 
Furthermore the knock on effects those events have, are 
increased by the endogenous fragility of the system where they 
realise. In fact we have seen thus far that financial sector is 
more vulnerable than other sectors because of the role played 
by information asymmetries, of the specialty of banks and of 
the tight interconnections between players. 
To sum up, an event can be considered systemic when its 
realisation has had as a consequence the impairment of the 
                                                 
75 See De Bandt O. Hartmann P., Systemic risk:  a survey, ECB working 
paper n. 35, 2000, available at www.ecb.int 
76 Ivi, 10 
77 Ivi, 10 
78 Or the whole economy, as for example in case of business cycles 
fluctuation or currency crisis. 
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smooth functioning of the related market or institutions, it 
doesn't matter whether it is idiosyncratic or systemic. To give a 
few examples, it could be a liquidity shortage, the freezing of 
funding channels, a severe asset depreciation, an assets 
downgrade, currency crisis, cyclical downturns and so on.  
 
In the economic literature, bank runs have been explained first 
as single-bank problem, and only -relatively- recently have 
been extended to multiple bank systems.  
The most important contributions have as starting point the 
consideration of banks as deposit takers. To this extent, they 
can be divided into two categories: one that considers runs as a 
coordination failure among depositors and the other considers 
runs as the consequence of asymmetric information among 
depositors over the bank fundamentals. 
 
The first stream – to whom the so called Diamond and Dybvig 
model79 belongs – considers basically runs as “self fulfilling 
prophecies”80.  
According to this strand81 banks have a liquidity premium over 
their investments whereas depositors have a pay off externality 
due to the possibility that no money is left to the bank when 
they want to withdraw. The lack of coordination arises because 
since depositors do not take out their money simultaneously 
                                                 
79 See Diamond D. V., Dybvig P., Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity,at 
Journal of Political Economy, issue 91(3), 1983, 401-419.   
80 Before this result, runs were considered as purely random events 
unrelated to changes in the real economy. See Kindleberger C. P., Manias, 
Panics and Crashes: a history of financial crisis, Basic Books, New York, 
1978. 
81 Other contributors include, Waldo D.G., Bank runs, the deposit currency 
ratio and the interest rate, in Journal of Monetary Economics, issue 5, 1985, 
269-277; Bryant J., Model of reserves, bank runs and deposit insurance, at 
Journal of banking and finance, issue 5, 1980, 335-344; Postlewaite A., 
Vives X., Bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon, at Journal of political 
economy, issue 95, 1987, 485-491; Goldstayn I., Pauzner A., Demand 
deposit contracts and the probability of bank runs, at Journal of  Finance, 
issue 60, 2005, 1293-1327.  
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(early and late withdrawals), the fear of early withdrawals by a 
too large number of depositors may trigger a run on the bank 
as a “sunspot” event, namely as if the uncertainty on 
depositors' preference creates the run. 
However, those sunspot events seem to be inconsistent because 
they are both   likely and unlikely, in the sense that depositors 
may or may not fear the possibility of being in the late queue, 
moreover, since financial contagion is usually modeled as an 
equilibrium phenomenon82, in equilibrium both solutions are 
possible, so maybe stronger assumption may be better suited 
to explain the run.  
 
The second strand is more focused on information 
asymmetries between players. Indeed it is a truism that 
information plays a crucial role in determining depositors' 
behaviors. If an information is released that put into question 
bank's viability, depositors may run to withdraw their 
deposits, both in case of  incomplete  information (where 
however runs may be rational but inefficient)  and even more 
in case of complete information (where run could be rational 
and efficient), as shown by Gorton (1985)83. Other studies link 
the depositors' behavior to an imperfect information received, 
related to a risky investment made by the bank, and hence 
distinguish between those whose claims are based on equities 
and those based on deposits84.  
In any event it is useful to underline that information signals 
may involve   depositors, and in such case the consequence 
may be the bank run, and markets expectations, and then asset 
depreciation and prices fluctuation can be experienced. 
Information can have as object the health of a financial 
                                                 
82 See Allen F., Gale D., Financial Contagion, in Journal of political economy, 
vol 108, n. 1, 2000, 1-33; Postlewaite and Vives, (1987). 
83 Gorton G., Bank suspension of convertibility, in Journal of monetary 
economics, issue 5, 1985, 177-193. 
84 See Jacklin C., Bhattacharya S., Distinguishing Panics and information-based 
runs: welfare and policy implications, in Journal of political economy, issue 
96, 1988, 568-592. 
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institution, and here may take the form of a full revelation or of 
a noisy signal, or may be a signal that generally coordinates the 
expectation of investors, without being actually related to the 
institution's health.   
However, those studies do not really consider the propagation 
mechanisms to other institutions. 
 
Such possibility has been investigated first by Garber and Grilli 
(1989)85 that extended the Waldo model to a two country open 
economy,  demonstrating that a run in one country would led 
to fire sales of long term securities to the second country and to 
higher interests rates there, whereas De Bandt (1995)86 applied 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya model to a multiple banking system 
and considered how an aggregate and idiosyncratic shock 
affects the return on different banks' assets, as explained by De 
Brandt and Hartman (2000).  
Allen and Gale (2000) explain the contagion as a drawback of 
regional (whereby region is a metaphor for categories of banks 
that may differ along several dimensions) overlapping claims 
between banks. In fact, in principle there are constant levels of 
liquidity as regions with liquidity surpluses provide liquidity 
for regions with liquidity shortages (through interregional 
cross holdings of deposits). However if there is an excessive 
demand for liquidity banks are forced to liquidate their assets: 
long run ones are costly to liquidate, so banks will liquidate 
their claims in other regions but since this mutual liquidation 
of claims do not create extra liquidity but oppositely it denies 
liquidity to the troubled region, what begins as a financial 
crisis in one region can spread by contagion to other regions 
because of the cross holdings of deposits, thus “the financial 
linkages caused by these cross holdings can turn out to be a 
                                                 
85 See Garber P.M., Grilli V.U., Bank runs in open economies and the 
international transmission of panics, in Journal of international economics, 
issue 27, 1989, 165-175 
86 See, De Bandt O., Competition among financial intermediaries and the risk of 
contagious failures, in Notes d'Etudes et de Recherches, no.30, 1995, at 
www.banquefrance.fr 
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disaster”87. Nonetheless their model can work only in 
incomplete markets, with strong linkages, whereas the same 
result (i.e. contagion) is not proved in complete markets or in 
incomplete ones with light tights between regions88. Lastly, free 
riding problem plays a crucial role as well in explaining the 
differences between complete and incomplete interbanking 
markets, since in the latter banks in regions other than the ones 
hit by the crisis pursue their own interest and refuse to 
liquidate their own assets until they find themselves on the 
front line of the contagion89. 
However the complete assumption is not realistic in nature 
since interconnections are not possible in all the states of the 
world because of transaction and information costs, because of 
business specialisations or geographical or political reasons. 
 
If we go beyond those cornerstone economic papers, we see 
that all those that followed have identified 3 main sources of 
contagion among banks:  
 
 information asymmetries; 
 linkages between banks; 
 payment and settlement risk. 
 
As far as the information asymmetries is concerned, we have 
already given an overview of how information effects are 
extremely important. Here we just want to add that the release 
of a bad signal related to institutions can influence the 
behavior of all the depositors fearing that their bank as well 
may be in troubles or that they be in the late queue and hence 
there may be no money left,  so they run on their own bank, 
whatever it is. This eventually implies that even fundamentally 
solvent banks can face troubles because of a noisy signal. 
                                                 
87 See Allen and Gale, (2000), p. 4. 
88 Complete markets are those where a given region y can hold deposit in 
every other region, whereas incomplete are those where banks in region 
y are allowed to hold deposits in some but not all of the other regions. 
89 See Allen and Gale (2000), p.5. 
 51  
Conversely, if the signal involves markets segments, all the 
institutions anyhow linked to that segment may face financial 
problems and the uncertainty about their counterparty 
exposure to that event may trigger irrational behaviors within 
the institutions, such as the closure of interbanking markets. In 
this sense, information based contagion seems to be strictly 
interwined with mutual confidence. 
However, it is also possible that the run is caused by the 
disclosure of some information on a fact that has been hidden 
for long time to the market/counterparty, i.e., reckless lending 
and bad loans, (over)valuation of stock prices and fixed rate 
exchange levels not in line with real economic fundamentals. 
 
As for network connections within banks, we have seen how 
one bank's behavior, maybe due to solvency reasons, can cause 
a hit on all other banks' balance sheets.  
Here we must add that the above contagion model needs to be 
refined because it implies a static view of banks and market 
behavior, as if  banks do not take any action to correct the 
problem, such as asset sales or withdrawal of other credits, and 
markets do not reply correspondingly. 
On the contrary they do take actions, but those action are 
systematically (i.e. for the system) counterproductive: in fact 
we have seen the insurgence of sales to get more liquidity or 
the calling back of own exposures; we have also observed that 
sales may take the form of fire sales as well as of a massive 
recourse to short selling or repo operations: in both cases many 
institutions are involved. 
Furthermore we have seen that markets respond to a shock 
either undervaluating assets, or freezing transactions within a 
sector: these actions as well impact many institutions, hence 
they may impede the restoring of all the involved banks' 
financial viability in the short run. 
Beside we must take into account that another unintended 
consequence of those  reactions is that (all) banks need to mark 
their accounts to the new market evaluation, which in turn 
means that they face higher margins, losses on existing 
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positions and they need again to make (fire) sales to have 
liquidity. This effect is increased even more because banks try 
to keep their leverage constant and this leads to a shock 
amplifying effect within the institutions. 
Eventually banks would fall in a spiral of uncertainty on the 
viability of other institutions, would shrink their activities in 
the interbank market and hence nearly all institution in the 
system would be hit by the crisis. 
 
The question now is: why are we concerned about TBTF 
institutions? What are the special features a smaller bank does 
not have in transmitting the shock to others? And finally, does 
the cross border nature of such group may cause greater spill 
over effects than what caused by a large bank located in only 
one country?  
To explain why the “size factor” is as important, we can simply 
list a number of reasons whereby it can be considered the main 
determinant of the impact of their crisis over the system as a 
whole, namely the consideration that TBTF institutions are of a 
systemic importance.  Let us list a few:  
 
• First, because the flow of daily transaction through 
TBTF institutions and other –usually TBTF as well –is a 
large multiple of their capital, leverage acts as an 
amplifier for each counterparty;  
 
• Second, because of information asymmetries between 
players and public that lead to liquidity problems to 
counterparties;  
 
• Third, because the off balance sheet exposures need to 
be called in in case of crisis and this can reveal much 
tighter ties between TBTF organizations; 
 
• Fourth, because a failing TBTF institution experiencing 
problems in clearing its position causes a massive 
disruption in the payment system; 
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• Fifth, the direct losses to shareholders, uninsured 
depositors, creditors, insurance funds and eventually 
employees would be enormous; 
 
• Sixth, because the massive use of derivatives and 
securitised products between financial institutions 
contributes to the risk spread; 
 
• Seventh, because large banks are at the heart of the 
payment settlement system, hence if they experience 
operational problems those could easily spread among 
other participants; 
 
• Eight, since there is no legal framework in place, the 
global uncertainty over the resolution and intervention 
proceedings Authorities would follow, may determine 
severe spill over effects to other players, especially in 
the short run; 
 
• Ninth, those banks make great use of opaque financial 
products such as derivatives, traded in unregulated 
markets, whose risk is highly underestimated; 
 
• Tenth, in our opinion propagation mechanisms among 
TBTF institutions are more likely because, if we take a 
global view of the phenomenon, those institutions 
constitutes basically an oligopolistic market wherein it 
is more likely that the same behavior or action is taken 
by all of them, because they all have the same 
information and operates under the same conditions. 
 
 
Hence, as Crockett (2005) said “thinking about the 
consequences of a failure at a large banking institution is the 
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financial equivalent of thinking the unthinkable”90  
 
 
We now should shift our attention to cross border institutions 
(CBI). 
Although the usual patterns of a systemic event seem to apply, 
and they make no exception to the contagion sources explained 
thus far, in our opinion in the case of a cross border bank the 
propagation mechanism is possibly simpler but has an even 
more dangerous result.  
In fact somehow there is not even the need of the actual impact 
on other banks, because a signal over the viability of a firm 
spreads automatically to all the country where that CBI is 
located.  
Let us assume that an event has hit bank A and, theoretically, 
has not involved any other bank. Now, as usual, depositors 
would run on the bank to withdraw their funding: however 
those depositors would run on all the subsidiaries of bank A, 
located in country 1, 2, 3, … This would have a greater 
amplifying effect on the group as a whole, but also would 
make depositors of country 1, 2, 3, … run on their own banks 
(B, C, D, …) because they would infer that their bank may not 
be immune to the event experienced by bank A. 
In this simple example thus we see how the shock propagates 
per se both to other banks and to other countries. 
In this respect we might say that in case of CBI’s, shocks are 
more firm-oriented rather than system-oriented. 
If we now add the (likely) possibility that the shock has hit 
other institutions, again we see how bank B, C, D, … would 
face greater knock on effects because the fact that bank A has 
experienced losses on all its subsidiaries (i.e. consolidated 
losses) would reduce the possibility that bank A may borrow 
money from other entities of the group, leading to a 
widespread unviability of the group, that makes even more 
                                                 
90  See Crockett A., Dealing with stress at large and complex financial 
institutions, in Systemic Financial Crisis: resolving large bank insolvencies, eds 
by Evanoff D.D., Kaufman G., World scientific Publishing, 2005, 17. 
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unlikely the ability of the bank to repay its debts. 
Moreover, because banks B, C, D, may have subsidiaries or 
branches located in the same country as bank A' they would all 
face a run. 
 
From the above stems how the cross border nature of a bank 
(usually coupled with size factors) impacts heavily not only the 
solvency of the same bank, but also the viability of different 
geographical markets and the speed at which the crisis spreads 
over many regions. 
This is why is of extreme importance the existence (and the 
quality) of harmonised safety nets related to crisis resolution 
and management of cross border banking groups. 
 
However although it is intuitive that the cross border nature of 
such groups adds layer of complexity to their insolvency, it 
would be interesting measuring the level of cross border 
externalities.  
Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2005)91, tried to construct a data 
set on the degree of penetration of cross border institutions in 
Europe and found, not surprisingly though, that in recent 
years the cross border asset penetration is gradually 
increasing, moving from 13% in 1997 to 16% in 2002.  
If they control for institutions, they discover that the number of 
banks that can be considered “European”, are again increasing, 
though some level of consolidation appears, and that their total 
level of capital is getting higher during the years. This means 
that usually CBI’s tend to be also TBTF. Table 1-3 show their 
results. 
Unfortunately, their research is limited to 2002-2003 data and, 
though if new data were available they would show the same 
trend, much empirical research in the field is needed.  
                                                 
91  Schoenmaker D., Oosterloo S., Financial Supervision in an integrating 
Europe: measuring cross border externalities, in International Finance, issue 
8, 2005, 1-27 
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Table 2: Cross Border Penetration of Banks: Interbank Assets 
 
 
Source: Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2005) 
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Table 3: Cross border penetration of banks: Assets 
 
 
 
Source: Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2005) 
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Table 4: Number of Subsidiaries of Credit Institution from EU 
and third Countries 
 
 
 
Source: ECB, EU Banking Structure, October 2008 
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Table 5: Total assets of subsidiaries of Credit Institutions from 
EU Countries and third Countries 
 
 
Source: ECB, EU Banking Structure, October 2008                                                                                                     
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Chapter 3 
 
Layers of complexity in cross border crisis 
management. Legal differences and early 
intervention tools 
 
3.1. The EU Insolvency Regime and the agency conflicts 
among Authorities 
Managing the insolvency of cross border banks in Europe is 
not an easy task.  
In fact, against the backdrop of a fast penetration of those 
institutions, encouraged also by EU policies, there is yet no 
common legal framework in place to deal with the issue. 
The current EU insolvency regime consists of three main 
norms: the Council Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings92, Directive 2001/24/EC on the Reorganisation and 
the winding up of credit institutions93 and Directive 
2001/17/EC on the Reorganisation and winding up of insurance 
undertakings94. 
Since the latter is outside the scope of our analysis, we will 
focus on Regulation 1346/2000, and Directive 2001/24.  
Unfortunately, none of the two’s does apply in the case of cross 
border credit institutions: Regulation 1346 recognises the 
increasing nature of the cross border activities and effects 
carried on by undertakings and ask for a community act to 
coordinate the measures to be taken regarding an insolvent 
                                                 
92 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings, in OJ L 160/1 of 30.6.2000 
93  Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, 
in OJ L 125 of 5.5.2001 
94  Directive 2001/17/EC of the European  Parliament and of the Council of 
19 March 2001 on the Reorganisation and Winding up of  insurance 
undertakings, in OJ L 110 of 20.4.2001  
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debtor’s assets as well as to avoid forum shopping. The matter 
is of such importance that the Commission gave it the dignity 
of an act directly applicable to all member states, as they said 
“in order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross border 
effects it is necessary, and appropriate, that the provisions on 
jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area should 
be contained in a Community law measure which is binding 
and directly applicable in member states”.95 Nonetheless the 
regulation does not apply to (insurance undertakings) credit 
institutions, investment undertakings which provide services 
involving the holding of funds or securities for third parties 
and collective investment undertakings.  
Moving to Directive 2001/2004, it expresses the importance of 
protecting creditors, workers and third parties involved in the 
failure of a credit institutions as well as the need of orderly 
resolute an ailing bank when many States are involved. But it 
applies only to credit institutions with branches –mere 
articulations of the parent company, not legally independent –
in other member states, not to subsidiaries. For the latter thus it 
holds that insolvency proceedings can be initiated 
autonomously in each country of incorporation and its 
resolution remains the responsibility of each authority. 
Nonetheless those acts are of a certain importance to our 
analysis because they express two concepts that may be 
fundamental in resolving a crisis: 1) mutual recognition of 
proceedings (universality) and 2) unity of the group. We will 
investigate them further in the following sections, when 
dealing with the ex post resolution possibilities to tackle a crisis. 
 
 
Today the crisis management is hence left to memoranda of 
understanding between member States that are basically 
private agreements96 on information sharing between 
                                                 
95  Regulation 1346/2001, considerandum 8. 
96 Despite a few exceptions that will be investigated further, they are not 
 63  
competent authorities in relation to the banking organizations 
with subsidiaries chartered in each country.  
In fact, in principle each State where a subsidiary is 
incorporated has the authority to supervise the company. 
However, this institutional arrangement is mitigated by the 
fact that the primary responsibility over the bank supervision 
remains on the Authority where the parent company is located. 
This principle is known as the home country control, and it is 
expressed in the Capital Requirement Directive, art. 40 and 41, 
wherein the prudential supervision of a credit institution is 
assigned to the competent authorities of the home member 
state (consolidated supervision), whereas to the host member 
states is left the responsibility –in cooperation with the 
competent authorities of the home member state –for the 
supervision of the subsidiary’s liquidity and compliance with 
regulatory standards (solo supervision).  
This structure has been thought to give efficiency and 
effectiveness to the supervisory’ goals, and is needed because, 
since the subsidiary is an independent legal entity, in case of 
run, it is the host authority that should act as a lender of last 
resort and should provide deposit protection. On the other 
hand the home Authority can have more easily access to the 
parent’s activities and may request the undertaking all the 
information needed to reach the opinion on the financial health 
of the group as a whole, but since financial stability is the remit 
of each country, home supervisor cannot be in charge of the 
stability of the host country. The complement to this structure 
is given by art. 129 of the CRD which states the duty to 
cooperate and coordinate their activities between home and 
host authorities, or better that the consolidated authority shall 
coordinate the gathering and dissemination of relevant and 
essential information in going concern and emergency 
situations and plan and coordinate supervisory activities in 
going concern as well as in emergency situation in cooperation 
                                                                                                                 
public indeed. 
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with the other competent authorities involved97. Furthermore, 
art. 130 states that where an emergency situation arises within 
a banking group which potentially jeopardizes the stability of 
the financial system in any of the member states where entities 
of a group have been authorized, the competent authority 
responsible for the exercise of supervision on a consolidated 
basis shall alert as soon as it is practicable the other authorities 
involved. 
Two trends in the industry should be added to the framework: 
the centralization of risk management (i.e. liquidity and asset 
management) functions and the cross border penetration of 
LCBO’s. 
The foremost consequence of the first trend is that it may 
question the effectiveness of host country supervision of 
liquidity risk in branches and subsidiaries. In fact, host 
supervisor may not be able to control how the liquidity is 
managed by the parent company as well as centralized 
liquidity management may weaken the legal protection arising 
from the subsidiary structure, since it may create features that 
make the group resemble one with a branch structure98. 
Eventually this would reinforce the role of home supervisor to 
control the group wide activities.  
Furthermore, the general operational settings of a cross border 
group may hamper/alter both supervisors’ ability to monitor 
bank’s activities and health. Nowadays many banking groups 
are organized through business lines (e.g. retail banking, 
merchant banking and so on), thus there is an implicit transfer 
                                                 
97 On the shortfalls of not having in place a single supervisor, see the 
model by Schuler M., Heinemann F., The costs of supervisory fragmentation 
in Europe, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) discussion 
paper 05/01, 2005, wherein Authors applies the usual cost of financial 
regulation (i.e. institutional costs of running supervisory agencies which 
arise inthe state sector; costs of compliance that can be attributed to the 
regulated firms; and structural distorsion of costs which arise in the 
financial markets) to the European supervisory architecture. 
98  See Nguyen G., Praet P., Cross border crisis management: a race against the 
clock or a hurdle race?, in Financial Stability Review, 2006, Central Bank of 
Belgium, 151-173, 165. 
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of decision powers from the national entity of the group to a 
centralized business-line manager who will not necessary be in 
the home country. This cross border business line integration 
means that there may be a higher possibility of intra group, 
cross border contagion that may not be caught in due time by 
the responsible supervisor. 
Whereas where they centralize operational function, again host 
supervisor may be unable to supervise those functions as well 
as it may be unable to assist a sound subsidiary if the parent 
company that houses the key operational functions goes 
bankrupt99. 
Kuritzkes, Schuermann and Weiner (2003), call this 
organisation as “hub and spoke” model. Spokes are 
responsible for risk management within business lines, 
whereas hubs provide centralized oversight of risk and capital 
at the group level100.  
Similarly, LCBO’s cross border penetration weaken the ability 
of the host authority to keep under control financial stability in 
its country101. 
This is why the main arguments are in favor of the only home 
country supervision, seen as the most effective because it is 
able to make a group wide assessment of the risk profile and 
                                                 
99  See Nguyen and Praet, (2006), 164. 
100  Activities at the spoke include the credit function within a bank 
serving as front line managers for most trading decision making. Those at 
the hub usually include assuming responsibility for group level risk 
reporting; participating in decision about group capital structure, funding 
practices, and target debt rating; liaising with regulators and rating 
agencies, advising of major risk transfer transaction, such as collateralized 
loan obligation and securitization; and sometimes even managing the 
balance sheet. Centralization implies that strategic decision-making is 
transferred from the functional or sectoral entities of the group to the level 
of the group as a whole. See, Kuritzkes A., Schuermann T., Weiner S., Risk 
measurement, risk management and capital adeguacy in financial conglomerates, 
in Brookings-Wharton papers on financial services, eds by Herrig and 
Litan, Brookings institution, 2003.      
101  See Schoenmaker D., Oosterloo S., Financial supervision in Europe: a 
proposal for a new architecture, in Building the financial foundations of the euro 
experiences and challenges, eds by Jonung L., Walkner C., Watson M., 2008.  
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the capital needed and as the most efficient since it eliminates 
duplication in regulatory costs and burdens.    
Despite the regulatory efforts in designing the most 
appropriate system, such structure has important drawbacks 
on the legal structure of a banking group: in fact when it is 
articulated into cross border branches these can benefit from a 
centralized liquidity and supervisory management whereas in 
case of subsidiaries, these may be subjected to different 
regulatory regimes and standards (i.e. on accepted collateral) 
and may not be entitled by their national law to claim the 
support of a parent company or conversely may be subjected 
to regulatory intervention at an earlier stage than their parent 
company. The former phenomenon is also known as “liquidity 
trap”: each subsidiary must comply with national supervisory 
requirements on liquidity computed on a stand alone basis 
which makes the liquidity management of a cross border 
group with subsidiaries much more expensive than in case of 
branches only102.  
Oppositely however, as Calzolari and Loranth (2005) have 
shown in their empirical model103, regulatory incentive to 
intervene is affected by the liability structure of the group (i.e. 
whether organized through subsidiaries or branches) and 
hence by the assets available to compensate depositors104.  
                                                 
102  See Lamandini M., Written testimony to the European Parliament on 
CRD and liquidity, 5 December 2008. 
103  See Calzolari G., Loranth G., Regulation of multinational banks. A 
theoretical inquiry, ECB working paper, n. 431, January 2005, in 
www.ecb.int 
104  More specifically, Authors’ conclusions may be summarised as 
follows: 1) when the LCBO is set up via a subsidiary, the home unit 
regulator has a stronger incentive in restructuring LCBO’s activities than 
the foreign regulator, because the former both benefits from the foreign 
unit’s residual assets and is shielded from foreign losses. The host 
regulator instead, is not confronted with this effect; 2) home units fall 
under soft regulation in branch LCBOs than with subsidiary LCBO. This 
comes as a consequence of different regulatory responsibility towards 
foreign depositors: the home regulators can access foreign assets 
regardless of the representation form, whereas she has to repay foreign 
depositors only when facing a branch LCBO. Home assets (possibly 
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In particular, in case of branches (i.e. shared liability between 
the group’ units) cost of intervention is reduced in any of the 
units then when they are legally distinct (i.e. in case of 
subsidiaries), since the regulator can take advantage of intra 
group assets transfer. At the same time, should the regulator 
face depositors’ protection responsibility in both countries (as 
in the case with branches), it decreases incentives to intervene 
in a given unit as compared with the case in which the 
regulator only has to compensate local depositors.   
Strangely enough, from the above we can infer that in this 
specific context, industry and authority’s interests are not 
conflicting. In fact, the former seems to prefer a centralized 
supervision, whereas the latter have greater incentive to 
supervise when it has the power over the group wide 
activities: both situations realize when a group is organized 
through branches. 
  
Since the last decade policy and voluntary (i.e. at BIS level) 
initiatives have been taken to address the problem, 
unsuccessfully though. They have intensified recently because 
of the financial meltdown that put into question the current 
state of play and asked for more coordination and agreement 
on the actions to take in case of crisis. In fact it is a truism that 
home/host authorities face different incentive when dealing 
with the problem.    
                                                                                                                 
available only if the home unit is not intervened) are therefore more 
valuable in branch LCBOs than with subsidiary representation; 3) when 
the home unit’s activities are not very safe, branch representation is 
preferred by the LCBO as it induces more lenient regulation over all 
units; 4) as far as regulators’ incentives to collect information on the 
group, authorities are influenced by some form of strategic behavior for 
monitoring, such as postponing information acquisition on the local 
unit; 5) in case of subsidiaries, the host regulator has more incentive to 
monitor foreign units than the home regulator regarding the home unit; 
and 6) incentive to monitor the group are maximal when it is organized 
only with branches than with subsidiaries. See Calzolari and Loranth, 
(2005), 6 f.  
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It has been noted105 that there is always a potential for conflicts 
among supervisors that increases as banks’ financial health 
weakens. According to the Author, the main feature of cross 
border crisis resolution is characterized by conflict rather than 
cooperation between authorities and that this non cooperative 
behavior delays the implementation of an efficient solution, 
which in turn increases the crisis magnitude, i.e. converting it 
into a systemic problem. 
Such conflicts can be framed in the agency relationship 
between supervisors and taxpayers as well as between 
divergent interests among home and host supervisors, 
influenced also by the national institutional architecture of 
supervision (i.e. whether integrated or not, at central bank 
level or not)106. 
Shuler (2003)107 investigated the problem both at national and 
at international (cross border) level and depicted the situation 
in table 1.  
As far as the internal dimension is concerned, the Author 
started considering the incentive problems of each player 
(banking industry, supervisor, taxpayers) showing that 
industry's profits depend on the level of supervision and the 
earning from their loan portfolio, thereby banks prefer low 
level of supervision and have incentive to take on excessive 
risk, favored by the fact that the regulator is not able to observe 
the quality of banks' portfolios and that banks may try to 
disinform regulators and taxpayers contributing to increase the 
normal information asymmetry. 
Taxpayers instead -considered as usual as the benevolent social 
                                                 
105 See Baxter T. C., Cross border challenges in resolving financial groups, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago discussion paper, 2004  
106  See Masciandaro D., Politician and financial supervision unification 
outside the central bank: Why they do it?, in Journal of Financial Stability, 2009, 
Issue 5, 124-146, for an explanation on the recent trend towards a certain 
degree of consolidation of powers in financial supervision, which resulted 
in the establisment of unified supervisors, different from central banks.  
107 Schuler M., Incentive problems in banking supervision- The European 
case, Centre for European economic research (ZEW), Mannheim, 
November 2003. 
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welfare maximising principal – want a stable financial system 
but are not able to monitor banks' portfolio, hence they 
delegate this function to supervisors -acting as agent- which 
are expected to take into account also cross border externalities 
deriving from banks' risk taking behavior in different 
countries. Nevertheless, taxpayers are not able either to 
observe supervisory efforts of the home and of the host 
regulators.  
Lastly regulators are appointed to serve as taxpayers' agents to 
safeguard financial stability that can be seen as a function of 
their efforts in supervising banks. However they face different 
conflicts in pursuing solely taxpayers' interests: they can be 
captured by the industry, they may pursue self interests, they 
may underestimate banking problems to avoid to incur in 
blame for poor supervision (situation known as bureaucratic 
gambling), may tend to protect their activities in front of 
politicians or to favor their interests and eventually they may 
even be tempted by the banking industry career. Eventually 
those conflicts may translate into more accommodating 
policies (forbearance) and into greater information 
asymmetries between players that not even the contract à la 
Jensen and Meckling between them can overcome. 
At cross border level, the misalignment of interests remains 
somehow the same, although is more intense in case of 
branches where the host supervisor has barely no power over 
their supervision, thus the potential threat from this entities for 
the stability of the domestic financial market may be 
disregarded, leading to a suboptimal level of supervision to the 
host country taxpayers since the home supervisor would tend 
not to take in great account cross border externalities.  
Furthermore from the home regulator's perspective, the 
tendency to forbearance applies especially if the branch is 
relatively small and the adverse consequences of its failure 
may be negligible, from the home country's perspective 
though. 
An additional problem is given by the poor incentive of the 
home country supervisor to share information with the host 
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supervisor, especially when they would illustrate poor 
regulatory performance. Similarly, the host supervisor may as 
well lack the incentive to keep the home authority informed 
since it has limited formal responsibility108.  
In case of subsidiaries however the supervision remains 
basically at host level so we would not observe the forbearance 
problems, but we could still apply Schuler model to them as 
for the information sharing disincentive.   
In fact it is a truism that supervisors tend to be country 
focused, and to be more concerned on their internal market, 
leading to home country bias, as in the case of preserving 
national championships as the recent Italian experience 
showed, or in those cases when authorities ring fence assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108  See also Eisenbeis R., Home country versus cross border negative 
externalities in large banking organization failures and how to avoid them, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working paper, n. 18, 2006, 8 ff; 
Eisenbeis R., Kaufman G., Cross border banking and financial stability in the 
EU, at Journal of Financial Stability, 4, 2008, 168-204    
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Table 6: The European incentive problem 
 
 
   Source: Schuler (2003). 
 
Furthermore, host countries may face monitoring difficulties 
especially in case of non systemically significant subsidiaries. 
In fact, according to a research conducted by the Committee on 
the Global Financial System in 2004109, host regulators and 
markets are less able to obtain useful information from foreign 
owned institutions than they are from domestically owned 
banks and this makes the monitoring of those banks more 
difficult especially when the subsidiary is not particularly 
relevant for the group as a whole. However that institution 
may be of a certain importance in the host market but home 
regulators may not have great incentive to collaborate with 
host authorities, since they would not even bear the final 
                                                 
109  Committee on the Global Financial System, Foreign direct investment 
in the financial sector of emerging market economies, BIS working paper, 
2004.  
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consequences of their bail out (i.e. liquidity provision and 
deposit protection). Because of those information disincentives, 
both regulators may face problems in efficiently supervising 
their institutions given the impossibility of understanding the 
group wide financial health.  
Going back to Schuler model, we may say that this difficulty 
could be increased as well by the tendency of supervised banks 
to conceal unfavorable information about their performance. 
 
Eventually we could stem few conclusions: 
1) supervisors’ incentive to obtain information is a function 
of their responsibilities;  
2) they may find advantageous not to share information 
with other regulators; and 
3) they may have poor or no incentive to take cross border 
externalities into account; 
 
 
The first conclusion is reinforced by a paper from Stoltz 
(2002)110 where the Author shows that supervisors will not take 
cross border contagion effects into accounts if they are 
accountable only to their jurisdiction, whereas Kane (2005)111, 
considers another factor that is of a certain relevance to our 
scope: the idea of regulatory culture. In fact, according to him, 
                                                 
110  Stoltz S., Banking Supervision in integrated financial markets: 
implication for the EU, CESifo Working paper series no. 812, 2002  
111  Kane E. J., Confronting divergent interests in cross country regulatory 
arrangements, NBER working Paper no. 11865, 2005. Carretta, Farina and 
Schwizer (2005), point at the cultural gaps as a possible stumbling block 
in the efficient exchange of information and the sharing of problems and 
goals among regulators and the industry. They developed a cultural 
survey based on the application of a text analysis model to a corpus of 
reference texts produced by two samples, drawn from the supervisory 
bodies and supervised entities. Their empirical findings “reveal 
numerous field of cultural differentiation, alongside several important 
areas in which the orientation of the two parts tend to overlap”. See, 
Carretta A., Farina V., Schwizer P., Banking regulation towards advisory: the 
“culture compliance” of banks and supervisory authorities, 2005, mimeo 
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regulatory (and private) efforts to monitor, deter and bond 
banks may differ within countries, leading to idiosyncratic 
features to resolve incentive conflicts with reasonable 
efficiency.   
His argument is interesting because he defines regulatory 
culture as more than a system of rules and enforcement but 
includes higher order norms about how officials should 
comport themselves.  
As he puts it:  
 
                 “(Regulatory culture) includes a matrix of attitudes and 
beliefs that defines what it means for a regulator to use its 
investigative and disciplinary authority honorably. These attitudes 
and beliefs set standards for the fair use of government power. 
Checks and balances that bound each agency’s jurisdiction express a 
distrust in government power that often traces back to abuses 
observed in a distant past when the country was occupied, colonized 
or run by a one party government. Underlying every formal 
regulatory structure is a set of higher order social norms that 
penetrate and shape the policy making process and the political and 
legal environments within which intersectoral bargaining takes 
place. These underlying standards, taboos, and traditions are 
normative in two senses. They simultaneously define what 
behaviors are normal and what behaviors regulators should mimic 
to avoid criticism or shame.” 
 
He then identifies six specific components that contribute to 
the actual behavior of supervisors to stop excessive risk taking, 
and to find and resolve hidden individual bank insolvencies in 
timely fashion:  
 
• legal authority and reporting obligations; 
• formulation and promulgation of specific rules; 
• technology of monitoring for violations and 
compliance;  
• penalties for material violations; 
• the regulator’s duty of consultation: to guarantee 
fairness regulated parties have a right to participation and due 
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process which imposes substantial burdens on proof on the 
regulator; 
• regulatees’ rights to judicial review: intervened parties 
have an access to appeals procedures that bond the fairness 
guarantee. 
 
 
Eventually, in our opinion regulatory culture can contribute in 
making the difference both in the way institutions are 
supervised (i.e. there may be higher or lower degrees of 
regulatory capture) and in the way they are resolved (i.e. there 
may be greater tendency to grant them financial support rather 
than liquidate them). In effect, if we take as examples the UK, 
Italy, Germany and France, it is fairly intuitive that Italy and 
France would tend to save the ailing bank maybe starting 
dialogues with other (national) banks to favor mergers, 
whereas Germany would tend to even directly intervene in 
their capital (given the long tradition of state intervention in 
banks’ governance), whereas we may expect from the UK the 
adoption of a more market oriented solution and a lessen 
degree of regulatory capture.  
A good mean to reduce those differences when dealing with 
distressed cross border groups may be burden sharing 
agreements that will be investigated in the next paragraph. 
 
Such misalignment of incentive among supervisors can be 
reduced in two ways: adherence to mou's and by virtue of the 
mediation of supranational committees such as the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors and the European Banking 
Committee notwithstanding the same Basel committee112.   
 
3.1.1. Memoranda of understanding 
 
These are statement of intent, not legally binding given their 
                                                 
112 http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid_24/index.htm 
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voluntary nature, that determine a duty to cooperate and 
consult between authorities or establish practical provisions in 
relation to supervision of subsidiaries, or in relation to 
information sharing on parent and subsidiaries' activities as 
well as external information with media in case of crisis or on 
which national Authority should coordinate actions to take in 
the latter event. They may also establish common principles 
regarding the resolution of firms with cross border activities 
and make provisions over the permissible use and 
confidentiality of information received. Lastly, they can be 
general or banking group specific, as in the case of the 
memorandum of understanding between Banca d'Italia and 
BaFin concerning the supervision of Unicredit group113.  
 
The prototype of every MOU can be considered the 
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the financial 
supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the 
European Union on cross border financial stability114, including 
common practical guidelines and a template for a systemic 
assessment framework.  
This document establishes comprehensive principles the 
Parties should comply with in case of crisis plus a clear 
division of labor between authorities.  
                                                 
113 See Side letter to the memorandum of Understanding of 16August 1993 
between the Banca d’Italia and the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”), legal successor to the 
Bundesaufsuchtsamt für das Kreditwesen concerning the supervision of the 
Unicredit Group, in www.bafin.de   
114  Memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the financial 
supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European 
Union on cross border financial stability, 1 June 2008, in www.ecb.int. See 
also, Memorandum of Understanding on high- level principles between the 
banking supervisors and central banks of the European Union in crisis 
management situations, 1 March 2003; Memorandum of Understanding on the 
exchange of information among national credit registers for the benefit of reporting 
institutions, 30 March 2003; Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation 
between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in the Stage Three of 
Economic and Monetary Union 2 April 2001, all available at www.ecb.int 
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First of all it states the final aims of crisis management: 
financial stability protection, primacy of private sector 
solution, limitation of the use of public money -that anyway 
should be used under strict and uniform conditions -fiscal 
burden sharing, prompt assessment of the systemic nature of 
the crisis, coordinating role of the home country supervisory 
authorities, compliance with EU competition and state aid 
rules.  
Second, as far as the division of labor between authorities is 
concerned, the MOU assigns the National coordinator115 of the 
home country the role of cross border coordinator. The actual 
coordinator may be each authority involved, depending on the 
type of crisis: in case of crisis affecting a cross border financial 
group it will be the group supervisor, in case of crisis affecting 
the performances of central banking functions it will be the 
relevant central bank of the home country, whereas in case of 
systemic implication which may imply the use of public funds, 
that would be the Finance minister of the home country. 
However, in our opinion, this distinction does not seem really 
feasible due to the difficulty of distinguishing a crisis 
“affecting the performance of central banks” from a crisis 
“with a potential for systemic implication”. In such cases then, 
especially because it would be inapplicable a “prevalence 
criterion”, it seems reasonable identify a determined Authority 
to act always as a National coordinator, and leave to its 
responsibility the decision of the actions to take.  
Third, as for information sharing,  there should constantly be a 
flow of available and relevant information between respective 
counterparties authorities both in normal times and in crisis 
situation and, under exceptional circumstances though, 
information may be transmitted directly at the cross border 
level between different types of Authorities. Furthermore, in 
                                                 
115 The national coordinator would normally be the National authority 
chosen by the involved authorities, in charge of the overall coordination 
of activities in order to enhance preparedness in normal times and 
facilitate the management and resolution of  a crisis at the national level. 
See Memorandum of understanding, key definitions, p. 3.   
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case of a wide disturbance in the economy, information sharing 
may be encouraged and facilitated by means of existing EU 
committee infrastructures and facilities.  
A common database should be designed including at least the 
following information: a) a concise description of the 
ownership, legal structure, management structure and key 
business areas; b) a list of all the relevant mayor payment, 
clearing and settlement systems and c) the financial position of 
at least the last five years, of all the relevant financial groups. 
Besides, a template for crisis data of the relevant financial 
group would include –possibly in line with CRD requirements 
–at least: aa) the relevant supervisor’s assessment of the 
projections of revenue and costs; bb) the relevant supervisor’s 
assessment of the quality of assets and liabilities; cc) the 
liquidity position, including relevant cash flow projections, 
funding structure, collateral buffers, and intra-group lending; 
dd) the size of large exposures, at least according to region, 
collateral used, type of customer and currency; ee) the size, 
nature and extent of the problem at hand, e.g. bad loans; and 
ff) the legal domicile of the major assets and off balance sheet 
items. 
Since few are public, here we would briefly consider the 
contents of some of them, specifically: the MOU between the 
central Banks of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden, the MOU among the banking supervisors of South 
Eastern union and, as far mou's across European borders, those 
between the US and the United Kingdom, and between Estonia 
and Russia116. 
 
1.1.2. The Nordisk mou 
 
                                                 
116 Outside the EU member States, see for instance, The Memorandum of 
Understanding and co-operation in banking supervision between the 
Croatian National Bank and the Central Bank of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Banking Agency of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Banking Agency of RepubliKa Srpska, dono on 5 
November 2003 in Sarajevo,  available at www??? 
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In June 2003, as a general framework, the central banks of 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have agreed 
upon a memorandum over the management of a financial 
crisis in banks with cross border establishments, keeping the 
freedom of entering into separate MOU's within each other 
where deemed necessary117. However, in cases where the 
Nordic central banks draw up a separate MoU in respect of a 
specified financial group, one of the central banks shall be 
made responsible for ensuring that a fact book containing 
relevant public information about the group is updated 
regularly. The purpose of the fact book is to give the central 
banks a common body of knowledge about the structure of the 
group’s business activities and balance sheet. 
The mou is a specification of the EU agreement and is based on 
two main principles: speed and efficiency in cooperation 
among authorities in the event of a crisis and no constraints 
over their flexibility as independent institutions118.   
In order to limit the extent of public intervention to the 
minimum, the mou strongly advocates down-streaming of 
funds from the parent company to the ailing subsidiary. Where 
this effort proves unsuccessfully, emergency liquidity 
assistance from the central bank could be provided only if the 
bank is still solvent, though no formal definition of insolvency 
is given. Nonetheless, if the parent is insolvent, the first 
preferred option is the sale of its solvent subsidiary bank, in 
order for the parent to be able to pay its debts. As for the crisis 
management, to the central banks is required the establishment 
of  a crisis organisation that enables the efficient acquisition 
and analysis of information to allow a quick assessment of the 
necessary policy measures, through a crisis management 
                                                 
117 See indeed, the Memorandum of understanding between the central 
banks of Sweden and Finland on co-operation in the oversight of the central 
securities depositories VPC AB ans Suomen Arvopaperikeskus Oy, January 
2006, in www.bof.fi 
118 The mou is of a certein relevance because of the particular 
arrangements in place for the supervision of Nordea, where authorities 
have overlapping responsibilities. 
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group whose representatives shall be able to communicate 
directly with their respective central bank executive board. 
Besides, such group should be immediately activated by the 
NCB that first identify a crisis, and its main task would be the 
provision of all central bank with quick access to the same 
information and the enabling of direct discussion and 
coordination of potential measures by producing background 
material on available information related to the possible bank' 
solvency . To this end it should ascertain the bank's liquidity 
and solvency situation and other relevant factor through direct 
communication with the management of the banking group 
and with any other significant party. 
Lastly, the mou defines obligations related to information 
sharing and basically assigns the crisis group the role of 
“information manager” both to the media and within 
authorities. 
 
3.1.3. The South Eastern Europe mou 
 
On July 2007, the Bank of Albania, the Bank of Greece, the 
Bulgarian National bank , the Central bank of Cyprus, the 
National Bank of Republic of Macedonia, the National Bank of 
Romania and the National Bank of Serbia, entered into a 
Memorandum of understanding on high level principles of co-
operation and co-ordination in the field of banking 
supervision119 . 
Against the background of EU legislation and best practices, 
the agreement aims essentially at facilitating the exchange of 
information and at harmonising as much as possible legal 
differences within countries as well as at trying to eliminate 
legal obstacles and different supervisory practices to the 
smooth functioning of cross border banking groups’ risks 
management. 
                                                 
119 See, Memorandum of understanding on high level principles of co-
operation and co-ordination among the banking supervisors of south eastern 
europe, in www.bankofalbania.org 
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It focuses on home-host cooperation, information exchange, 
convergence of supervisory practices, monitoring banking 
groups’ system and controls, financial stability and macro 
prudential issues, crisis management, anti-laundering and 
terrorist financing risks, implementation and confidentiality of 
information. 
In order to foster harmonization, parties have agreed to 
communicate to each other, on a semi annual basis, major 
changes in their legal framework pertinent to supervision, 
whereas special consideration should be given to the 
identification and treatment of any legal obstacles in sharing 
information with other supervisory authorities. Furthermore in 
order to ensure that both at consolidated level and on a solo 
basis banks are adequately supervised, home-host authorities 
should list the issues that warrant an allocation of tasks –
without depriving supervisory authorities of their 
natural/regular powers though, and to examine in the long run 
the possibility and the appropriateness of gradual allocation of 
tasks aiming at a more effective and efficient supervision of 
banking groups, operating on a cross border basis. Drawing 
upon the Basel document on Home Host information sharing for 
effective Basel II implementation and the CEBS’ Guidelines on 
supervisory cooperation for cross border banking and investment firm 
groups,  they would also draw a list of information to be shared 
useful for both supervisors. 
Convergence in supervisory practices may be achieved 
encouraging the developments of networks between line 
supervisors of different entities within a group, setting up 
experts teams to deal with specific issues, enabling joint 
inspections to be carried out by the home and host authorities 
involved, exchanging views in order to understand different 
practices and cultures and to develop a common supervisory 
culture, exchanging staff and consulting with market 
participants. Harmonisation of national reporting 
requirements would be an asset. In order to obtain a shared 
monitoring of banking groups, parties agreed to exchange 
views on the degree of convergence reached by testing the 
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performance of specific centralised functions in all the units of 
major banking groups operating in the region and enabling 
authorities directly involved with the supervision of a specific 
banking group and its individual units, to assess jointly the 
risk profile of this group. To guarantee financial stability, 
parties committed themselves to share information of 
macroeconomic and financial market developments; banks 
condition and outlook; conditions of non financial corporates 
and households linked with banks’ asset quality; market risks 
and regulatory developments. 
In the event of crisis, parties will closely cooperate to develop 
gradually suitable intraregional  arrangement, allowing for a 
clear understanding of the respective roles of home and host 
country authorities; a more concrete cross border cooperation, 
comprising a crisis management group, contact lists and 
communication procedures; a prearranged process for 
exchanging views and information with authorities likely to be 
involved as well; an effective coordination of crisis 
management actions; a joint communication policy to the 
public and for the regular review of the crisis management 
arrangements. Furthermore in order to avoid moral hazard 
they agreed not to publicise or communicate to the markets o 
publish any crisis management arrangement concluded within 
the framework of the mou. 
Although some provisions, especially those on crisis 
management, do not seem particularly consistent and seem too 
vague, it is appreciable the effort of countries with deep 
regulatory and legal differences to develop a common 
framework also by means of the creation of networks of line 
supervisors, college of supervision heads and ad hoc experts 
working groups. 
 
 
3.1.4. The Russia-Estonia mou 
 
In august 2008 the central bank of the Russian federation and 
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the Estonian financial supervision authority, have signed up a 
memorandum of understanding to exchange information for 
the effective fulfilment of their functions and to assist the 
reliability and stability of banking systems in their countries120. 
Therein they decided to co-operate and exchange information 
in the areas of licensing, owner control, on going supervision 
(off site and on site inspections), anti money laundering and 
counter terrorism financing. Co-operation should take place 
under the initiative of one of the supervisory Authorities as 
well as unilaterally, providing the other Authority with 
information that according to the estimation of the providing 
Authority may deem necessary to the receiver for the 
supervisory purposes. As far as licensing is concerned, upon 
the receipt of the application the host supervisor shall inform 
the home supervisor about its contents, and after consideration 
of the application shall inform in writing about its results. 
Conversely, the home supervisor shall inform the host 
supervisor on the basis of a relevant request whether the 
applicant supervised institution complies with the national 
legislation as well as about the state of corporate governance, 
risk management and internal control system of the applicant 
institution121.  
As far as the cooperative duties is concerned, the supervisory 
authorities shall consult before granting permission with 
regard to the acquisition of shares by a single or a group of 
legal entities or private single and groups individuals in a 
supervised institution registered in other country. Besides, they 
should inform each other about concerns on the financial 
soundness of supervised institutions having cross border 
establishments in the respective other country and they have a 
duty to notify each other of any action taken or of any relevant 
information gained  in respect to the supervised institution 
(whether parent or subsidiary). By relevant information they 
                                                 
120 Memorandum of understanding between the central bank of the 
russian federation and the estonian financial supervisdion authority, 
August 2008, in www.cbr.ru 
121  See ibidem, § 5.1-5.3 
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mean: concerns about the financial soundness of a supervised 
institution (i.e. failure to meet capital adequacy or other 
financial requirements, significant losses, rapid decline in 
profits or a deterioration in profitability), concerns relating to 
banking supervision both on a solo and consolidated basis, 
concerns arising from the results of inspections, or from 
reports and meetings and other communications with a 
supervised institution, concerns arising from late and/or 
unreliable reporting, information about the breaches of anti-
money laundering and counter terrorist financing legislation 
made by supervised parent institutions and cross border 
establishments.  
Furthermore, Authorities shall assist each other in carrying out 
on site inspections, providing possible full informational and 
consultative support to their colleagues in such inspection; 
where allowed by national legislation they should also 
communicate the results of the inspection. 
To guarantee a smooth functioning of the agreement, the 
involved authorities have set up provisions related to 
expenses, list of contact persons, availability of respective 
regulations and electronic means of communication. 
 
3.1.5. The UK-US Mou 
 
The agreement reached between the United States Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the United Kingdom Bank 
of England on the 10th of January 2010, is related on the 
exchange of information and cooperation in resolving troubled 
cross-border insured depository institutions122. 
Scope of the mou is therefore the enhancement and 
strengthening of Authorities’ cooperation and consultation’ 
intents in mutually understanding the complexities inherent in 
                                                 
122  See, Memorandum of Understanding concerning consultation, 
cooperation and the exchange  of information related to the resolution of insured 
depository institutions with cross border operations in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, of 10th of January 2010, available at www.boe.co.uk  
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cross border banking operations by firms in the UK and in the 
US, in conducting cooperative analyses of the challenges in 
resolution of such firms and in contingency planning for such 
challenges and resolutions.  
Thereby, after the usual disclaimers on independency of each 
authority, on the adaptation to the normative framework of 
each jurisdiction, on the division of responsibilities between 
authorities, on the fact that there should be no prejudice of 
their own roles and so on, the Authorities agreed to adhere to 
common principles to be followed in case of resolution of 
banks with cross border activities, namely: careful ex ante 
preparation to establish optimal processes and steps to ensure 
effective coordination and implementation of possible 
resolution strategies; flexibility to adapting to the specific 
features of a crisis and of the institution involved; ability to 
promptly assess the broader effects of any banking crisis and 
its cross-border implications based on common terminology 
and analysis; consistency with national supervision and crisis 
prevention. 
As far as the mechanisms and scope of resolution, consultation, 
cooperation and exchange of information is concerned, they 
intend to endeavour to inform the other Authority in advance 
of regulatory changes taking place and which may accordingly 
have a significant impact on the operations and activities of the 
regulated firms.  They also recognised the importance of ex 
ante coordination, hence they committed themselves to 
enhance cooperation in the analysis of cross border banking 
resolution issues, planning for potential resolution scenarios 
and appropriate simulation, contingency planning or other 
work deemed necessary. Furthermore they decided to work 
with the firms to plan the development of appropriate (going 
concern) recovery plans and (gone concern) resolution plans 
by firms and ensuring that such plans stay up to date. 
They agreed also on staff exchange and on the need of clearly 
identify a contact person. In committing to assist each other, 
FDIC and BOE should respectively share information related 
to the financial and operational conditions of the firm, 
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including capital structure, liquidity and funding profiles, 
internal controls procedures, external market or ratings 
information, entities providing important operational 
capabilities, identification of materially significant subsidiaries 
and affiliates, and to other confidential supervisory 
information. Lastly it shall be provided any needed form of 
assistance. 
Actually, over information exchange there are few exceptions 
related to the degree of confidentiality, reasonability and 
restricting disclosure on grounds of public interest or national 
security or interference with on going investigation. 
 
 
Despite what we said above, according to Enria and Vesala 
(2003)123, that draw on mechanism design and incomplete 
contract theory, MOU are not yet able to diminish incentive 
conflicts between supervisors because they do not address 
explicitly the areas where incentive constraints could hamper 
the effective exchange of information nor are able to achieve 
efficient supervision and systemic stability surveillance from 
the perspective of an overall optimum124.  
In fact, they highlight that125: a) MOU's do not provide for the 
routine transfer of “market surveillance” information among 
supervisors; b) they do not explicitly deal with the exchange of 
concerns about individual institutions and they do not contain 
instructions on the content and timing  of communication in 
crisis situations; c) they do not address the issue of 
coordination in crisis situations, for example stipulating 
consultations between the home and host authorities in order 
to address the issue of externalities. 
Furthermore, they seem to be quite pessimistic in warning that 
there are needs for cooperation that cannot be resolved even 
                                                 
123  Enria A., Vesala J., Externalities in Supervision: the European case, in 
Financial Supervision in Europe, eds by Kremers, Shoenmaker, Wierts, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003, 60  
124 Op.loc.ult. cit. p. 61 
125 Op. Loc. Ult. Cit. p. 71 
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via optimally functioning bilateral relations or disclosure. 
However, we may partly disagree with the Authors’ 
conclusions since our specific description of MOU’s contents 
shows exactly the opposite, namely that mou’s are detailed as 
for types of information to be shared, cooperation ex ante and 
during the crisis, set up of ad hoc units, division of labor 
within authorities and warning alerts on the financial situation 
of supervised entities. 
Nonetheless we must acknowledge what the recent crisis has 
shown: Enria and Vesala’s concerns about conflicts between 
supervisors proved to be right since MOU’s in place have not 
been followed, most probably because the accountability to 
national governments and the primacy given to local interests 
have played a more crucial role.  
Furthermore we must note that one strong weakness of Mou’s 
is due to their main feature: as they are not legally binding 
there is neither enforceability nor sanction in case of 
infringement. This gives parties poor incentive to implement 
the agreement. 
 
3.2 The European Banking Committee (EBC) 
 
The European Banking Committee (EBC), is the successor to 
the Banking Advisory Committee and it is now run by the 
European Commission. The Committee fulfils both comitology 
and advisory functions. It assists the Commission in adopting 
implementing measures for EU Directives and provides advice 
on policy issues related to banking activities. The EBC is 
composed of high level representatives from the Member 
States and chaired by a representative of the Commission. 
Observers from the European Central Bank, the Committee of 
European Supervisors as well as from EFTA countries and 
candidate countries are also invited to attend.  
It is well known how the legislation path in the field of 
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banking, securities and insurance is organized at 4 levels126. 
The EBC is a so-called “Level 2” Committee under the four 
level “Lamfalussy” framework. 
 
3.2.1. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) 
 
Cebs127 as well is part of the Lamfalussy procedure on the 
financial regulatory architecture. It is a L3 committee, whose 
main task is the convergence of supervisory practices among 
member states and especially between supervisory colleges. It 
gives advice to the Commission both upon request and 
autonomously in the preparation of drafts implementing 
measures in the field of banking activities. Besides, it 
                                                 
126  At the first level there is the legislative initiative by the Parliament, 
the Council or the commission: they set up the core principles to be 
implemented at level 2; at the second level the measuer is updated with 
technicalities and details deriving from EBC, EIOPC, ESC–namely the 
European committees made up of the competent ministres. The level 
three committees –CEBS, CEIOPS, CESR –advice the regulatory 
committees and contribute to consistent and convergent implementation 
of EU laws, by fostering cooperation and information exchange between 
national supervisors. Lastly level 4 of the procedure is where the 
Commission enforces and monitors the timely and correct transposition 
of EU legislation into national law. There is wide consensus over the 
necessity to change this framework. One main point is the powers the 
not legally binding decisions attributed to L3 committees. See for 
example, Communication from the Commission, Review of the Lamfalussy 
process. Strenghtening supervisory convergence, 2007, in www.ec.europa.eu; 
CEBS, CEBS Contribution to the Lamfalussy review, 12 November 2007, in 
www.c-ebs.org. However this scenario is changing at a fast pace since 
the plans to introduce a new EU financial architecture, which is 
trasforming L3 Committees granting them more powers and tasks. See 
Communication from the Commission, European Financial Supervision, 
COM 2009(252), of 27/05/2009, available at www.ec.europa.eu 
127  See Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003; and Commission 
Decision C(2009)177 establishing the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors, both available at www.ec.europa.eu. According to the de 
Laroisiere approach, CEBS will became the European Banking Authority 
(EBA).  
 88  
contributes to the implementation of the related EC body of 
laws. It is composed of representatives of national supervisors 
and central banks of the EU. 
As far as our analysis is concerned, we must acknowledge that 
CEBS has been particularly proactive in developing a common 
set of supervisory guidelines and, according to CRD 
requirements related to home-host cooperation, it has 
implemented back to 2006 Guidelines on supervisory 
cooperation for cross border banking and investment firms 
group: CEBS opinion has been recently updated in the light of 
the current turmoil through a piece of advice to the EC 
commission on the information that may be exchanged 
between home and host supervisors under art. 42 of the CRD. 
Relevant documents have been issued also in relation to the 
cooperation between colleges of supervisors of cross border 
banking groups, to their operational functioning, good 
practices to be followed, and a template for their written 
agreements has been issued128. 
 
3.2.2. The Basel committee on Banking Supervision 
 
The Basel committee on banking supervision is an institution 
created by the Central Bank Governors of the Group of ten in 
1974.  
Its work is on the formulation of standards, best practices and 
                                                 
128  See CEBS, Guidelines on supervisory cooperation for cross-border 
banking and investment firm groups, of 25 January 2006; ID., Range of 
practices on supervisory colleges and home-host cooperation, of 27 December 
2007; ID., Multilateral co-operation and co-ordination agreement, of 27 
December 2007; CEBS-CEIOPS, Ten principles for the functioning of 
supervisory colleges, of 27 January 2009; CEBS, Template for written 
agreements between supervisors for the functioning of colleges, of 27 January 
2009; ID., Good practices on the functioning of college of supervisors for cross 
border banking groups, of 2 April 2009; ID., Advice on the information that 
may be exchanged between home and host supervisors of branches under art. 42 
of the CRD, of 3 June 2009; ID., Draft Guidelines for the operational 
functioning of colleges, of 17 December 2009. All are available at www.c-
ebs.org 
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guidelines in relation to banking supervision, as well as it 
promotes regular cooperation among supervisors.  
Although its documents are not binding in Member States 
since they can be seen as soft law provisions, nonetheless they 
are widely accepted by the Community and in some instances 
are even translated into EC Directives (see the CRD that 
mirrors the Basel Accord). Further some of them , as the 
principle of sound corporate governance in banks, are widely 
recognised and taken as a point of reference for national 
legislators. 
Its main purpose is to encourage convergence and to enhance 
understanding of key supervisory issues in the field of banking 
regulation and supervision. 
  
 
3.2.3. The Financial Stability Board (ex FSF) 
 
 
The Financial Stability Board shall be considered among the 
supranational organizations entrusted with the task of finding 
common consensus and agreed solutions between member 
states in relation to financial stability issues. It is composed of 
worldwide authorities responsible for financial stability, sector 
specifics international groupings of regulators and supervisors 
and committees of central bank experts. In the wake of the 
crisis it enacted a Decalogue on cross border cooperation on 
crisis management, which defines the scope of crisis 
management and gives competent Authorities instructions on 
how to prepare and manage financial crisis. 
As they define the final aim of those crisis as the prevention of 
serious domestic or international instability that would have 
an adverse impact on the real economy. In so doing they 
should 1) maintain incentives for financial institutions to 
behave prudently; 2) promote private sector solutions and use 
public sector intervention only when this is necessary to 
preserve financial stability; and 3) maintain a level competitive 
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international playing field in the spirit of the Basel accord.  
As far as home –host coordination is concerned it is 
recommended that home authorities should lead work with 
the key host authorities to look at the practical barriers to 
achieving coordinated action in the event of a financial crisis 
involving specific firms, for every cross-border bank identified 
by the FSB as having or going to have a core supervisory 
college. 
To prepare for a crisis, Authorities should develop common 
support tools for managing a cross border financial crisis, meet 
at least annually to consider together the specific issues and 
barriers to coordinated actions under the guide of home 
supervisors, which is also given the task to keep interested 
authorities informed on the arrangements for crisis 
management. Besides, they should share a minimum defined 
set of information (e.g. on group structure, interlinkages 
between the firm and the financial system, contingency 
funding arrangements, etc.) and ensure that firms are capable 
of supplying them on a timely fashion. 
In managing a crisis Authorities should strive to find 
internationally coordinated solutions that take into account 
negative externalities on other countries, share national 
assessment of systemic implications, share information as 
freely as practicable with relevant authorities from an early 
stage preserving confidentiality though and where a fully 
coordinated solution is not applicable, they should discuss 
national measures with other relevant authorities.  
We can see how this set of soft laws implicitly underlines both 
coordination problems and information sharing as we have 
highlighted thus far. Nonetheless, although such rules can be 
considered more “prominent” than mous and so there may be 
grater incentive to obey, they have the same limitations as the 
latter: they lack of enforceability and control over their actual 
application. 
 
 
 
 91  
3.3. The rationale behind bank insolvency regulation. The 
case for a lex specialis  
 
Scope of bank129 insolvency regulation is manifold.  
In fact, in implementing early and late intervention tools, 
competent authorities should bear in mind depositor 
protection and public confidence in the system, as well as 
should maintain financial stability, preserve critical banking 
functions and protect competition in the sense of ensuring that 
banks’ claimholders are not treated more favorably than other 
non banking entities. Furthermore they should be designed in 
such a way to mimimise the overall resolution costs, the actual 
cost for taxpayers and to avoid moral hazard.  
In fact, bankers who are aware that their position, reputation 
and wage would be put at stake should their bank fail, may 
have little incentive to engage on risky transactions; similarly, 
if depositors and creditors know they would bear severe losses 
in case of crisis they would tend to take extra care in 
monitoring bank’s management. But if both parties know that 
losses and adverse consequences would be borne by taxpayers 
and the government, they won’t have incentive to behave. This 
means, at least as far as moral hazard is concerned, that the 
regulatory framework would work at its best if it is able to 
share losses between equity shareholders, insiders, investors, 
capital providers and unsecured creditors of the bank, and 
then to avoid any expectations on likely bailouts, irrespectively 
of the bank’s size.  
Depositor protection on the other hand, can be explained 
                                                 
129 As for corporate insolvency law objectives, according to Shiffman, 
those should aim at fulfilling the fair and predictable treatment of 
creditors and the maximisation of assets of the debtor in the interests of 
creditors, see Shiffman H., Legal measures to manage bank insolvency, in 
«Bank Failures and Bank insolvency Law in economies in transition», 
eds by Lastra and Shiffman, Kluwer Law, 1999, passim. For a thorough 
analysis of corporate insolvency law, see Schwartz A., A normative theory 
of business bankruptcy, at Virginia Law Review, vol. 91, issue 5, 2005, 
1199-1265  
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because of the information asymmetries between savers and 
banks: the former do not have the means to evaluate bank’s 
financial health nor they could exert any form of real 
monitoring to the banks. Besides, protecting depositors means 
also protecting the public confidence and the economic 
stability, although most of the times depositors are not even 
informed on the existence of this safety net and therefore run 
anyway on their bank130. Depositor protection can also be seen 
as a form of political choice since the opposite could come at a 
politically high cost as it could be viewed as an unpopular 
decision131. 
To preserve the other goals, we expect insolvency system to be 
able to meet some other critical requirements, such as i) clearly 
defined grounds for intervention, so that ailing banks cannot 
free ride on authorities’ disorganization and normative 
lacunae; ii) ability to promptly correct the situation before it 
gets too severe; iii) a well defined deposit insurance system, so 
that depositors are quickly and fully repaid; however, to avoid 
                                                 
130  Some attribute the need to protect depositors to the payment 
services provision by banks. They say that “the reduction of transaction 
costs by the generalized use of the payment system can only be attained 
if depositors are confident that their deposits are safe in the bank. This 
means that banking regulation should provide guarantees that create 
sufficient incentive for potential depositors to open a bank account and 
to access the payment system”. See CEPR, Bailing out the banks: 
reconciling stability and competition, 2009, at www.cepr.org, 10. 
131  In the aftermath of the Argentinian crisis of the early ninetines, 
argentinian government actually abolished depositor protecion and 
forbidden central bank to give financial help to banks in difficulties. The 
main results were the diversification of interest rates among depositors, 
reflecting different risk premia, the establishemnt of interbank rating 
agencies, the organisation of mutual support in the event of financial 
crisis and other form of private arrangements. Eventually however, 
government had to step back on its decision and to re introduce a form 
of deposit insrance, to cope with the so called “tequila effect” due to the 
currency crisis being experienced by Mexico at the time. For a very 
interesting and detalied analisis of the issue, see Miller G., Is deposit 
insurance inevitable? Lessons from Argentina, at International review of law 
and economics, 16, 1996, 211-232. 
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moral hazard, the system shall be designed not to result in a 
form of blanket guarantee to bank’s losses; iv) insolvency law 
should give the competent authorities full, unconditional and 
immediate power to access and dispose of bank’s assets and 
accounts, to have the clearest idea possible of bank’s health and 
finally, v) resolution Authority should have adequate powers 
to maximize recoveries and minimize third parties 
interferences132. Basically once crisis’ intensity has been 
carefully assessed, competent Authority shall have all the 
needed powers to efficiently tailoring their response.  
Anticipating here what will be described throughout further, 
when the crisis has cross border aspects, legal, regulatory and 
operational problems must be addressed as noted by 
Krimminger (2005)133.  
In fact, legal issues stem from the imperfect and sometimes 
conflicting interaction of legal systems, whereas regulatory 
problems arise because of domestic regulators having to 
coordinate their actions (take the Northern Rock case as an 
example) and operational issues since, as we have seen 
analyzing mou’s and conflict of interests, there is no binding 
agreement in place and because involved states may take a 
different approach to the crisis, due to their perception of 
bank’s importance.  
Besides, applicable law should fulfill other components, such 
as clear ex ante responsible authority identification, role 
assigned to the supervisor(s) without primary responsibility, 
coordination between different regulatory and supervisory 
infrastructures, LOLR arrangements, different legal treatment 
of corporate structure, to cite a few.   
 
                                                 
132  See Krimminger M., The resolution of cross border banks: issues for 
deposit insurers and proposal for cooperation, in Journal of Financial 
Stability, 4, 2008, 376-390.  
133  See  Krimminger M., Banking in a changing world: Issues and 
questions in the resolution of cross border banks, paper presented at the 
Federal Reserve bank of Chicago conference on Cross Border banking: 
Regulatory Challenges, October 6-7- 2005, mimeo. 
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Before proceeding though, we shall preface that in our analysis 
we are of the opinion that multinational banking groups need 
a special resolution regime and cannot be confined into 
national law or EU law related to corporate insolvency, as for 
example Regulation 1346/2000.  
Nonetheless, it may be useful just to give a glimpse on the 
related debate.  
The main point is whether or not common insolvency rules (lex 
generalis) can be applied to banks.  
In principle, no apparent reasons justify the negative opinion, 
indeed this is what happens in some jurisdictions (Spain, 
Ireland and, until some times ago, UK) though few ad hoc 
provisions apply in case of credit institution (e.g. in case of 
setting off and netting of financial claims) or, wherein special 
law applies, it may be established that for any unregulated 
aspect, general insolvency provisions apply, insofar as they are 
compatible or appropriate. Moreover, since banks in crisis are 
no longer performing banking functions, one may say that 
there is no need to carry on subjecting them to the banking 
supervisor/regulator and therefore there is scope to leave their 
resolution to courts. 
However, as we highlighted in the first chapter, banks are 
special under many perspectives, both because of the 
“functions” pursued, and because they are already treated 
differently from corporate legislation. Banks are hence 
submitted to the supervision and regulation of an ad hoc 
authority134. 
                                                 
134  On the other side of the spectrum tough, there is the high opacity 
of banks, which calls for regulatory intervention because debt and 
equity holders may find very difficult monitoring bank’s managers, 
controlling banks from risk shifting, designing contracts that align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and makes it easier for insiders 
to exploit outside investors. Furthermore it reduces two fundamental 
forces, usually present in commercial firms: product market and 
takeover. See Levine R., The Corporate governance of banks: a concise 
discussion of concepts and evidence, 2003, at www.ssrn.com; and Caprio G., 
Levine R., Corporate governance in finance: concepts and international 
observation, in Financial Sector governance: the roles of the public and 
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Banks are different from other companies135 even in respect to 
the triggering event of a crisis136. While the latter go bust 
basically for market events and internal management and/or 
accounting problems, banks are subjected to wider and most 
sensitive causes that need to be handled with extra care than a 
commercial company. Nonetheless insolvency proceedings are 
usually administered or coordinated by a public authority, 
such as the competent Minister, even in the case of non-
financial firms, when these are of big dimensions. 
Banks’ specificity thus translates into characteristic features of 
banking law compared to general insolvency law. 
As we highlighted in the previous chapter, not only the 
triggering event but the triggers for supervisory action are 
different, because watchdogs can intervene long before the 
bank gets insolvent and even if it is not insolvent at all. We 
have seen in fact that in common insolvency law, creditors 
intervene when the firm is not able to fulfill its obligation when 
they fall due. Banking law oppositely gives authorities powers 
to intervene whenever they retain it necessary.  
This means that, as it has been noted by Hupkes (2003), «the 
insolvency concept under general law proves somewhat 
dysfunctional for banks»137. 
To give more strength to the argument, we may add that lex 
                                                                                                                 
private sectors, eds by Litan, Pomerleano, Sundararajan, 2002.  
135  Obviously banks are corporations its elves, which under some 
regards face the same corporate governance issues than commercial 
companies. Nonetheless in relation to this, the existing strands of studies 
reach opposite conclusions: the first argues that the same corporate 
control mechanisms that influence the governance of non-financial firms 
also influence bank operations whereas the second confirm the 
specificity of banks to this regard. See, Polo A., Corporate governance of 
banks: the current state of the debate, 2007, working paper available at 
www.ssrn.com. 
136  On the differences between insolvency of financial and non 
financial firms see also, Caprio G., Klingebiel D., Bank Insolvency: bad 
luck, bad policy or bad banking?, in Proceedings of the annual world bank 
conference on development economics, 1996, at www.worlbank.org 
137  P. 10 
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generalis deals with mortician firms, but banks cannot be 
considered as such since they are yet able to paying creditors 
even when in financial difficulties. This is due to the maturity 
mismatch liability structure that characterizes them. This 
reinforces the opinion that insolvency is not always a trigger 
for intervention, oppositely to what happens to non financial 
companies: as we said in the previous chapter, we can 
differentiate between the failure of a bank and its insolvency, 
and we can say that banking insolvency law aims at promptly 
intervening at any point before a failure occurs, creditors incur 
losses and bank becomes over indebted. 
Triggers are also related to financial stability and soundness, 
whereas in corporate insolvency law these are initiated by 
creditors’ impulse: this means that at the core of common 
insolvency law is the protection of private interests rather than 
mixed ones and we may suppose that the law is designed 
accordingly. Should this be the case, we have found another 
proof for the advocacy of a special resolution mechanism for 
banks.   
If we move to stakeholders, these are given different powers 
and possibilities in relation to the underlying different grounds 
for intervention.  
Under lex generalis they can initiate proceedings, they may 
constitute a consortium to protect their interests in front of a 
judge, they can have their say and they can suggest actions to 
be taken by the court appointed person. This function cannot 
be met by special law because we saw how scope of bank’s 
resolution cannot only be the asset maximization, as it would 
be the case for commercial firms, and hence banking law needs 
to give powers to a public authority whose statutory objective 
is financial stability protection. Besides, it is a matter of fact 
that creditor participation to insolvency proceedings usually 
slows down final decisions and settlement, whereas in bank 
insolvency law time is an asset. 
Furthermore only a procedure administrated by the supervisor 
seems to have the normative legitimacy to act irrespectively of 
the existing company law.  
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In fact, keeping in mind that timeframe is essential, that a 
greater number of objectives must be preserved and that 
stakeholders’ control over bank management is confined to the 
minimum, it may be vital having the possibility of blocking, 
avoiding or somehow strongly and timely contrasting 
management or shareholders’ decisions that may threaten even 
more the institute’s (and de relato system’s) stability, and that 
may be detrimental to the satisfaction of third parties. 
Moreover those harmful decisions are usually taken in the 
meanwhile just before the crisis comes out, hence the presence 
of a third authority empowered to take prompt control over 
actions or decisions such as bonus payments made to 
managers and high level employees, or elargition of large 
dividend payment to existing shareholders, or any other action 
that threats to shift away value and resources or to increase 
risk in a final rush to catch all the gains. On the other hand 
supervisors may impose asset transferability within the group, 
as a source of strength to the ailing subsidiary138. 
A special law for bank’s insolvency may also give supervisors 
the ability to change management, and to cross over legal 
obstacles on certain decisions that need shareholders approval 
as when mergers or taking over are encouraged or other form 
of private/public solution would be the optimal solution. 
However, conferring those powers to Authorities comes at a 
cost for shareholders, whose rights are protected not only by 
the related body of EU laws (e.g., second company law 
directive, shareholders’ rights directive, third company law 
directive, directive on cross border mergers, sixth company 
law directive), but also by the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Under art. 1 of the Protocol, in case of transfer of 
ownership or assets of an ailing bank, shareholders’ rights 
must be considered as to guarantee their peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions. In fact, the related interference must strike a “fair 
balance between the demands of the protection of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the 
                                                 
138  On the source of strength doctrine, see infra. 
 98  
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”, such as the 
privation of their own shares, or the suffering of a diminution 
of their value.  
It is not by chance then that laws allowing for public 
intervention, admit the pari passu principle or imply only a 
partial reduction to their rights, such as the one to call the 
general meeting or to take certain decisions. However, more 
clarification is needed in the to be implemented framework.  
 
 
Finally, from the above derives that the agenda on special 
resolution should: 
• Allow the authorities to take control of the financial 
institutions at an early stage of its financial difficulties;  
• Empower the authorities to use a wide range of tools to 
deal with a failing financial institution, without the consent of 
shareholders or creditors;  
• Establish an effective and specialized framework for 
liquidation of the institution that assigns a central role to the 
authorities;  
• Ensure clarity as to the objectives of the regime and 
define clearly the scope of judicial review139;  
• Promote information sharing and coordination among 
all authorities involved in supervision and resolution; 
• Modify company law directives to allow for a restriction 
of shareholder rights in case of public interest and preservation 
of financial stability, designing appropriate safeguards to 
redress and compensate their claims; 
• Reduce the total costs of failure to taxpayers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139  See Cihak M., Nier E., The need for special resolution regimes for 
financial institutions –the case of the European Union, IMF working paper, 
n. 200, 2009, at www.imf.org, p. 11.  
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3.4.  Cross border crisis management issues.  
 
When it involves cross border features, crisis management and 
resolution is even more critical.  
As far as the operational difficulties is concerned, we have 
already seen what the division of labor between home and host 
authority shall be and how the misalignment of interests 
among supervisors play a crucial role in the feasibility of 
coordination and collaboration. 
We concluded that the mismatch among supervisory 
responsibility, availability of information, legal authority to 
intervene and different consideration of branch/subsidiary 
importance may lead to a suboptimal level of crisis 
management. 
 
In this paragraph we want to focus on the legal and regulatory 
differences mentioned above.  
In fact, another layer of complexity in managing the failure of a 
group is given by the –sometimes profound –differences 
between supervisory architecture, triggers for intervention, 
types of procedures, power attributed to authorities, deposit 
insurance and lender of last resort functioning. 
We want investigate each of them giving a general overview of 
EU member States and then focusing on those States where the 
highest concentration of cross border banking groups is 
headquartered, namely Italy, Spain, France, Germany and UK.  
Our analysis will be based basically on the survey conducted 
by CEBS in 2008, on the mapping of supervisory powers in 
Europe140. 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 See, CEBS, Mapping of Supervisory objectives and powers, including 
early intervention measures and sanctioning powers, Report n. 47, March 
2009 
 100  
3.4.1. Supervisory architecture and objectives 
 
Supervision may be integrated, not integrated and partially 
integrated141.  
By the first we mean that the same authority is responsible for 
banking, insurance and securities sector. This is the case in the 
UK, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, Poland and 
Sweden.  
In a non integrated supervisory architecture, three different 
authorities are competent for each sector. Usually in this case, 
banks’ supervision is a task of the central bank, as in Italy, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Spain, Greece, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.  
Lastly, partially integrated supervision realizes when the same 
authority is in charge of monitoring banks and one other 
sectoral institution. In Europe a stand alone banking 
supervisor is in France142.  
                                                 
141  See FSI, Institutional arrangements for financial sector supervision. 
Results of the 2006 FSI Survey, BIS occasional working paper, 2007. The 
report takes into account major changes of supervisory environment 
worldwide. Its main findings are that although central bank is the 
dominant domicile for supervisory authorities, controlling for “major 
changes” there is a decline in authorities domicile din government 
departments, an increase in authorities domiciled in separate agencies, 
and a small decline in authorities domiciled in central banks. As far as 
the level of integration is concerned, non integrated authorities are and 
remain the dominant category, but, again, controlling for the major 
changes in the level of integration appears a decline in the number of 
non integrated authorities, an increase both in the number of partially 
integrated and integrated categories and a movement towards more 
integrated supervisory structures. Lastly, the cross category analysis 
shows how, controlling for the major changes, there has been an increase 
in the number of central banking authorities fully integrated, an even 
higher increase in the same direction there has been in the authorities 
domiciled in separate agencies, which would confirm the tendency 
towards a fully integrated supervisory arrangement. 
142  See CEBS, Mapping of supervisory objective and powers, including 
early intervention measures and sanctioning powers, March 2009, available at 
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It shall be kept in mind that national differences on 
supervisory architecture, gives rise to divergent policy choices, 
incentives and mandates and that in such a case the possibility 
of inefficient and not timely exchange of information and 
cooperation increases.  
 
As far as the policy objective is concerned, not all the member 
States share the same goals.  
In fact, only the banking regulation compliance, the duty to 
cooperate among supervisors and the maintenance of financial 
stability (with the exception of Malta) are shared objectives.  
Many States have in common the duty to protect banks’ client 
from bad business practices, or to prevent financial crime (all 
Authorities have this responsibility except Malta and Spain), 
while differences appear in relation to the enforcement powers. 
Only some member States (five) have the express mandate to 
promote convergence of supervisory practices: to this regard, 
however, some are amending their laws whereas others 
consider it as an implicit function. In two member states the 
enforcement of competition rules is a task, while in many 
others there is an ad hoc authority; as far as promoting access 
to banking services, this responsibility is common only to four 
authorities.  
Supervisory objective is particularly important since the lack of 
the appropriate goal may lead to an inability of the institution 
to take a decision or to timely react as needed. A clear example 
of this situation has happened during the crisis of the British 
bank “Northern Rock”, where the FSA was not statutory 
entrusted with financial stability and therefore could not act 
promptly to stop the run. Furthermore, none of the other 
British supervisory authorities had formally such power and 
eventually none of them was willing (maybe because of 
political implications) to take the lead to prevent greater 
damages.   
 
                                                                                                                 
www.c-ebs.org 
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3.4.2 Supervisory powers 
 
Supervisory powers entail the range of possibilities and 
competences an Authority has over the regulated entities.  
Our aim here is to show how many times supervisors are not 
in charge of the same powers and even where this happens 
they may not have the same enforcement powers to counteract 
the related infringement. Following our reasoning path, this 
means that there may be a differentiated treatment among 
subsidiaries within the group depending on where they are 
incorporated.  
This in turn implies a certain percentage of regulatory 
arbitrage in deciding where to set up a subsidiary or the same 
holding company and which legal form may be more 
convenient.  
We can now take into account licensing, information gathering 
and inspections, and rule making powers, since those are the 
powers that a firm may want to look at before establish 
subsidiaries. 
Although all member States submit banking activity upon 
authorisation, only fifteen of them have direct enforcement 
powers, such as imposing fines, issuing orders to close down 
the business or seizing premises, whereas four have more 
general powers to impose pecuniary sanctions and require 
closure of unauthorized activities. As far as licensing is 
concerned, the related power is mostly granted to competent 
authorities, but it may also be allocated to the minister of 
finance (Spain) and Treasury (Luxemburg) or to an ad hoc 
licensing agency, as in the case of France. 
All authorities have powers to conduct on site inspection, 
either directly or by delegating the task as well as have great 
information requiring powers. Nonetheless, not all of them 
have the same powers in relation to the possibility to carry 
inspection or to require information to companies performing 
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outsourced functions. Rule making power, in the form of 
regulations or instructions is common to mostly all member 
states, though three of them (Estonia, France, Hungary) have 
no powers to issue binding rules or principles, whilst other 
have regulatory powers that go beyond prudential regulation, 
such as in the area of accounting standards, anti money 
laundering, price stabilization, financial promotion or control 
of information. 
As far as the intervention in case of financial difficulties is 
concerned, this has been divided by CEBS into different 
categories: i) measures aimed at restoring compliance, capital 
adequacy and soundness of an institution; ii) sanctioning 
powers that operate through public notices; iii) intervention 
and sanctioning powers; iv) measures directed at the 
management body of the institution; v) measures directed at 
the shareholders; vi) capital related measures; vii) measures 
related to pre-insolvency situations and insolvency 
proceedings, and viii) powers to trigger deposit guarantee 
schemes. 
Among the measures aimed at restoring compliance and 
soundness, we are mostly interested into the possibility of 
limiting intra group and outside the group asset transfers and 
transactions and to exercise supervisory forbearance. The 
limitation on intra group asset transferability is not always 
expressly provided for in the legal framework, nonetheless 
these can be imposed by all authorities but Estonia, Finland 
and Ireland whilst those outside the group by every authority 
but Finland, Romania and Slovenia. 
Powers to forbearance, namely to grant temporary exception to 
the application of a legal requirement in exceptional 
circumstances, are not uniformly distributed among member 
states. In fact, even where this possibility is admitted, the 
preconditions or the scope of prudential requirements that can 
be waived differs. As well as such power may be limited to 
targeted cases expressly provided for in the legislation.  
Measures directed at the management body may vary from the 
opposition to the nomination of a director or of a board 
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member, to management replace, to the manager appointment 
from the authority to the control over remunerations. 
However, although those powers are theoretically common to 
all member states, triggers for intervention differ widely. In 
some instances they can be exercised in case of lack of fit and 
proper qualities, in others in case of liquidity or stability 
problems, as well as  a distinction appears in business as usual 
case or in case of crisis. The latter situation is true especially 
when an ad hoc administrator shall be appointed. In fact, we 
can observe that in business as usual situations (i.e. simple 
vacancy) the power is generally attributed to shareholders, 
while only three authorities have the power to make an 
application to the national court in order to appoint an 
administrator. Whereas, in times of difficulties for a bank, 
though not severe, twenty authorities have the possibility to 
directly appoint a person or body possessing general or 
specific powers to authorise acts or to take decisions on behalf 
of banks, whilst two have the power to petition the courts to 
appoint an administrator or examiner. Differences arise also in 
the type of person that can be appointed, the preconditions 
necessary, the appointment process and the range of powers 
the appointed person has. 
As we said, the exercise of powers may imply a restriction and 
also a violation of shareholders' rights, and it is therefore 
needed only in case of severe distress of the institution and to 
protect financial stability and depositors' interests. To this end, 
measures may vary from the suspension of voting rights, to the 
power to require the transfer of the shares or shares certificate, 
the power  to require a change in ownership and to prohibit or 
limit the distribution of profits and finally the power to require 
commitments/actions from shareholders to support the 
institution if needed, with cash or equity. 
We therefore see that all authorities, but Netherlands and 
France, have the power to suspend the voting rights attached 
to specific shareholders, although the categories of 
shareholders and the triggers vary among countries, as well as 
the exercise of those powers may be autonomous or shall be 
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conducted in collaboration with other entities (i.e. competent 
Minister). Beside, also the grounds upon which the suspension 
of profits may be exercised vary among authorities, ranking 
from the failure to comply with legal requirements, to the 
impairment of the liquidity position to the threat to become 
insolvent. 
The possibility to ask for a transfer of shares is admitted only 
in nine countries whereas few have the possibility to exercise 
this power only over shareholders with qualifying holdings 
and when the authorisation to obtain a qualifying holding has 
been withdrawn.  
Those authorities that cannot require a transfer of shares or 
change in ownership may nonethelss obtain the same result by 
suspending voting rights to bring about a transfer or a change 
in ownership, or asking for a capital increase. 
Only eleven authorities can oblige shareholders to pump 
money in the company by injecting cash, although differences 
arise with regard to the pre-conditions needed.    
As concerns measures related with capital, those may be of 
three types: i) limitation or prohibition of the principal or 
interests payments on subordinated debt, that can be required 
by eighteen authorities; ii) request of conversion of 
subordinated debt into preferential or new equity, that can be 
asked by only six autorities; and iii) the limitation or 
prohibition of any major capital expenditure that can be fully 
requested by eighteen autorities.  
 
3.4.3. Supervisory powers in relation to pre-insolvency 
situation and insolvency proceedings  
 
We have seen how the lack of coordination among authorities 
arises also because they shall act under different grounds and 
circumstances. Furthermore, the consequent powers are also 
different as well as the proceedings. Here we want to take into 
account the role played by the competent authorities in 
initiating insolvency proceedings, in the reorganisation or 
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winding up and their possibility to coordinate a rescue plan 
before insolvency occurs.    
Whilst all authorities, except in Belgium, Spain, Finland and 
Sweden, have the power to initiate insolvency proceedings 
aimed at restructuring or winding up the bank, only sixteen of 
them143 have the power to coordinate a rescue plan, and even 
where this is possible, different abilities are attached to the 
Authorities. In fact, if we consider the possibility of setting up 
a bridge bank, creating a new bank or favouring a take over, 
very few authorities can set up a bridge bank or a new bank, 
although this can be the indirectly achieved by favouring 
mergers or takeovers. Furthermore, the role of coordinator can 
vary from having direct powers of intervention to being only 
involved without enforceable powers. 
Some authorities (i.e. France, Finland and Czech Republic) 
have no direct responsibility in coordinating a rescue plan: in 
some cases coordination is left to the Ministry of Finance, 
under the technical assistance of the Authority, whereas in 
other instances, the Authorities are involved through the 
conservatorship and special administration regime. In the 
remaining countries such role simply doesn’t exist. 
As for winding up and reorganisation procedures, the former 
is generally initiated when the bank is facing an irreversible 
crisis and bank’s closure is inevitable, whilst the latter may be 
commenced if the crisis appears to be temporary and/or 
reversible. Where a lex specialis is in place, those procedures 
are generally conducted by the administrative Authority, 
whereas under the lex generalis framework, proceedings are 
judicial in nature; competent authorities have anyway a role in 
the crisis resolution or/and management (except tough in some 
eastern European countries). 
Authorities’  powers differ according to the type of procedure, 
ranging from the whole responsibility for reorganisation to 
                                                 
143 Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Hungary, Finland, Irelan, Italy, Lituania, Luxemburg, Malta, Purtugal, 
United Kingdom and Sweden 
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involvement in the winding up(that usually belongs to judicial 
authorities); from an advisory role to the possibility of 
applying to the court to convene a meeting of the bank’s 
creditors that may be ratified by the judge; from the possibility 
to directly appoint a liquidator or a receiver, to the possibility 
of proposing it; from the possibility of issuing orders to the 
liquidator to the consultative role with it to the possibility of 
automatically act as an administrator. In Poland the 
supervisory Authority has the power to appoint a receiver, 
arrange a takeover, reorganise and liquidate a credit 
institution. 
To give a concrete examples of the supervisory’s powers 
patchwork, it is worth noting the differences among the “big 
five” EU countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain).  
According to the Banking Bill 2009, British Tripartite 
Authorities have the power to decide whether the set up of a 
bridge bank would be beneficial or whether a private sector 
solution or the nationalisation may obtain greater results. The 
decision is taken when public interests and depositors' 
protection come at stake. It is the Bank of England that decides 
the transfer, upon Treasury autorisation in case this implies 
fiscal costs, but in any event the Central bank must consult 
with the FSA: the latter indeed shall evaluate whether the bank 
can be considered insolvent or not. 
If a stabilization power other than a public ownership option is 
exercised, and if the BoE is satisfied that the residual bank is—
or is likely to become—unable to pay its debts, the Court 
would appoint an administrator.  Its main objectives are 
supporting the commercial purchaser or bridge bank, by 
cooperatively providing services and facilities, to satisfy BoE’s 
requests and to avoid any action that is likely to prejudice 
performance by the residual bank.  Indeed, the administrator’s 
main task is to manage what is still in place in the failing 
institution, namely the part of the ailing bank that has not been 
sold or not been transferred to the private purchaser. 
The bank’s administrator has a wide range of powers to sustain 
the bank in respect to the creditors, payments, custody of 
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properties, and court applications.  The option of last resort 
which can be used by the BoE, FSA, or the Secretary of State, is 
seeking a bank insolvency order.  This could be an appropriate 
course of action when the bank is unable to repay its debts, 
winding up the bank would be in the public interest, or it 
would be fair and the bank has eligible depositors under the 
terms of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS).  
If such an order was sought, the court would appoint a bank 
liquidator, who would be responsible for working with the 
FSCS to ensure that either the accounts of eligible depositors 
are transferred to another institution, or that they get paid 
promptly.  When compensation payments cannot be funded 
from the assets of the failing bank, they are made by the FSCS.  
Where transfers of deposits have been made to other banks, the 
FSCS can make monies available to fund that transfer144. 
Liquidators are also obliged to wind up the affairs of a failed 
bank in the interests of the creditors generally.  Its powers are 
essentially the same as those of a bank administrator, which in 
turn mimic the powers given to the insolvency administrator in 
the Insolvency Act 1986.  If necessary, the BoE can make 
supplemental, reverse and onward transfer instruments in 
relation to property or securities. 
In France, the Commission Bancaire can only appoint a special 
administrator who is in charge of all the relevant decisions, is 
supervised by the Commission and it works in close 
cooperation with the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the Bank of 
France, to coordinate actions in case of difficulties. Liquidation 
is a proceeding with separate liquidators acting under the 
control of the Court pursuant to the commercial code.  
The German BaFin can coordinate private sector solutions 
before insolvency occurs, can set up a “bad” bank and favour 
the orderly transfer of business in case of crisis. It can 
participate in the further nationalisation of the bank that is 
                                                 
144  For further references, please see, Russo C., The Uk Banking Act, 
2009: new laws, old problems, in «Bulletin of international legal 
developments»,  issue 04, 2009.  
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permitted only if the expropriation authority – the Federal 
Ministry of Finance – has previously made an unsuccessful 
attempt at an alternative acquisition or if such an attempt, in 
view of the urgency, lacks sufficient prospects of success. 
Nationalisation assumes that the required majority in the 
company's general shareholders' meeting for such a capital 
measure was not achieved, or that the resolution was not 
registered in a timely manner. It takes place by means of an 
order from the federal government without the consent of the 
Federal Council. 
In Italy, the consolidated banking law gives great powers to the 
Bank of Italy to decide which procedure is most suited for the 
ailing bank, whether a special administration (SA) or a 
compulsory liquidation (CL). In fact, while those procedures 
are formally initiated by the ministry of finance, under BdI 
proposal, the Bank is in charge of the supervision and direction 
of the procedures and appoints the bodies governing the 
proceedings. By means of the Special administration, 
reorganization of the bank is possible. In fact, it has a 
preventive nature and is adopted at an early stage of the crisis. 
During this procedure rescue plans may be adopted by the 
special administrator in strict connection and under the 
approval of the central bank.  If is under the SA, board of 
directors and auditors are substituted by special bodies and 
the general shareholders meeting is suspended. The final 
outcomes of the special administration might be: i) the bank 
restructuring and the return to ordinary administration 
(appointment of a new board of directors and auditors by the 
shareholders); ii) the combination (merger or acquisition) with 
a sound bank; iii) the initiation of CL. When there is an 
emergency situation and the conditions for initiating a SA are 
fulfilled, the BI can arrange directly for one or more special 
administrators to take over the management of the bank for a 
period of no more than two months, while the functions of 
directors are suspended and shareholders’ meeting is not 
affected at all (so called, Provisional Administration). 
Under Compulsory Administrative Liquidation (CL), the bank 
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is wound up. In fact, preconditions for the application of such 
procedure are that the bank is not able to repay its liabilities 
and fulfil its obligation. This may imply an assignment of 
assets and liabilities to another bank, in the form of purchase 
and assumption, without nonetheless any interruption of 
business to minimise the impact on involved stakeholders. The 
decision is taken by the liquidators, under the autorisation of 
the Bank of Italy. 
Lastly, the Spanish system provides for a role for the Deposit 
Funds in deciding whether to act or not. In fact, while the BdE 
decides to replace the management, appointing interventores 
when the funds, the stability or liquidity of the bank are in 
danger, it then acts in coordination with the Deposit funds 
(DGF).  In fact, the BoE informs the DGF about troubled 
institutions and the latter decides if an action plan is to be 
undertaken, with the approval of the BdE, to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of the institution. DGF’s may adopt a wide range 
of preventive and reorganisation measures aimed at improving 
the institution’s viability to overcome a crisis situation: direct 
financial assistance (loans under favourable conditions, the 
purchase of impaired assets, etc.), capital restructuring (capital 
subscribed by the DGFs) and measures aimed at favouring a 
merger with or acquisition by a sound institution. The 
efficiency of such measures must be previously assessed 
compared to that of the restitution of depositors.  As stated in 
Insolvency Law, in the case of insolvency of a credit institution, 
the corresponding Deposit Guarantee Fund shall be appointed 
as one of the trustees in insolvency instead of the creditor, the 
other two members of the insolvency administration body 
shall be appointed among those proposed by the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund. In the event a credit institution may decide its 
dissolution and corresponding voluntary liquidation, it must 
inform BdE, which can impose conditions to such decision. The 
Minister of Economy and Finance is empowered to decide the 
intervention of the liquidation process of a bank. 
Nonetheless the BdE cannot initiate insolvency proceedings, 
given that those are competence of the judicial authority: it 
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shall be informed but its main role is pre emptive. Indeed, 
although the BoE intervention is not automatic to the existence 
of a trigger, it has a wide range of tools at its disposal 
including: i) issuance of requirements or binding instructions 
coupled with actions plans including reporting requirements 
and special audits for its monitoring; ii) approval by the BoE of 
a plan submitted by the ailing bank to restore prudential 
requirements infringement; iii) autorisation to distribute 
dividends and to open new branches. The plan under ii) may 
include limitation of activities, disinvestment in specific assets 
or measures to increase own funds. The BdE has the power to 
establish additional measures at its discretion.  
 
As far as pre insolvency situations, we must add that all the 
authorities share the possibility of withdrawing the licence as 
an extreme sanction to avoid the insovency but not all of them 
share the ability to impose a moratorium on the bank, that may 
take the form of temporary suspension of payment to closure 
of the bank for business without declaring insolvency, whereas 
in some countries moratoria do not apply to credit institutions 
that are subjected to specific rules. Where it applies, triggers, 
competent authority and quantity of powers differ. 
Further, according to art. 136 of the Capital Requirement 
Directive, whenever an institution does not comply with 
requirements imposed by the Directive, each Authority shall at 
least have the following preemptive powers:  1) obliging credit 
institution to hold own funds in excess of the minimum level 
setup by the law; 2) requiring the reinforcement of the 
arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies 
implemented to comply with the Directive; 3) requiring credit 
institution to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment 
of assets in terms of own funds requirements; 4) restricting or 
limiting the business, operation or network of credit 
institutions, and 5) requiring the reduction of the risk inherent 
activities, products and systems of credit institutions. 
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3.4.4. Hints on deposit insurance and Lender of Last resort 
functions 
 
Should a bank become insolvent two mechanisms take place 
beside, but mostly in coordination with, supervisory role: 
deposit insurance and the lender of last resort. 
The former is a tool designed to protect bank’s depositors. In 
fact it intervenes to reimburse depositors’ losses whenever 
their bank is not able anymore to repay their money. It tops up 
a minimum amount fixed by the EU directive145 in 50.000 
euros146. However national legislations differ in relation to the 
amount actually covered, the types of depositors eligible, the 
funding structure for the insurance system, the possible role of 
government in backing the coverage, the availability of 
supplementary insurance (see Spain), the system 
administration and the timeframe for action.   
All those issues contribute to increase both moral hazard and 
ability of the Authorities to cooperate. In fact, on the one hand 
timely resolution is essential; on the other it is important to 
avoid the potential for moral hazard. As in the case for 
government recapitalisation and in that of protection from 
losses, with deposit insurance in place banks may assume that 
the risk from losses would not be borne by the institute itself 
hence it can gamble with the deposit insurance fund. 
Furthermore empirical findings147 showed that explicit deposit 
insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking crisis 
especially when the fund has an extensive coverage and if the 
                                                 
145  Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit 
guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay, at 
OJ L 68/3 of 13.3.2009.  
146  Before the latest amndments to the directive, the minimum amont 
as fixed at 20.000 euros. By December 2010 the Commission plans to 
increase this level up to 100.000euros. 
147  See Demirguc-Kunt A., Detragiache E., Does deposit insurance 
increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation, in «Journal of 
Monetary economics», 49, 2002, 1373-1406. 
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insurance system is run by the government rather than the 
private system. The results hold particularly when the 
institutional framework is weak and bank interest rates are 
deregulated.  
These results are reinforced by other evidence that showed an 
increase in risk taking behavior once deposit insurance had 
been introduced148: banks’ loans had higher interests rates and 
bad performance, but nonetheless banks neither pledged 
adequate collateral to those activities nor decreased loan 
maturity. Moreover, differences between ‘too big to fail’ and 
smaller institutions diminished in the post deposit insurance 
introduction period.  
The opinion in favor of deposit insurance advocates that, by 
removing the incentive for depositors to “run” on the bank, the 
institute may experience greater stability. This in turn would 
lead to the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
Unfortunately this theory relies on wrong assumptions: the 
first is the consideration of the awareness of depositors on the 
existence and the role of the Fund and the second is that banks 
really go bust because of depositors’ panics. In fact, depositors 
do run anyway notwithstanding the existence of such a safety 
net and they may contribute to the contagion of the crisis but 
not really to the crisis itself that we have seen having other 
causes. 
However other findings may give robustness to the above 
opinion: Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) showed how forbearance 
policy by the regulator may have an incentive compatible role 
in banks risks assumptions. They demonstrated that in a model 
where the regulator provides deposit insurance and has the 
authority to set a minimum capital requirement, to set the 
deposit insurance premium and possibly follow a forbearance 
                                                 
148  See, Ioannidou V. P., Penas M. F., Deposit insurance and bank risk 
taking: evidence from internal loan rating, at «Journal of Financial 
Intermediation», 19, 2010, 95-115, that take the recent introduction of 
deposit protection in Bolivia in 2001 as an example. 
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policy149, in presence of moral hazard banks may have 
incentive to improve the ex ante quality of assets150. 
Deposit insurance, as well as lender of last resort, can be 
framed into a too big to fail policy, since their existence may 
influence bank’s behavior, especially as far as its cost of funds 
is concerned. Consider that the interests rate banks pay for 
their deposits, CD’s and other borrowing can be seen as a 
function of the possibility to go bust (risk premium): without a 
maximum insurable the possibility for the bank to declare 
insolvency diminish leading to the deposit fund to basically 
subsidise the bank. In fact, the declaration of the Comptroller 
of the Currency that gave rise to the expression “too big to 
fail”151 actually had as a consequence an increase in the wealth 
effect (i.e. increase in share price) accruing to the eleven TBTF 
institution with corresponding negative effects accruing to the 
“too small to save” ones152. 
We said that differences among jurisdictions in relation to 
deposit insurance may aggravate coordination problems: this 
is due to the fact that insurance is provided by each country 
where a subsidiary is incorporated. This means that home 
country would have fewer incentives to share information and 
the host country would be more worried about the stability of 
that bank as well as on the possibility to recoup the money 
from the home authority. Notwithstanding other 
considerations that may arise, such as protection of local 
banks, economic stress, policy and political perspectives. As 
Krimminger wonders: «in the calculus of differing interests 
(between home/host authorities, nda), the key questions may 
                                                 
149  Namely, the possibility of allowing the insolvent bank to continue 
its business under regulatory supervision. 
150  See Nagarajan S., Sealey C. W., Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing 
and incentive compatible bank regulation, at «Journal of banking and 
finance», issue 19, 1995, 1109-1130 
151  For more references, see Chapter 1. 
152  See, O’Hara M., Shaw W., Deposit insurance and wealth effects: the 
value of being to big too fail, at «The journal of Finance», vol XLV, no. 5, 
1990, 1587-1600 
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continue to be who has the power to act and who has the 
information to fully assess the potential consequences from 
action or inaction»153 . 
Conversely, more cooperation between interested authorities 
would fix an optimal level of deposits coverage and 
agreements to cap deposit guarantee could be beneficial since 
otherwise each country would tend to provide excessive 
amounts of coverage that may in turn have adverse effects on 
financial stability elsewhere. Agreements among authorities 
would also favour a more tight supervision154.  
Lender of last resort is the role pursued by the national central 
banks in supporting not yet insolvent banks.  
Its theoretical foundations dates back at the XIX century when 
Thornton (An Inquiry into the nature and effects of the paper credit 
of Great Britain, 1802) and Bagheot (Lombard Street, 1873) 
developed the idea that central banks should lend short term 
money at temporarily illiquid but solvent banks although at a 
penalty rate155. 
The instruments actually used by central banks are open 
market operation, repo’s and assets’ swap. However, 
experience has shown how central banks act irrespectively 
from illiquidity or insolvency: whenever they think that an 
intervention is needed to preserve financial stability they 
engage in those operations, with the result of increasing moral 
hazard and, when it comes to cross border issues, to free 
riding. This is due to the fact that nearly ever is possible clearly 
                                                 
153  See, Krimminger M., (2008), supra. 
154  See,  Hardy D., Nieto M., Cross border coordination of prudential 
supervision and deposit guarantees, IMF working paper no. 283, 2008, 
available at www.imf.org 
155  Other elements of the model involved the possibility to 
accommodate anyone with good money, valued at pre-panic prices; the 
clear ex ante declaration of intent of Central bank readiness to lend; 
discretionary and not mandatory role of the LOLR; intervention 
subjected upon the evaluation of the bank’s solvency and the existence of 
a trigger for contagion. See Lastra R. M., Lender of Last Resort, An 
international perspective, at «The International and comparative law 
quarterly», vol. 48, no. 2, 1999, 340-361. 
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distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity, whereas a 
shortfall of the types of intervention is that a fully 
collateralized repo market allows central banks to provide the 
adequate aggregate amount of liquidity and leave to the banks 
the responsibility of lending uncollateralized156.  
Eventually LLR turns out to be a blunt instrument and, given 
the asymmetry of information, is not able to distinguish 
between fundamentally sound but illiquid institutions and 
those truly insolvent157. 
Lender of last resort functions are discretionary and stay at 
national level. We said that this implies a certain degree of 
moral hazard: banks are aware that CB, possibly in 
combination with deposit insurance mechanisms and public 
intervention, would rescue them and therefore they would 
gamble again with the tool.  
Furthermore LOLR acts with regards of banks incorporated in 
each country, notwithstanding whether they form part of a 
group or not. Again, coordination problems may arise. 
 
 
 
3.5. Coordination vs. ring fencing. Early intervention tools. 
 
We are now mature to exactly frame the case of a cross border 
group that gets insolvent.  
In an ideal framework the home country regulator would take 
the lead and coordinate actions among host countries’ 
supervisors, making use of informal contacts as well as of 
provisions contained in the MOU. The group would possibly 
be treated as a whole entity and creditors, assets, and 
shareholders rights would be settled consequently, as well as 
there will be a contribution by each member state by providing 
                                                 
156  See, Freixas X., Parigi B., Rochet J-C., The lender of last resort: a 
twenty-first century approach, at «Journal of European Economic 
Association», 2, 2004, 1085-1115. 
157  See, Llewellyn D., The economic  rationale for financial regulation, FSA 
occasional paper, 1999.  
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deposit insurance or lender of last resort tools.  
However we have showed how the above proved to be wrong.  
Coordination is likely to be suboptimal because of 1) 
conflicting interests among authorities; 2) lack of compulsory 
application and enforceability of MoU’s in place; 3) poor 
mediating role of EU Agencies; 4) severe difference between 
legal frameworks, supervisory powers and triggers for 
intervention. Hence group’s companies will be resolved as 
separate legal entities under the local law in all jurisdictions. 
Eventually, member States would intervene possibly with 
recapitalization or guarantee measures to maintain financial 
stability. 
Furthermore what may happen is that member States may ring 
fence subsidiary’s assets. 
By ring fencing we mean the ability of one Country (through 
its supervisor or central bank or minister of finance) to isolate 
local operations and to size local assets of the bank in order to 
protect its local creditors and other stakeholders, whenever the 
parent company threatens to become insolvent158. The final 
outcome is then the impossibility of the ailing parent to make 
use of subsidiaries’ assets to get fresh money or to stay afloat at 
the expenses of foreign stakeholders.  
Ring fencing may have positive implications on early 
corrective actions among countries. In fact, it may provide 
more predictable results, it maight contain contagion, and it 
may give incentive to home authority to share information and 
                                                 
158  More precisely, ring fencing can take mainly two forms: 1) 
country’s supervisor imposition of assets pledge or asset maintenance to 
assure that sufficient assets will be available in their jurisdiction in the 
event of failure of the parent company. Supervisors may also encourage 
or require that operation by foreign banks be conducted through 
standalone subsidiaries. This requires the resiliency of the local 
operation; and 2) imposition of limitation on inter-affiliate transactions, 
including transfer of assets, to prevent contagion and to protect creditors 
of a legal entity. Local authorities may also impose  limits on intragroup 
transaction to protect the domestic entity from contagion and prevent 
the outflows of funds that may be detrimental to the subsidiary. See, BIS, 
nt. 67. 
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to collaborate because of the treat of having to face local 
differentiated independent proceedings. It can also contribute 
to the resiliency of the separate operation within host country 
assigning greater role to the subsidiary. Notwithstanding this, 
for host Countries ring fencing is particularly appealing –
unless of course their chartered entity is the weak one or it is 
strongly dependent upon the ailing parent. It indeed allows 
greater control of capital, liquidity and risk management of 
incorporated banks albeit this comes at a cost, namely the 
possibility of the parent company to reduce –while still in 
business –operations in that country and the likelihood of the 
home authority not to fully cooperate in the on going 
supervision.  
In effect, shortfalls of ring fencing are not negligible either. It 
cannot avoid the collapse of the subsidiary, whose strength 
derives from parent’s downstreams, and may hamper 
creditors’ satisfaction, which in turn means that liquidity of the 
group as a whole may be compromised because of the 
segregation of internal funding and liquidity flows. It may 
hence hinder orderly resolution form the home authority by 
reducing the pool of assets available for intra group transfers.   
Lastly it may increase the probability of further defaults on 
other countries and complicate crisis management159. 
To this regard, burden sharing can be seen a way to minimize 
the above drawbacks. 
In this section we hence shall investigate the means that could 
be activate ex ante, namely before the crisis occurs. 
We can divide them in public or private: the public admit the 
intervention of the State and could be the so called burden 
sharing agreements between involved countries whereas 
private solutions could be the asset transferability within the 
group, namely a downward or an upward streaming of 
resources, and the so called living wills, namely the 
predisposition of a plan by the bank wherein actions to be 
                                                 
159  See, BIS, Report and recommendations of the Cross border bank 
resolution group, March 2010, available at www.bis.org 
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taken in case of crisis are anticipated to the regulators. 
 
3.5.1 Burden Sharing agreements 
 
This expression has been recently in vogue in the financial 
sector. It admits the possibility that involved States share the 
fiscal responsibility of a cross border banking group collapse. 
In fact, as we will see in chapter 4, when a crisis occurs, public 
actors get involved by providing public financing in order to 
protect financial stability and public confidence.  
Our opinion is that this aid should be confined to the 
minimum and that a private solution should be preferred to 
avoid taxpayers’ burdens and moral hazard. Beside, public 
authorities should take a more extensive approach of art. 123-
126 Eu Treaty (ex art. 101-104). 
According to art. 123, central banks cannot provide overdraft 
facilities and any other type of credit facility to EU institutions 
and the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national 
central banks of debt instruments shall be prohibited, unless 
those measures are required by prudential considerations160. 
Article 124 gives indeed room for manoeuvre to support ailing 
institution only when prudential concerns come at stake. These 
concerns however shall not be interpreted extensively but shall 
be limited to ensure the stability of the financial system as a 
whole, as well as shall not necessarily imply that actions can be 
taken only by NCB’s, but might be carried on from private 
banks as well. 
Although art. 126 has immediate implications on other aspects 
                                                 
160  Nieto and Schinasi (2009) point out that one interpretation of art. 
123 would be that if a bank were declared insolvent than all assets 
(included collateral) would be frozen and creditors would have the first 
priority in being made whole. See, Nieto M., Schinasi G., EU framework 
for safeguarding financial stability: towards an analytical benchmark for 
assessing its effectiveness, IMF working paper no. 260, 2007, available at 
www.imf.org. Namely, this would formally justify ring fencing 
behaviors.  
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of public expenditures, it states an easy but challenging 
principle: «Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits». If we consider how many billions governments have 
otherwise lent to ailing banks, we understand why this 
principle may be of a certain importance in our debate. 
Burden sharing agreements can intervene ex ante, namely 
before a crisis occurs, to predefine each State participation, and 
ex post, namely after a crisis has actually occurred, to assess the 
degree of aid to be given. 
Clarification is needed on the actual meaning of the 
expression.  
What is the burden to share and how to share it? 
The burden may refer to budgetary and fiscal costs borne by 
the State where the ailing bank is incorporated. This definitions 
considers the net direct costs and may include the costs of 
measures enacted (i.e. recapitalization, asset guarantee and 
swaps) as well as –where any –the revenues that may result 
from the management of the banking crisis (i.e. flows arising 
from the asset sales of from dividend distribution). In a much 
broader sense, burden sharing may refer to the total welfare 
losses incurred by the State. That may include the net 
budgetary costs as well as the overall economic impact of the 
crisis and would comprise the diminution of wealth and 
welfare with respect to the previous situation.  
Obviously, the second meaning is too vague to be measured, 
although it takes into account the real consequences of a 
financial crisis on a State. Consider the current crisis: the 
meltdown propagated to the real economy leading to an 
increase in unemployment rate, contraction of credit, 
diminution of private expenditures and so on forcing 
governments to intervene with economic stimulus packages 
besides financial aid to the banks.  
We will then consider only the net budgetary costs of bailing 
out the bank.  
The sharing agreement may be fixed on different grounds.  
One may be, as we said, an ex ante division.  
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Goodhart and Shoenmaker (2006; 2009)161 have developed a 
model whereby they admit two types of sharing agreements:  
what they call generic burden sharing and a specific burden 
sharing. The first is a general scheme financed collectively by 
the participating countries that would participate in the 
funding on a GDP base. In such a way the cost for 
recapitalization would be proportionally shared among all 
Countries. More specifically, Authors’ idea is to create a 
European fund managed by the European Investment Bank 
(EIB, to overcome the mentioned prohibitions of the Treaty on 
the ECB). The funding mechanism would occur during the 
crisis when bonds could be issued by the EIB to finance the 
recapitalization and used to bailing out ailing banks, whereas 
the annual servicing costs of the bonds would be paid by the 
government. According to the Authors, the borrowed money 
would cover the full nominal value needed for the rescue and 
interest on the outstanding bonds would be paid out of the 
fund as any loss on the bonds. 
However, this model may give only a partial and intermediate 
solution to the problem and would be somehow in contrast 
with the prohibition of monetary financing from EU bodies.  
What they call “specific burden sharing” consists instead on 
the participation of only those countries where subsidiaries of 
the failing company are incorporated. Each involved part 
would pay its relevant part of the burden. That would imply 
the exact definition of “relevant part” and, we would say, of 
the cross border externality and penetration, but we have seen 
how difficult it proves: to this end reference may be done to 
assets (foreign assets/total assets), income (foreign income/total 
income) and employee (foreign employment/total 
employment)162. In this way, cross border transfers may be 
                                                 
161  See Goodhart C., Schoenmaker D., Burden sharing in a banking crisis 
in Europe, LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series, 2006; Ii., 
Fiscal burden sharing in cross border banking crisis, at «International Journal 
of central banking», 5, 2009   
162 See Sullivan D., Measuring the degree of internationalisation of a firm, in 
«Journal of international business studies», 25, 1994, 325-342   
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avoided. 
To us, both models have severe free riding and moral hazard 
problems and still do not overcome the enforceability problem.  
Ex post division (once the crisis has occurred) is better able to 
frame the burdens borne by each country, and can limit the 
temptation to cheat by member States since their involvement 
is more transparent.  
Empirical findings showed how it nonetheless proved to be 
inefficient. Freixas (2003) realized that ex post burden sharing 
arrangements lead to an underprovision of recapitalizations: it 
called this consequence «improvised co-operation». In fact, 
countries would have incentive to understate their share of the 
problem to play a smaller part in the costs. This would leave 
the largest country, usually the home country, with the 
decision whether to shoulder the costs on its own or let the 
bank close and possibly liquidated163. 
 
 
3.5.2. Overcoming the empasse? 
 
Whenever a private solution is not feasible, at least in the short 
run we must acknowledge the possibility of state intervention. 
In our opinion however there is no need to clear cut ex ante 
from ex post agreements, we rather want to focus on a “soft” 
combination of the two’s.  
Our idea is that a form of burden sharing must be realized 
because collective costs and stability treats are effectively 
existent, because we cannot deny that if a crisis explodes it is 
partly because who had to supervise failed to do it and 
because the legal personality principle cannot pose such high 
barriers to impede a global consideration of the group and 
global responsibilities among all the interested parties. 
                                                 
163 Freixas X., Crisis management in Europe, in «Financial Supervision in 
Europe», eds. By Kremes, Shoenmaker and Wierts, Edward Elgar, 102-
119. 
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Especially since those institutions operate in an “internal 
market”. 
The word “internal”, also in re to the competent DG of the 
Commission, implies that there cannot be a segmentation of 
the European market into “national boundaries”, but 
nonetheless public intervention shall be designed in such a 
way to avoid opportunistic behaviors from banks. This means 
that one part of the proposed burden sharing agreement shall 
include provisions on its final outcome: let the banks, its 
management and shareholders bear the costs.  
So we want to consider the possibility of imposing ex ante a 
duty of coordination and of “crisis management sharing” 
among involved authorities. To this end, MOU’s are of a great 
help because they define preconditions under which those 
agreements shall rely upon as well as already contain 
provisions on burden sharing and have already been accepted 
by interested parties.  
Since it is always likely that member States would tend to hide 
their real involvement, it is necessary to fix preconditions 
under which those agreements may work.  
The first is related to mutual trust.  
Authorities will be willing to cooperate only if they rely on the 
other cooperation as well as on the other credibility.  
In fact, a country may have incentive to sign such an 
agreement if it considers its peer able to efficiently monitoring 
the institutions and willing to share any relevant information. 
This eventually implies the need to pierce the veil of the legal 
personality and taking a broader view of the group.  Further, 
the awareness that there may be a form of sanction on the 
supervisor may give incentive to the Authority (especially the 
home) to share its information and to solicit host authority to 
do its own job, because in such a way it may not have to pay all 
the costs associated with the parent failure.  
The second precondition is legal recognition.  
How can you make such an agreement on the duty to act in a 
certain way should a crisis occur binding? 
One possibility would be seeking parliamentary approval so 
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that it becomes a law of the State. However the related 
procedure would be long, subjected to strong lobbying 
pressures and may violate the secrecy necessary to avoid 
banks’ opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore since the text has 
to be the same for all member States involved, any amendment 
shall be approved again by each chamber of each State. It may 
turn out to be a never ending story or to lead to a sub-sub-
optimal agreement. 
One other would be seeking judiciary approval to make the 
agreement binding erga omnes. The competent judge may 
possibly be the Court of Auditors.  
This solution has a certain appeal because the judge would 
confine its role to the formal recognition of the obligation of 
the interested party to respect their own wills. It would not 
play a role into the negotiations nor would substitute itself to 
the source of commitment that remains in the public parties’ 
ability to act on behalf of the State. Nonetheless, if requested it 
may play a consultative role on the actual existence of public 
funds. It is for this reason that the ministry of budget and 
finance shall instead participate to the negotiations: they can 
have a clearer idea then the supervisory authorities on the 
actual use and limitations on public funds and possibilities. 
The very problem is that for a burden sharing plan to be 
credible participating States must be confident on the actual 
use of public funds from each participant in case of need. This 
is why a certain role must be played by ministry of finance or 
budget or whoever is in charge of decisions on public 
expenditures. Those are the only people that can commit the 
State to spend the money needed and that can figure out the 
means to have access or to raise those funds.  
The actual feasibility of this solution may be instead at stake 
because of the division of labour among public powers and the 
fact that it may raise many constitutional and legal concerns. 
So maybe one solution may be leave the question of legally 
binding formalities aside and for grant but focus on the other 
side of the spectrum that is its actual enforcement.    
The third precondition is indeed enforceability. 
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We have seen how mou’s currently in place have not proved to 
be followed in case of crisis for the reasons that we are aware 
of. So the idea is leaving to a European agency the duty to 
supervise the actual implementation of the contents of the 
agreement and the information sharing. To this end, since we 
have considered provisions included into mou’s as 
precondition for mutual trust, MOU’s shall be made legally 
binding. The Authority shall receive in copy any document, 
any information, any resume of meetings, reports of 
inspections and so on and so forth to double check the actual 
respect of the overall provisions. 
Should authorities do not comply with the requirements, the 
EU authority must take appropriate actions.  
This power may be entrusted to the newly created European 
Banking Authority (ex CEBS). Nonetheless we must 
acknowledge that EBA involvement may not ensure that 
Authorities may have access or may want to respect budgetary 
promises.  
This is even truer in the light of the recent supervisory reform 
of the financial regulatory architecture, wherein the micro 
supervisor can issue binding decisions directed to states as 
well as to single institution. However, whenever those 
decisions imply a fiscal responsibility of the member state it 
can appeal to the council. The example is to show how when it 
comes to fiscal and budgetary decisions these are yet national 
prerogatives. 
The last precondition for a burden sharing plan to be effective 
is the commonly agreed assessment of the best policy option. 
This is something that States won’t decide with exact details in 
advance since nobody can predict the actual manifestation of 
the crisis. However, it seems necessary that the plan would fix 
state participation in proportion of certain indicators plus it 
should be related to concept definable beforehand such as: self 
enforcement; proportionality; involvement; restitution; home 
authority responsibility; and so on. Those criteria may 
influence supervisors’ behavior in normal times, so great 
attention should be paid in their definition. 
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Only if those condition are satisfied and considering that a 
certain degree of uncertainty is anyway present, we may 
expect a burden sharing agreement to be enforced and 
respected by participating countries. 
 
The next steps are related to the object of the agreement and 
the participating parties.  
In our opinion it has not great sense make all the EU member 
states participating in a common fund nor that GDP is a fair 
point of reference. Shall these mechanisms be in place, banks 
would feel even freer to assume risky behaviors, since State 
intervention is formalized in an ad hoc fund and depositors are 
protected through deposit insurance mechanisms. Further, 
these facilities make sense when an event is the direct 
consequence of one institution’s choices. This is the rationale 
behind the funding mechanisms of deposit guarantees whose 
financial contribution is imposed on the banks itself. So banks 
are held responsible and (contribute to) “pay” for their 
mistakes.   
Here the thing is that in on going business situations 
governments have no decision, information or whatever power 
in relation to banks’ businesses choices. So the underlying 
question is: why should they pay for someone else 
misconducts over which they had no intervention powers? 
This is to avoid that a vicious culture takes place in Europe: the 
idea that governments must rescue banks. 
Better, if we agree with the idea of correlation between 
financial contribution and responsibility, it would be more 
appropriate make Supervisory authorities participating, with 
own resources, to the bailing fund. The incentive to better 
supervise would be greater. 
Lastly, although GDP reflects with no doubts the wealth of a 
nation, it still does not capture all the variables related to the 
presence and contribution of a certain banking group to that 
wealth. Maybe more sector- specific variables would be better 
suited. 
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So the idea is that Member states should ex ante formally 
commit themselves to participate in a certain burden sharing 
agreement whenever an identified banking group would face 
financial difficulties. The way by which they commit 
themselves shall fulfill the above preconditions. Also, 
participating members shall be banking groups specific.  
Now the problem moves to the contents of the agreement. 
Two main features: the decision shall be first of all on the 
triggers for intervention. Whatever they will be, State 
intervention shall be activated only after that banks’ internal 
mechanisms of crisis prevention have been exhausted164 and 
only if a private solution has not proved feasible. It should be a 
sort of intervention of last resort. 
The other would be on the choice of the policy option to 
pursue.  
The optimal resolution policy cannot however being decided 
before the event has occurred.  It can also include the ring 
fencing option, which we have seen not to be detrimental per 
se, but only in re to the hindering of a group wide resolution. 
Here we can only remind that it has to be a credible 
commitment, has to be enacted in a timely manner, has to be 
cost efficient and has to take into account all the steps already 
done by the bank involved. 
 
 
3.5.3. Asset transfer within the group 
One way to manage/prevent the crisis of the whole group 
avoiding public intervention may be admitting the possibility 
of a cross border transfer of funds from the parent to the 
subsidiary or vice versa. This is not revolutionary at all since it 
is what happens under normal circumstances, especially from 
the parent to the subsidiary in national based groups.  
Further, it is expressly recognized in the CRD Directive in its 
recitals165 as a sound banking management tool –although 
                                                 
164  We will se in the next section what those mechanisms would be. 
165  According to recital 52, Directive 2006/48/EC, “When a credit 
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particular prudence is required –and it can be framed into the 
free movement of capital guaranteed by the EU Treaty.  
Beside, member states body of laws does not distinguish 
between a transfer made during a crisis situation and a transfer 
made in an on going base. 
However we have seen that in crisis situation, competent 
authorities may ring fence bank’s assets. In fact, CRD directive 
requires credit undertakings to maintain a constant level of 
own funds hence supervisors may prohibit any transfer that 
may hamper subsidiary’s solvency. Furthermore there may be 
legal obstacles to the transfer deriving from company law, 
insolvency law and banking law. The final aim is stakeholders’ 
protection (shareholders, depositors, creditors). The lack of a 
common set of rules in relation to groups’ transfers, group’s 
identification and recognition of a “group interest” and of a 
European regulatory framework complicates the matter. 
 
In what follows we will briefly describe legal obstacles and 
advantages/disadvantages of intra-group transfer in case of 
crisis. A proposal will follow further. 
We shall start with the definition of transfer: we want to refer 
basically to inter-bank lending, financial instruments and 
                                                                                                                 
institution incurs an exposure to its own parent undentaking or to other 
subsidiaries of its parent undertaking, particular prudence is necessary. 
The management of exposures incurred by credit instututiuons should 
be carried out in a fully autonomous manner, in accordance with the 
principles of sound banking, without regard to other considerations. 
Where the influence exercised by persons directly or indirectly holding a 
qualifying participation in a credit institution is likely to operate to the 
detriment of the sound and prudent management of that institution, the 
competent authorities should take appropriate measures to put an end 
to that situation. In the field of large exposure, specific standards, 
including more stringent restrictions, should be laid down for esposures 
incurred by a credit institution to its own group. Such standards need 
not however be applied where the parent undertaking is a financial 
holding or a credit institution or where the other subsidiaries are either 
credit or financial institutions or undertakings offering ancillary 
services, provided that all such undertakings are covered by the 
supervision of the credit institution on a consolidated basis”. 
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capital transfers 166. 
One main problem with the asset transfer is that when it take 
the form of a downstream (from PtoS) of capital, it does not 
create great concerns, since the dependency of a subsidiary 
from its parent is a matter of fact as well as the power of 
direction and control from the first to the second implies a 
form of financial contribution. Likewise, the financial health of 
its subsidiaries is a primary interest for the parent and such a 
transfer avoids the loss of confidence within the group. In this 
respect, parent company acts as a source of strength to its 
controlled companies whenever they are in need of financial 
aid167. Lastly the parent in a sense recoups the aid through its 
participation in the subsidiary. 
Unlike, an upstream transfer (from StoP) would create greater 
concerns since it may be the result of an unduly influence of 
                                                 
166  In relation to the transfer of capital, a special case is the capital 
increase of the receiver: this would require shareholder approval, hence 
it would delay the procedure to support the institution. 
167  The so called source of strenght docrtine, fairly unknown in 
Europe, is instead formalised in the US. For instance, in Board of 
Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp the Board had to assess the financial 
and managerial soundness of a company which had applied to purchase 
a controlling interest in a bank corporation. The Court upheld the board 
denial for application on the basis that the purchaser was financially 
unsound and “would not be a sufficient suorce of financial and 
managerial strenght to its subsidiary bank”. Further, when US 
regulators deem a bank failed or about to fail, they have the authority to 
compel existing controlling shareholders to downstream additional 
capital into the ailing bank. Regulation Y of the Board of Governors 
adopted in 1984 states at § 225.4 “Corporate Practices Bank holding 
Company Policy and Operations”: (1) A bank holding company shall 
serve as a source of financial and managerial strenght to its subsidiaries 
and shall not conduct its operation in an unsafe or unsound manner. For 
further reference see, Schinski M., Mullineaux D.J., The Impact of the 
Federal Reserve's Source of Strength Policy on Bank Holding Companies, at 
«Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance», 35, 2004; Bierman, 
Fraser, The 'Source of Strength' Doctrine: Formulating the Future of 
America's Financial Markets, «Annual Review of Banking Law», 12,  1993, 
269-316; Alexander K., Bank special resolution regimes: Balancing prudential 
regulation and shareholders rights, 2009, mimeo  
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the parent over subsidiary’s businesses decisions. 
Although there is no specific prohibition of transfers within a 
group, some types of asset transfers may be expressly 
prohibited. According to a study of the European 
Commission168, if the transfer is considered as a repayment of 
shares it may be prohibited in some member states: to this end, 
it shall be conducted at arm’s length, or it may be severely 
taxed or maybe expressly prohibited if it has as a consequence 
a refund of the registered equity. Other member State’s law 
contains restriction on loans (Estonia) directed to shareholders 
above a certain threshold or in a conflicting position, whereas 
some types of transfers need prior shareholders approval169 or 
supervisory approval170.  
Another question is whether the arm’s length principle can be 
waived.  
In fact, in principle, transfers shall be conducted under “fair” 
                                                 
168  DBB LAW,  Study on the feasibility of reducing obstacles to thetransfer of 
assets within a cross border banking group during a financial crisis. Final 
Report, available at www.ec.europa.eu 
169  Shareholders approval is needed when the transaction is of a 
certain importance, because it is carried on by two company strictly 
interlinked, because in not conducted under normal terms (e.g. at arm’s 
length), because it exceed a certain percentage of company’s capital, 
because it is considered beyond the scope of everyday economic 
activities, because transaction belongs to a specific category generally 
void, if it is a share transfer, and so on. 
170  For instance, in Spain the permission of the State financial 
Institution commission is required for the transfer of account portfolios 
and contracts for repayment of monetary instruments from PtoS. In 
Portugal, prior authorization of the Central bank is needed for 
transaction (i.e. transfer of assets within the banking group) conducted 
in crisis situation and when recovery measures are to be implemented. 
In Italy (as in other countries), art. 58 banking law requires the 
authorisation of the Bank of Italy to transfer en masse of assets if the 
bank of the banking group’s equity margin is less than or equal to zero. 
Authorisation is required for any transfer exceeding 10% of the 
transferee’s regulatory capital. In Sweden, if the transferee is a Swedish 
bank and the consideration to be paid by exceeds 25% of its  own funds, 
it needs the prior approval of the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority. 
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conditions, to protect subsidiary’s solvency, shareholders’ and 
creditors’ rights, especially since the provision of collateral or a 
form of guarantee is generally not considered compulsory.  
With the exception of Spain, where the transfer does not need 
to be concluded in fair conditions but is otherwise subjected to 
stringent publicity requirements, the arm’s length principle is 
directly or indirectly required by national regulations. This 
means that either it must be made under market conditions or 
shall be justified on the grounds of a more general interest171 of 
the group: should not this be the case, civil responsibility 
and/or criminal liability of the transferor’ managers, non 
opposability to the transferor’s creditors and cancellation are 
the due consequences.  
However one may think that in crisis situation, market price 
may be lower than usual hence leading to a sub optimal 
transaction for the transferor and if it is not the case, it may 
contribute to aggravate receiver’s financial distress. Caveats are 
hence necessary.    
As far as sanction is concerned, when those transactions took 
place against law or have provoked damage to the transferor, 
insolvency law, company law and banking law provide a set of 
remedies. 
In fact usually insolvency law172 may ex post render void and 
null the transfer, because the transaction is considered done in 
fraud, to the detriment or in prejudice of creditors and 
shareholders173. The primary effect is that the transaction is 
                                                 
171 What in Italy is called “vantaggi compensativi”. 
172 Provisions we are referring to are not specific to intra group transaction 
since they apply to transaction with any party. However since they do 
include also transfers within affiliates and related parties they are 
included in the scope of our analysis. 
173 For instance, in France if transactions occurred during a suspected 
period those can be canceled, in Denmark the tax authorities would 
decide upon the allocation, in Italy criminal liability is admitted, in 
Luxembourg, the transaction can be annulled and there may be the 
extension of the bankruptcy to the directors. In Portugal, all acts 
performed in the four previous years to an insolvency procedure can be 
annulled in order to allow that the assets subject to those acts can be 
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treated as if it has never occurred and actions must be taken to 
restore the status quo ante.  
Also, it may hold directors liable for the corporations’ debts. 
For instance, in France directors may be compelled to bear its 
debts in the whole or in part, when company’s liabilities exceed 
its assets or in Luxemburg they may see their personal asset 
merged with those of the ailing company whenever they 
caused the company to enter into transaction wherein they had 
an interest or when they used company properties for private 
purposes. 
However for such sanctions to take place insolvency 
proceedings must be initiated in regard of the subsidiary and 
the only transactions that will be taken into account will be 
those conducted over a certain period, namely when the 
company’s insolvency where likely to exist. 
Irrespectively of insolvency proceedings, civil and company 
law provides other means that may discourage and obstacle 
the smooth transfer of assets in case of crisis.  
These are related to Directors’ liability towards the company, 
its shareholders, creditors and third parties for transactions 
deemed to be fraudulent. If directors make (negligently) 
intragroup transfers resulting in company’s insolvency because 
of excessive expenditures, granting or taking excessive credit 
or carelessly using such credit, or by concluding high risk 
transactions outside the usual scope of subsidiaries business 
transactions or when are in sharp contrast of the company’s 
financial means available, they can be held liable for damages 
incurred to the company and may be obliged to compensate 
the damages. Likewise, some countries may consider 
shareholders itself liable for losses caused to one company’s 
creditors174.  
                                                                                                                 
affected to the assets belonging to the bankruptcy assets (massa 
insolvente), in UK there is a claw back provision for suspect transactions 
whilst in Spain no sanctions can be taken.  
174  This is the case in Austria, where shareholders may be held liable 
for losses caused to a company’s creditor. This is the “piercing the veil” 
principle and may occur when the assets of a shareholder are 
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Also, in some Countries transactions can be rendered null and 
void by the same company and civil law175. 
Banking law instead gives competent Authorities the 
possibility to intervene in irregular or unfair transactions, as 
well as to restrict credit institutions ability to enter into 
transaction especially when the institution fails to achieve 
minimum liquidity or solvency ratios. Authorities can also fine 
institutions for any violations of regulatory provisions in 
relation to the matter. 
Lastly, transfer of assets within the group may have criminal 
consequences for the management of the company, ranging 
from fines to criminal imprisoning according to the nature of 
the asset transfer and other circumstances. 
Other constraints may stem from private international law 
provisions contained into the EU Regulation 593/2008. 
When an intra-group transfer occurs, one may think that the 
main players are the receiver and the transferor. However 
other interested parties are directly or indirectly involved, 
whose rights shall be taken into account: supervisors, 
depositors, shareholders, creditors and employees.  
Since supervisors must monitor the respect of solvency ratios, 
large exposures, minimum capital requirements and so on, 
                                                                                                                 
commingled with the assets of the company, in cases of gross 
undercapitalisation or when a dominant shareholder has exercise undue 
influence in the management of the company or had de facto taking over 
the running of the company. In Germany, a parent company that 
misuses its influence over a subsidiary company is liable for any 
resulting loss. In Italy, art. 2497 civil code admits the liability of the 
parent company for the damages occurred to the subsidiary when a 
certain operation was not in the group’s interest.   
175  For instance, in Germany a creditor of the transferor can contest the 
transfer of assets in accordance the Act of Protection of Creditors, if the 
transfer of assets discriminates against creditors provided that other 
conditions are fulfilled. In Belgium and France, creditors may benefit, 
under civil law, of the so called action “paulienne”, that however 
requires the transaction or transfer be known by the third party to be 
fraudulent. In France, under company law, a transaction may be null or 
void if it required prior approval of the board of directors and this 
approval had not been sought.  
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banks’ manager have a duty to inform the competent 
authorities of any transfer of assets that would impair 
company’s liquidity/solvency/ratios. In most cases regulatory 
approval is necessary. 
As far as shareholders rights is concerned, albeit there are no 
specific provisions in relation to a duty to inform them or to 
get their approval, some member states may recognize a 
general right for minority shareholders to request information 
whilst we have seen how some types of asset transfer require 
prior General Assembly approval. An external evaluator 
assessment on the price fairness may also be required. Further, 
after transfer has been implemented minority shareholders 
may sue directors, whenever they think that their decisions 
have been conducted in violation of the statute, in bad faith, or 
in case of breach of fiduciary duties. 
Once the transfer had taken place, creditors of the transferor 
may act judiciary to obtain the annulment of the transaction 
when it would negatively impact the ability of the transferor to 
fulfill its obligations. 
Certain duties of information are to be paid to the employees. 
In fact, if the transfer involves all or substantially all of the 
assets, the transferor informs its employees of the 
contemplated transfer within a reasonable time prior to the 
transfer. 
Lastly, although no specific regulations are in place with 
regard to prior/subsequent depositors’ information/approval, 
nonetheless if the transfer has been fraudulent, depositors may 
have a right to restitution of their funds making use of civil law 
provisions.  
 
To sum up, member States do not regulate the case of cross 
border transfers since those are considered into the day to day 
activity of companies belonging to a group; further, no specific 
distinction is done in relation to crisis or normal times nor 
from banking and non banking companies. However the 
specialty of banks is such that supervisors play a role in 
evaluating those transactions. 
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To the fast, efficient, predictable and smooth functioning of this 
tool, legal obstacles and risks run against.  
As for the obstacles, we saw that if ex post the transfer is 
deemed to be fraudulent, it may be revoked by a judge as well 
as if it is not conducted at arm’s length, directors may be held 
liable. The latter may incur in civil and criminal liability in case 
of damage to the company. 
National laws tend, rightly enough, to protect both 
subsidiaries and stakeholders. The first from the unduly 
influence of the parent that may affect subsidiary’s 
independence of assets and independent decision making, and 
the stakeholders are protected from unfair decisions taken by 
the board of directors; minority shareholders from majority 
shareholders decisions; creditors from the development of an 
imbalance between the creditors of the transferor and those of 
the receiver. 
Obstacles may derive also from the lack of certainty in relation 
to the criteria used to assess the transfer, to the absence of clear 
regulations in place and so on. 
 
So we see that asset transfer’s outcome is twofold: on the one 
hand it may help the entity in difficulty to facilitate its 
responsiveness to the crisis and not to go bankrupt. If transfers 
are upstream, the avoidance of the parent’s collapse may help 
to keep afloat the group as a whole. It is a truism in fact that in 
the market the group is seen as a whole entity, hence solvent 
subsidiaries can hardly survive when the parent or a major 
subsidiary is in financial distress because of reputation risk. 
Further assets transfers in case of distress may also facilitate 
private sector rescue to be arranged in the meanwhile. 
As EU Commission put it «the transfer of assets as a means of 
intragroup financial support could assist groups in managing 
liquidity positions and in some cases could help stabilise 
entities in a developing crisis»176  
                                                 
176  See Commission staff working document accompanying the 
Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, 
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The importance of allowing asset transfer in case of crisis sand 
the detrimental effects the impossibility has, is showed by the 
following tables (6, 7) 
 
                                                                                                                 
the European economic and social committee, the European court of justice and 
the European central bank. An EU framework for cross-border crisis 
management in the banking sector, available at www.ec.europa.eu  
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Table 7: Barriers to cross border transfer of liquidity in 
liquidity test stress 
 
 
Source: ECB 
In table 6 stress tests carried by banks showed that 
constrained177 imposed on banks in relation to asset transfer 
have a high impact on involved entities’ liquidity, or better, 
have a negative impact on efficient liquidity risk management 
for cross border banking groups. 
                                                 
177  Namely, local liquidity requirments, large exposures, barrieres to 
cross border transfer of collateral, differences in certral bank frameworks 
for the provision of liquidity, operational hurdles and time zone 
mismatches. See, ECB, EU banks liquidity stress testing and contingency 
funding plans, November 2008, at www.ecb.int 
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Table 8: Barriers to cross border transfer of liquidity in 
liquidity test stress: relevance for the group and further 
elaboration   
   
 
Source:  ECB 
However, table 7 shows that during the current turmoil those 
hurdles had not been as significant as showed in stress tests: 
only six (over 27) banks stated that local liquidity requirements 
were relevant, whereas only four declared that large exposures 
regulations were relevant whilst the remaining barriers did not 
have any relevance for the banks in the sample. 
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On the other hand, intra-group asset transfers do carry risks. 
Those stem from the fact that since these may have as a result 
the total transfer of a subsidiary’s control, the transfer of a 
branch or activity and the transfer of a portfolio of deposit 
accounts: in such a way creditors and shareholder would be 
extremely damaged since their company would have become 
an empty box. 
So the basic idea would be trying to develop a harmonized 
framework for the matter.  
This could be done by modifying CDR Directive to take into 
account the idea of “group’s interest” and then allow 
supervisor to include in their Mou’s and/or burden sharing 
agreements the possibility of such transfer. Furthermore 
banking living wills, where any, shall contain provisions on 
subsidiary’s/parent’s contribution to the ailing peers. 
However precautions must be taken to protect stakeholders.  
Thresholds must be designed to top up the maximum amount 
that can be transferred correlated to the transferor’s financial 
capacity, covenants should be included to define transferor’s 
return against penalties to the receiver and priority shall be 
given to transferor’s creditors. 
 
3.5.4. Living wills 
As we said, banks may, and in some member States must178 
draw plans to decide in advance how the whole group would 
be treated in case of financial distress. Specifically, these could 
be recovery, resolution and contingency funding plans. 
The living wills idea is fairly new and derives from the 
necessity to make the banks being liable for their failure and 
                                                 
178
 See the recent British financial regulatory reform, whereby the FSA has a 
duty to make rules requiring financial institutions to create and 
maintain recovery and resolution plans in the event that they become 
financially vulnerable. Those provisions are included into the Financial 
Services Act 2010, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/pdf/ukpga_20100028_en.pdf 
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not to spread the cost to taxpayers. 
Further they may help reducing the complexity of the group 
and consider subsidiaries as independent entities to be wound 
up singularly. 
However the big issue with those plans is their actual shape 
and their contents.  
In absence of any neither practical examples nor specific 
regulations yet in place, we may only try to figure out their 
features. 
 
First of all we must think at their intermediate goals. 
Those may be i) the capability of authorities to get a clearer 
information framework on the group structure; ii) the 
capability of banks and authorities to get a clear cut idea on the 
functioning of internal and structural mechanisms (IT systems, 
data, intra-group facilities and so on) in responding to a group 
alert; iii) the understanding of feasibility or non feasibility or 
certain recovery options. 
 Second of all we shall look at their final aim: this should be the 
complete self sufficiency of the plan either to restore bank’s 
viability or to winding up the institution. 
So keeping this in mind, we may consider differently recovery 
from resolution plans. 
The former are plans that shall allow for the orderly and timely 
business continuity in case of financial distress that does not 
compel the institution’s solvency, whilst under a resolution 
plan the bank shall be able to plan in advance for the kind of 
information required and useful for the Authorities to carry on 
an orderly liquidation/resolution of the bank.  
How can a bank recover from a crisis without getting into 
insolvency proceedings? 
Usually, by having access to fresh capital. 
In a living will this possibility should be entangled in capital 
and liquidity planning. 
However since this kind of planning are already in place in a 
day to day business of the firm, when included into a recovery 
plan they shall take a different form: they must contain the 
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outside option and specifically refer to how and from whom 
they intend to get financed if their usual sources of funding are 
not available. 
In fact, the usual sources may well not be willing to put the 
unusual (large) amount of capital required, nor they may be 
able to do it in a timely manner, or maybe, legal obstacles 
deriving from company law may arise. Further, it may get too 
costly for the bank raising new capital at time of distress (the 
risk premium for the investors would be higher than usual).  
This would add uncertainty to the efficiency of a living will. 
The practicability of the plan may be challenged in case of 
contingency plans. Here in fact, banks shall be able to 
demonstrate that, under stress and besides the on going 
liquidity arrangements, they may still have back up sources, 
collateral as well as routine sources. Namely banks must be ble 
to demonstrate that they can have access to a wider source of 
funding. To be credible, a contingency plan should contain also 
a reduction of risky activities such as the closure of certain 
positions. 
Should a bank being able to demonstrate those requirements, a 
living will may be of a certain efficacy. 
An alternative would be a living will that contains provisions 
for the sale of some business lines and/or their closure. To this 
end, managers shall be able to demonstrate that the line is 
saleable and that no shareholders approval is requested 
(otherwise it would be too lengthy and unpredictable). This 
would imply that the activity shall be run by a separate 
subsidiary, shall be operationally sizeable and the subsidiary 
shall be self sufficient as regards funding, assets and liquidity 
positions. 
Here a solution may be providing in the Statute of the 
company that in case of crisis shareholders rights in relation to 
certain matters are suspended. 
Otherwise, recovery plans may provide for the sale of the 
entire business through private acquisitions. 
However great concerns arise as far as competition is 
concerned and for the possibility of efficiently concluding the 
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deal. 
In fact, the only player that can be able to buy a bank is a big 
financial institution that will however more consolidate its 
position in the market and become even bigger to fail. 
As for the smooth success of the sale, that may be hampered by 
some type of liquidity backstop and/or guarantees required by 
the buyer, i.e. on the safe approval of the transaction from 
shareholders. Again a modification of statutory law may be 
considered. 
Those plans –that are institution specific –should contain 
exactly the triggers for intervention.  
As far as resolution plans is concerned, they are directed 
immediately to the Authorities to give them a clear picture of 
the group structure and hence must be confined to the 
following contents: 1) group structure (characteristic, assets, 
liability, subsidiaries fully self sufficient and so on); 2) groups 
infrastructure functioning; 3) resolution options taking into 
account different laws of incorporation. 
Lastly, whatever the plan is, coherently with its objectives, it 
should be designed in such a way to i) ensure a timely frame of 
the group for the supervisors and bank’s managers itself; ii) be 
able of being enacted in a timely fashion; iii) allow for the split 
up of entities; iv) contain a reasonable set of options; and v) be 
credible and enforceable. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions  
 
In this chapter we have gone deeply through the maze of 
obstacles that can hamper the smooth functioning of the crisis 
management.  
The cross border character and the size of the financial 
institution make it fairly impossible to predict the outcome of 
their insolvency. 
This is indeed affected by:  
i) agency conflicts among interested authorities, that do not –or 
poorly –cooperate since they pursue local interests;  
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ii) differences in regulatory culture;  
iii) the inefficient regulatory framework in place that assigns 
the matter to non binding and not enforceable private 
agreements; and 
iv) differences in national legal frameworks that –although 
harmonised to a certain degree –maintain divergent 
approaches on supervisory powers’, triggers for intervention, 
resolutions tools and procedures. 
 
A formal European framework to regulate the issue with a lex 
specialis is thus urgently needed.  
This shall have a mixed nature, since it must contain 
provisions directly addressing the crisis as well as great 
reference must be paid to private tools. 
In our opinion, the choice between an ad hoc 
directive/regulation or the modification of the already existing 
directives (CRD, Conglomerate, Winding Up) is left to political 
discretions. However the fastest and more efficient mean must 
be preferred.  
The framework shall pursue a maximum harmonisation 
approach whereby at the same time contain obligation for the 
States to obey to the provisions included in MoU’s and burden 
sharing agreement. In fact, the peculiarity of each group, the 
financial sectors of reference and the need to give incentive to 
these institutions to invest in Europe, makes it necessary to 
develop consistency in the approaches plus however 
institution based solutions. 
To this end great role can be played by ex ante intervention 
tools. 
In fact, the idea would be rendering binding the current 
MOU’s: this would be in a sense time efficient and frictionless 
because States already engaged into them and they contain 
provisions sufficient enough to define the room for manoeuvre 
for coordination in case of crisis. Further, for what is not 
expressively mentioned reference can be made to the EU Mou 
of 2008. 
As for crisis management, States must intervene only as a last 
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resort chance after that recovery plans and intra-group asset 
transfers have proved to be ineffective and insufficient.  
This would be coherent with the natural consequence of those 
failures: the resolution of the bank.  
Obviously the effective implementation of those tools may 
compress some shareholders rights. Nonetheless this 
possibility shall be provided under the common EU lex 
specialis to obtain a certain degree of harmonisation of laws. 
Further work needs to be done on the triggers for intervention.   
This requires two steps: the modification of art. 136 of the CRD 
Directive to entrust Authorities to require a wider range of pre-
emptive situations and measures they can impose and to ask 
fore a more uniform application of such powers as well as the 
identification of triggers specifically tailored upon the single 
entity. These shall be identified into the living wills plan. 
Further changes shall be done to art. 129 and 130 of the CRD to 
improve coordination efforts and a much leading role shall be 
formalised to the college of supervisors. 
However those efforts may be of poor help if a high degree of 
discretion is left to policymakers and governments.  
Although the question on (if and) how to eliminate these 
discretionary powers would open a wide and lively debate, it 
must be acknowledged that a great States’ commitment to 
respect the agreements is nonetheless needed.  
In fact, shall they always be able not to respect and implement 
agreements, to act differently under the justification of 
financial stability rather then depositors’ protection or public 
confidence, their crisis management choices will always be 
perceived as time inconsistent.  
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Chapter 4 
 
European banking bail out plans 
implemented during the current turmoil 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
After the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and 
of AIG179, the “giant” of the insurance industry, the financial 
crisis began to be felt throughout all European markets, which 
                                                 
179  The 14th of September 2008, LB filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
procedure. The triggering  event was in that case the ring fencing 
procedure imposed by the Japanese Financial Supervisory Authority on 
LB’s subsidiaries, motivated by the amount of debts which they held 
with regard to some Japanese banks, particularly Aozora, Shinsei e 
Mizuho. Such amount of debts appeared not to be proportionate with 
respect to LB subsidiaries’ assets. Total debts amounted to 463mln 
dollars on Aozora, 363mln dollars with regards to Shinsei and 239bn for 
Mizuho. On this subject see 
www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2008/gb20080916_047232.
htm. 
 It has been calculated that the total liability of those European banks 
mostly involved with LB in the second quarter of 2008 amounted to: 
473,329bn euros for Société Générale, 383,995mln euros for Credit 
Agricole, 460,423mln euros for Barclays, 1,138,090bn euros for Deutsche 
Bank, 277,362bn euros for Credit Suisse and 652,972mln euros for UBS. 
Source: JP Morgan. AIG was the insurance company which collapsed 
because of its exposure in the derivatives market and Credit Default 
Swaps in particular. 
http://www.aig.com/aigweb/internet/en/files/CounterpartyAttachments0
31509_tcm385-153015.pdf .   
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up until then, had been only marginally affected. Therefore, 
EU Member States have been forced to intervene to bolster 
banks’ capital and prevent a crisis of confidence and a 
subsequent run on the banks. In fact, the decision to intervene 
to support banks was taken by the Member States in an 
ECOFIN meeting held in October 2008.  
In that meeting Member States took on the responsibility of 
adopting all the necessary measures in order to guarantee 
financial stability and the interests of depositors. These 
measures were to be adopted at each State’s discretion, but 
should also respect the following agreed common principles, 
namely:  
a) interventions should be promptly adopted, but support 
should be temporary,  
b) interventions should take into account taxpayers’ interests;  
c) shareholders should bear the necessary consequences of the 
interventions;  
d) Governments should be able to change the management of 
the company;  
e) managers should not be able to maintain any undue benefit 
and, inter alia, the Government should be able to intervene on 
their remuneration; and, in addition to that, 
 f) Governments should protect competition, especially with 
regards to state aid rules;  
g) negative spillover effects should be avoided180.  
Member States also committed to avoid any distortion of 
treatment between US and European banks, due to the 
application of different accounting methods. Finally, Member 
States agreed to face in the next future the problem of the 
correct evaluation of assets in banks’ balance sheets.  
Although each plan is different, measures adopted by the 
States basically follow three main policy directions: i) direct 
injection of capital through subscription of financial 
                                                 
180  http://www.ue2008.fr/PFUE/cache/offonce/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-
10_2008/PFUE07.10.2008/ECOFIN_results;jsessionid=469F155B629C7825
CA68410951BA4750. 
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instruments; ii) State guarantee of liabilities of the banks and 
finally iii) swap of “toxic” securities with high-quality ones. 
In this article, the bank bail-out plans of some European 
countries will be described, and the main policy choices of 
each Member State will be spelt out. In particular, the possible 
compatibility of such plans with EU state aid legislation will be 
analysed, and, more generally, the future role of EU state aid 
legislation in the banking sector will be highlighted. Indeed, 
even if all recapitalisation plans are declared to be compatible 
with art. 87 of the EU Treaty, it appears that a proper analysis 
of the relevant EU decisions on this matter could only be 
conducted over a longer period. More specifically, if we look at 
the overall financial market structure resulting from those 
“compatibility decisions” we could argue that the role of the 
State may be more than “temporary” and less than “profitable” 
for the taxpayers. Moreover serious moral hazard problems 
may arise. 
This would led to the conclusion that the final outcome of the 
EU approvals would be a distortion of competition in the 
banking sector in future “peaceful” times due to the fact that in 
some States (i.e. the UK), the Government is deeply involved in 
banks’ capital through overlapping levels of intervention (that 
will be in place at least for next 3-4 years), while in others (i.e. 
France) there are no binding covenants on share repurchase 
agreements or on distribution of dividends (i.e. Italy), which 
might turn out to have damaging consequences  for the 
profitability and hence  the willingness of the State to leave the 
bank. Moreover, given that huge amount of money has been 
lent to the banks, some of them may not be able to repay the 
loan/guarantee or to redeem its own shares in due time. This 
possibility adds uncertainty to the likelihood of the State to exit 
the bank. Should it be impossible for the State to exit, other 
form of intervention on the institute governance –in the form 
of i.e. veto/voting powers or in the form of shares conversion –
are likely to arise 
In addition, few States (i.e. UK) discipline the transfer of share 
regime. There might be the possibility that when-if the State 
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wants to exit, given the peculiarity of the shares subscribed, it 
could attach ad hoc provisions on the characteristics of the 
future purchaser of the shares, conditions that in turn might be 
affected by domestic economic policy arguments. Should this 
be the case, possible “national championship” temptations 
might materialise. Lastly, the current EU Commission 
approach might lead to a weakening of state aid rules 
perception and enforcement, with the risk of seriously 
hindering EU Commission strength and credibility in the 
matter.  
 In the following sections the bank recapitalisation plans in the 
United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy and Germany will be 
described, and some critical reflections will be drawn in the 
last section.  
 
4.2. The French case: on how the State becomes a market 
player 
 
The plan set up by the French Government (Le plan de 
financement de l’economie) consists of several layers of measures 
approved after the beginning of the crisis. Indeed, the first 
intervention dates back to October 2008, with the approval of a 
Bill, the “Loi 2008-1061” on the financing of the economy181, 
which was followed in December 2008182 and February183 2009 
                                                 
181 See,www.premier-
ministre.gouv.fr/chantiers/croissance_847/nicolas_sarkozy_presente_pla
n_61358.html;http://www.premier-
ministre.gouv.fr/chantiers/plan_relance_economie_1393/garantir_system
e_bancaire_1401/; 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000019
653147&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO. 
182  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020
014790&dateTexte=. 
183  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020
215123&dateTexte=. 
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by a modification of the funding scheme of the banks and by 
the increase in the allotted budget. Moreover, the French 
Government completed the intervention by fine-tuning the 
creation of ad hoc state corporations and by giving birth to a 
Committee in charge of monitoring the plan implementation, 
with the approval of the Decree 2008-1287 of December 10th 
2008 184. 
The Government hence intervened to strengthen banks’ capital 
adequacy and to inject liquidity into the banking sector, 
through the creation of the Société de Financement de l’économie 
française (SFEF)185 and the Société de prise de participation pour 
l’État (SPPE). Furthermore, the Government approved a State 
guarantee of banks’ debt, amounting to an initial investment 
equal to 360 billions euros. The course of action followed by 
the Government in order to reinforce funds of relatively sound 
banks was a horizontal intervention. In fact, it set up a State-
owned company that would have subscribed preference shares 
or subordinated debt. The SPPE, financed by public debt, was 
funded by an initial amount of 40bn euros. The first tranche of 
this capital (10,5bn euros) has been used to subscribe TSS (titres 
super-subordonnès)186, issued by the six major French banks for a 
total amount almost equal to 0.5% of their regulatory capital. 
The second tranche has been increased in January 2009 from 
10.5bn to 11bn and the expiring date of issuance of eligible 
securities has been postponed to the 31th of August 2009. In 
this second phase as well the French Government has given 
                                                 
184  http://textes.droit.org/JORF/2008/12/11/0288/0020/. 
185  The SFEF is owned both by the State (34%) and private investors 
(66%), namely seven large French banks: Banques Populaires, BNP 
Paribas, Caisses d’Epargne, Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, HSBC 
France and Société Générale.  
186  The main characteristics of the TSS being: they are perpetual and 
early redemption is at issuer’s discretion; the security ranks senior only 
to share capital; under certain conditions, the payment of dividend is left 
at the issuer’s discretion; should the payment endanger the viability of 
the bank, the non payment must be compulsory; the issuer retains the 
ability to reduce the nominal value of the securities to absorb potential 
losses.   
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banks the option of issuing subordinated debt in addition to 
preferred stocks without voting rights.  
The remuneration fixed for the subscription of issued securities 
is equal to 8,2%, which would eventually result in 850bn profit 
for the French Government 187.   
Horizontal intervention is also contemplated to sustain banks’ 
liquidity. Indeed, the Government guarantees securities issued 
by an ad hoc company called SFEF, whose statutory function is 
to grant loans to relatively sound banks. The SFEF is funded by 
selling its securities on the market; hence SFEF is supervised 
by the Commission Bancaire. The State guarantee is applicable to 
all instruments issued by SFEF within the 31st of December 
2009 and it has a maximum duration of 5 years.  
Institutions eligible to participate in the plan are banks 
incorporated in France, including subsidiaries of foreign 
banks.  
In common with the previous measure, in this case financial 
aid comes at a cost, since all the participating banks must 
pledge collateral188 whose quality is determined on a case by 
case basis by the French Central Bank and the Finance 
Minister. 
Banks must pay the Government interest calculated on the 
basis of the cost of financing for SFEF and the specific State 
interest rate for the issuance of the guarantee.  
                                                 
187  However, direct intervention by the State in relation to banks’ 
capital is permitted in case of special necessity and urgency: the 
Government could thus subscribe a capital increase of any financial 
institution whose default poses a systemic threat to the marketThis is 
what happened in the DEXIA case. See, http://premier-
ministre.gouv.fr/fr/;http://www.premierministre.gouv.fr/chantiers/croiss
ance_847/point_presse_christine_lagarde_61177.html 
.http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1745&fo
rmat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/399&for
mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en .  
188  It can be either residential mortgage -backed loans, or a warranty 
issued by a finance institution, or loans to public administrations, or to 
firms with high credit rating level, or consumer credit. 
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In so far SFEF, which is managed by the Treasury, has 
borrowed 23bn euros from the market, and has lent an equal 
amount to 13 banks, at an interest rate equal to 4%, which will 
allow the Government to make 380bn euros profits on the 
initial investment189. The total amount of money the 
Government committed to guarantee amounts at 265bn euros. 
One billion was specifically addressed to banks making loans 
to car manufacturers, in order to sustain this specific industrial 
sector.  
In addition, at the end of January 2009 the Government created 
the “Committee of Supervisors on the implementation of the 
plan”, consisting of the President and the Rapporteurs of 
Parliamentary Committee on Financial Affairs, the Chairman 
of the French Central Bank, the Deputy Director of the 
Treasury and the Deputy Director of the Budget190. 
The participating banks are required to make both an 
economic and an ethical contribution. Their commitments are 
specified in a memorandum of understanding signed by the 
banks and SFEF where the obligation to increase their lending 
activity by 3-4% by the end of December 2009 and to sustain 
the export industry191 are established.  
Banks are also required to participate in “credit mediation” 
programs. These programs are designed to increase access to 
credit for the highest possible number of enterprises, through 
the subscription and re-negotiation of loans192. 
Moreover, banks should adopt the MEDEF/AFEP code of 
conduct on directors’ remuneration193 and, before the 31st of 
March 2009, their managers should have renounced any 
variable component of their remuneration package. 
                                                 
189 SFES are rated AAA by Moody’s v. 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-19491164.html . 
190 http://www.minefe.gouv.fr/discours-presse/discours-
communiques_finances.php?type=communique&id=2455&rub=1. 
191  http://www.minefe.gouv.fr/discours-presse/discours-
communiques_finances.php?type=communique&id=2795&rub=1. 
192 http://www.mediateurducredit.fr/.. 
193 http://www.medef.fr/medias/files/132856_FICHIER_0.pdf . 
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As can be seen from the explanation given above, the French 
intervention measures to sustain banking capital are mixed 
(public-private) measures. On the one hand State companies 
are created in order to inject liquidity into the banking system, 
but on the other hand they seem to mimic market-based 
mechanisms, as they are raising funds from the financial 
market, and accordingly, they impose high interest rates as 
remuneration for the higher risk incurred.  
Nevertheless, the nature of the hybrid instruments subscribed 
by the Government should not be underestimated. Indeed it 
appears that the TSSs subscribed seem to be the less-intrusive 
instruments in order to satisfy the credit interests of the owner. 
It may be also for this reason that the Government has decided 
to set high interest rates in order to compensate for the 
significant financial sacrifice involved. Nonetheless, the final 
say on the opportunity to repay securities purchased by State-
owned companies is left to the bank which benefits from the 
public intervention194.  
It is also unclear how the French Government is going to shed 
its participation, and how it would behave with regard to 
participating banks: indeed, on the one hand it is clear that the 
Government’s guarantee is going to be limited in time. 
However, there is not a time limit for banks’ repurchase of 
financial instruments subscribed by the Government.  
In addition to that, Government prescribed that its 
representative should have the right to attend the SFEF board 
of directors’ meetings, with veto rights over funding 
resolutions. However, it has not been explained whether the 
Government representative has powers over participating 
institutions’ resolutions, and what, if any, those powers are. 
Indeed it seems likely that SFEF’s directors or the Government 
                                                 
194  However it might be argued that the provision contained in §6, art. 
6, of the Law 2008-1061 –which states that, in the event of bankruptcy, 
the State -owned company should have priority over other creditors on 
the reimbursement of pledged collateral –represents sufficient 
protection for the State. 
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representatives will be in touch with the directors of 
beneficiary institutions and that could dissuade them from 
taking certain decisions: nonetheless, they can only exercise 
“soft suasion” powers, given that the directors still retain full 
discretion to adopt any business decision, within the confines 
of the agreement in place between State and participating 
entities.     
 
4.3. The 360° United Kindom plan: on how monetary policy 
could save the system 
 
The United Kingdom could be seen as the first European 
country to be seriously damaged by the freezing of the 
wholesale markets as a result of the subprime crisis195.  
As soon as financial market conditions worsened, the Tripartite 
Authorities responsible for the banking  system, namely the 
FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of England put in place both 
general and specific provisions to ease banks’ difficulties. 
The UK Government announced its first measures in October 
2008 and provided additional facilities in January 2009. Since 
January 2009, those facilities have been constantly updated 
following the continuing deterioration of market conditions. 
However, the very first measure adopted by the Government 
to support the financial system dates back in April 2008 several 
months  before the EcoFin decision, followed by further 
intervention at the beginning of October 2008. New measures 
followed in April 2009, specifically tailored to increase banks 
tier 1 capital, namely the Asset Protection Scheme and the 
Asset purchase facility196.  
                                                 
195  Indeed the first signal dates back to September 2007, when 
Northern Rock, a small mortgage bank was forced to ask for a LOLR 
intervention that eventually ended up with the nationalization of the 
bank. The Northern Rock experience gave rise though to a vast process 
of reforms that involved all the areas which proved inadequate in 
dealing with the crisis , such as bank insolvency legislation, deposit 
protection, risk management and supervision. 
196  Previous measures adopted by the Bank of England were updated 
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4.3.1. The Special Liquidity Scheme 
 
The Special liquidity scheme was first introduced in April 
2008197 and it allows banks to swap for up to three years their 
illiquid assets for Treasury bills.  
The measure operates as follows: firstly, HM Treasury issues 
Treasury Bills borrowed by the Bank of England; secondly the 
BoE, in return for a fee198, swaps those Bills for assets that 
banks held on balance sheet as at 31st December 2007. The main 
category of eligible instruments is made up of securities 
backed by residential mortgages199. These assets will be high 
quality rated as AAA.  
Lastly, the underlying value of the illiquid assets must be 
higher than the Treasury bills value: for instance, if the illiquid 
asset is worth 100 pounds, the bank would receive Treasury 
bills worth70-90 pounds, depending on collateral quality. This 
is needed to avoid the Government bearing the credit risk, or 
limiting  its exposure to losses to the hypothesis of bank’s 
default, or to the amount exceeding  the asset value of the Bills. 
From April 2008 to January 2009, participating banks borrowed 
Treasury bills amounting to a total value of 185bn, whereas the 
face value of illiquid securities amounted to 287bn. However, 
because of the deterioration in market conditions in January 
                                                                                                                 
as well, such as the Operational lending and deposit facility and the 
Discount window facility: those open market operations  are in addition 
to the normal repurchase agreements already in place: however, more 
types of instruments have been accepted as collateral. 
197 See  Bank of England, Special Liquidity Scheme: Market Notice, 21th of 
April 2008, in 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice080421.pdf  
198  See. 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/information080421.pdf, p. 2. 
199  The BoE retains the discretion to accept securities backed by credit 
cards but it will not accept securities backed by US mortgages, although 
it can routinely accept assets denominated in currencies other than 
sterling. 
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2009, their value has been reduced to 242bn. 
Despite Government efforts, the attempt to ease the liquidity 
problems of banks did not succeed, so the Treasury had to 
adopt new measures to increase banks’ access to funding and 
to improve credit conditions in the economy. To this end, the 
BoE and the Treasury issued in October 2008 a fresh set of 
measures including the Discount Window Facility and the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme. A further analysis of those measures 
follows. 
 
4.3.2. The Credit Guarantee Scheme 
 
By means of the CGS HM Treasury guarantees new debt 
instruments of eligible institutions: specifically, in the event 
that the institution is not able to meet its obligations when the 
payment falls due, the Treasury will pay the guaranteed 
liability to the beneficiary200. 
Eligible institutions are banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom, as well as UK subsidiaries of foreign institutions 
that have a relevant activity in UK. Subject to Treasury 
discretion, it would be possible to consider other institutions as 
eligible. Within a banking group, the only entities able to 
participate are deposit-taking institutions.   
The main objects of the scheme are to:  
i) provide sufficient liquidity in the short term, ii) make 
available new capital to UK banks and building societies to 
strengthen their resources, permitting them to restructure their 
finances while maintaining the support for the real economy, 
iii) ensure that banking system has the funds necessary to 
maintain lending in the medium term. 
To qualify for the scheme, the relevant institution must either 
already have or have committed to raising tier 1 capital, in the 
form and amount agreed with the Government. Subsequently 
                                                 
200  
http://www.dmo.gov.uk/documentview.aspx?docname=cgs/press/cgsrul
es.pdf&page=. 
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the Government will guarantee the emission of new medium 
and short term debt, in return for market oriented 
remuneration. 
Eligible senior unsecured debt instruments include the 
following: certificates of deposit, commercial paper, bonds or 
notes, issued between the 13th of October and the 31st of 
December 2009. Moreover, they must not contain any cross 
default or cross acceleration clause or any right of payment by 
the issuer. 
Instruments have to be expressed in sterling, US dollars or 
Euro. Later the Government permitted the issue of instruments 
in Yen, Austrian dollars, Canadian dollars, and Swiss francs, to 
allow the banks to have access to a wider range of markets, 
taking advantage of the State guarantee. 
The guarantee will be valid up to 36 months, unless extended 
for a further 2 years, at Treasury discretion, but only up to 1/3 
of the total amount of guaranteed liabilities. In any event, the 
guarantee  must end in April 2014201. 
In its first notice of the measure, HM Treasury named some 
banks as eligible to participate immediately in the scheme202. 
However not all of them have taken up the offer. During the 
following months other banks have asked for a Government 
guarantee. In so far the Treasury has guaranteed liabilities for a 
total amount of 17.175billion of sterling, 13.850 billion of euros 
and 4.850 billion of US dollars203. 
 
4.3.3. The Bank Recapitalisation Fund 
                                                 
201  See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/2057. 
202  Namely: Abbey National plc, Bank of Scotland plc, Barclays Bank 
plc, HCBS Bank plc, Lloyds TSB Bank plc, Nationwide building society, 
The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, Standard Chartered Bank. Si v. 
http://www.dmo.gov.uk/documentview.aspx?docname=cgs/press/cgs090
208.pdf&page=. 
203  See, 
http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=CGS/CGSLiabilities#publiclyi
ssued. See, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm .  
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The second measure announced in October 2008, directly 
intervenes in relation to bank capital: by means of this facility 
the Government will make available new tier 1 capital to 
eligible institutions in the form of preference shares or PIBS204 
in case of building societies, under certain conditions 
Eligibility criteria are the same as the CGS scheme (UK 
incorporated banks, including UK subsidiaries of foreign 
institutions), whereas the total amount and types of eligible 
instruments should be determined on a case by case basis, 
taking into account the amount of tier 1 capital that the bank 
wants to raise. 
Irrespective of the amount raised, the Government, if it decides 
to provide capital, will lay down terms and conditions relating 
to managers’ remuneration205, dividend policies, and a full 
commitment to support lending to small businesses and home 
buyers206. 
The Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and HBOS immediately 
asked to participate in the fund. It was agreed that the 
Government would subscribe 5bn of RBS's preference shares207, 
3bn of HBOS' preference shares208  and 1bn of Lloyds' 
                                                 
204  See, http://www.bsa.org.uk/faq/whatarepibs.htm.  
205  See, www. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_10.pdf. 
206  As soon as it announced the measure, the Government made 
available 25bn for the facility, and made available another 25bn to the 
same institutions identified under the CGS. These banks had committed 
to the Government to increase their total tier 1 capital by 25bn, at 
aggregate level. The main objective of the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
was to protect the banks from future shocks and to strengthen their 
resources for the current crisis. According to the Chancellor, the decision 
to underwrite preference shares was justified by the fact that these rank 
above the shares of ordinary shareholders. Moreover, given the 
provision of a commission, taxpayers would be fully rewarded for the 
investment. See, http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_081008.htm. 
207  See, Preference share subscription agreement between the Commissioner 
of Her Majesty’s Treasury and The Royal Bank of Scotland group plc, 366. 
208  See, Preference share subscription agreement between the Commissioner 
of Her Majesty’s Treasury and HBOS plc. 
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preference shares209. Eventually the total stake in Lloyds was 
increased because of the merger between Lloyd’s and HBOS, 
which took place a few months later. 
According to the conditions attached to the subscription 
agreement between HM Treasury and RBS210, the bank could 
not pay dividends, nor redeem, purchase or otherwise acquire 
in any way any of its own ordinary shares, until the 
Government's preference shares had been redeemed or 
repurchased in full. Another covenant of that agreement stated 
that in any case the Government's preference shares would not 
be treated as ranking after any new ordinary share and that a 
HM Treasury representative should be entitled to attend the 
general meeting of the company and to speak or to vote upon 
any resolution proposed thereat in circumstances where the 
dividend stated to be payable had not been declared and paid 
in full.  
Another interesting clause in the contract establishes the duty 
to notify the Government immediately if the RBS directors 
resolve not to pay any dividend on preference shares by reason 
of lack of distributable profits, or because of the application of 
FSA capital adequacy requirements, or the exercise of their 
own discretion211. 
If we read such covenants a contrario, this means that directors, 
under certain circumstances, are not obliged to pay dividends 
on the preference shares. However, such conditions may not 
only be objective (lack of distributable profits) but also 
subjective ( at the directors' discretion), which makes these 
                                                 
209  See, Preference share subscription agreement between the Commissioner 
of Her Majesty’s Treasury and LLOYDS TSB plc, 414. 
210  http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/combined_rbs_hbos_lloydstsb.pdf. 
211  “The Directors may, in their sole and absolute discretion, resolve 
(...) that the dividend in the (...) Preference shares, or part thereof, shall 
not be paid on that Dividend Payment Date. If the Directors resolve as 
aforesaid, then none or (…) part only of the dividend shall be declared 
and/or paid”. See, Preference share subscription agreement between the 
Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury and The Royal Bank of Scotland 
group plc,  368. 
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shares comparable to the shares acquired by the French 
Government. 
 As with RBS, HBOS shares subscribed by the Government 
were preferred in the dividend distribution, the payment of 
dividends was subjected upon certain conditions, and the bank 
could not conduct operation on its own shares until the 
Government shares are repaid in full212. 
Lastly, as far as Lloyds's shares are concerned, the subscribed 
shares have the same features as RBS and HBOS preference 
shares (dividends and payment, ranking, voting rights), with 
only one difference, in the Lloyds agreement there is a 
covenant relating to the holder's rights in case of liquidation of 
the institution, stating that holders of preference shares will 
rank equally with holders of the most senior class of preference 
shares and in priority to the holders of any other share capital 
of the company. 
Given that the beneficiaries of the measure were 
fundamentally sound institutions, they were not asked to 
present a restructuring plan; it sufficed instead, to produce a 
report demonstrating that they remain fundamentally sound 
and indicating how they plan to repay the state capital213. 
                                                 
212  However the agreement with HBOS differed from the RBS 
agreement because the former had a capital disqualification clause and 
granted the Treasury representative voting rights in respect of general 
meeting resolutions when the dividend had not been paid in full (as for 
RBS) and where a resolution is proposed varying or abrogating any of the 
rights, preferences, privileges, limitations or restrictions attached to any 
class of shares of which preference shares form part. 
 
213  However, it is well known that the public intervention has not 
proved sufficient to restore banks’ capital viability and this, coupled with 
the continuing closure of inter banking lending market, forced the British 
Government to dramatically change strategy. First, on the 19th of January 
2009,  HM Treasury converted its RBS preference shares into ordinary 
shares. See, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_06_09.htm. The aim of 
the conversion is to provide “additional core tier 1 capital to the bank to 
strengthen its resources, enable it to absorb expected losses and permit it to 
restructure its finances and give the bank the opportunity to build its 
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4.3.4. The Discount Window Facility 
 
By participating in the Discount Window Facility214, banks, in 
return for a commission and a guarantee issuance, can borrow 
gilts215 from the Bank of England to strengthen their resources. 
Eligible institutions are UK banks that usually pay cash ratio 
deposits and that satisfy eligibility criteria to participate in the 
BoE's program for the Sterling monetary framework. Banks can 
hold securities no longer than 30 days, although the period can 
be extended by the Central Bank. Indeed, in January 2009 the 
term has been increased to one year. Instruments admitted as 
collateral might be of 4 kinds, but basically they are the same 
as the instruments normally admitted by the BoE in its open 
market operations: e.g.  G10 State bonds, covered bonds 
guaranteed by triple A commercial mortgages. No synthetic 
                                                                                                                 
capital further so that it is able to maintain and increase its support for the 
real economy by facilitating £6bn more lending to industry and 
homeowners, over and above the existing commitments”. See also, 
http://www.investors.rbs.com/investor_relations/capitalisation
_issue_2009.cfm. Eventually, after other interventions mentioned below, 
the Government held 70% of the bank's capital. Secondly, during March 
2009, the Government changed its term agreement with Lloyds.   As a result 
of the bank's request  to participate in the new public measures, it was 
decided to increase the bank's capital increase and to convert the preference 
shares into ordinary shares. In this way, the Government became the owner 
of   43.5% of the bank. In addition, it was established that, if the increase in 
capital could not be underwritten, the Treasury would take up its  pro rata 
share of the offer and would also subscribe for any additional shares not 
taken up by existing shareholders. Should this be the case, the total stake in 
Lloyds would  amount to 65% of the capital. The Government shares 
conversion was also subject to the adoption by the bank of the FSA's 
principles on remuneration practices. See www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_23_09.htm. and http://www.ukfi.gov.uk/. 
214  See Bank of England Market Notice: Operational Standing Lending and 
Deposit Facilities; Discount Window Facility, in 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/ marketnotice081020.pdf . 
215  See, http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/About_Gilts. 
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products are eligible. In order to bolster banks’ liquidity, 
borrowed gilts can be used as collateral in  open market 
operations.  
 
On the 19th of January 2009, because of the deterioration of 
market conditions, the UK Government decided to intervene 
again this time with monetary policy measures. However, in 
this case the measures adopted -the Guarantee Scheme for 
ABS, the Asset Protection Scheme and the Asset Purchase 
Facility216 -seem to be more “aggressive” than those adopted 
previously.  
 
4.3.5. The Guarantee Scheme for Asset Backed Securities 
 
As in the case of the CGS, the aim of the Government in 
issuing such measure was to improve market players’ 
confidence in the stability of the wholesale market, to “help 
support lending and promote robust and sustainable markets 
over the longer –term. To this end, the Government provided 
full or partial guarantees to triple A rated ABS, including 
mortgage and corporate and consumer debt. Institutions 
eligible to participate in the CGS will be held eligible to 
participate the Guarantee scheme as well. However, those 
institutions have to fulfill international standards and best 
practices in underwriting, disclosure, reporting and valuation. 
The Bank of England reserved the right to add other terms and 
conditions at a later date, especially as far as eligible assets and 
collateral are concerned217.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
216  See,  www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_05_09.htm.  
217  All the details will be available on the Debt Management Office 
website: www.dmo.gov.uk . 
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4.3.6. The Asset protection scheme  
 
The program218 is designed as follows: the Treasury, in return 
for a fee219, will provide protection against future credit losses 
on one or more portfolios or defined assets. The institutions 
should bear a first loss amount, but the 90% of the excess will 
be hedged by the State. The fact that the first 10% of the loss 
will not be covered by the State should give institutions 
sufficient incentive to minimize losses220. 
Eligible institutions are UK- incorporated deposit -takers, 
including UK subsidiaries of foreign institutions, with more 
than 25bn of eligible assets. To be included in the scheme, 
assets must be owned by the bank, and basically must consist 
of corporate and leveraged loans, residential and commercial 
                                                 
218  See, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_19_09_htm and the Appendix. 
219 The fee will be determined according to “international practices so 
as to provide appropriate incentives to participating institutions to meet 
their commitments agreed with the Treasury to support lending to 
creditworthy borrowers and to ensure appropriate protection to 
taxpayers. The pricing will also ensure that the Treasury benefits from a 
share of any upside returns”. And “the fee will include an amount 
calculated to be the applicable participants pro rata share of the costs 
incurred or to be incurred by HMT in establishing the Scheme”, ivi in 
Appendix, 15.  
220  The procedure for assessing the respective losses to be borne by the 
bank and by the Government is as follows: first, a “trigger event” must 
have occurred resulting in a loss covered by the scheme. The trigger 
might be: a) a failure to pay amounts due subject to grace period and 
provision for remedy, b) bankruptcy, c) such other event or 
circumstances as HMT might agree shall be a trigger in respect of a 
specific covered asset or covered pool.  The event might have occurred 
even before the scheme commencement date. Triggers do not include (i) 
unrealised mark-to-market losses, (ii) accounting provisions or 
accounting write downs, or (iii) disposal of Covered Assets. Secondly, a 
loss will be considered equal to the lesser of the outstanding principal 
balance of that covered asset, as at the date on which the trigger 
occurred, and the covered amount. Hence part of such lower value will 
be covered by the institution, whereas the remaining part, if any, is 
divided between the State (90% net of costs and expenses) and the bank 
(10%). See www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_19_09_htm and the Appendix. 
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loans, residential mortgage-backed securities, collateralized 
loan obligation, commercial mortgage backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligation, held by the participating 
institution as at 31st December 2008. The Treasury has 
discretion to extend the scheme to other assets.     
In order to participate in the programme, banks must, inter alia, 
commit to increase their total lending to worthwhile debtors, 
with monthly reporting to the Government, to adopt 
remuneration practices in line with the FSA code, and satisfy 
the highest international standards of public disclosure in 
relation to their asset books. Lastly, they must give access to 
the Treasury and its advisors to all the documents necessary to 
evaluate assets’ risk.  
The participating institution will continue to manage the 
covered assets. However in this regard there is a clause that 
may give the Government some control of the management of 
the bank: in fact, banks must adopt oversight, control and 
management procedures in respect of the covered asset pool 
that help to identify both risks and asset performance. The 
institution must report on those procedures to the Treasury on 
a regular basis, in a transparent and complete manner, and 
must manage the assets according to common agreed guiding 
principles The institution must monitor and manage conflicts 
of interest, both actual and potential, that might arise and must 
grant access to all relevant documents, books, records and 
other information to a Government representative.   
Specific reporting requirements cover transactions with related 
parties, or that are not at arm's length, or that exceed a certain 
amount. 
In the latter cases taxpayers' interest in the correct use of public 
funds is protected by giving the Treasury the power to approve 
such operations; the Government can also appoint an 
independent manager that, in prescribed circumstances, has 
the right to manage or supervise the management of some or 
all of the covered assets, including the case where aggregate 
losses exceed the applicable threshold specified in the 
agreement. The fee may be paid in cash or through the issue of 
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capital instruments by the institution. These may include a 
range of alternative capital instruments but are not expected to 
include ordinary voting shares at the outset. 
The expression “at the outset” seems to envisage the 
hypothesis that the institution is in such a bad shape that it is 
not even able to repay the commission: should this be the case, 
the State might exercise  its voting rights  to participate actively 
in the governance of the institution. 
The first bank that participated in the measure was RBS221: in 
return for the relief provided by the government, the bank 
committed to increase its lending activities by £25bn in 2009. 
Should the lending demand be particularly high, £9bn will be 
specifically devoted to mortgages and the remaining £16bn to 
business lendings222. 
                                                 
221  On that occasion the Government and the bank's managers agreed 
both on a fresh injection of capital and on the participation of the bank  in 
the scheme.In the first case, the Government subscribed a capital increase of 
13bn and committed to subscribe a 6bn capital increase at the  bank's 
request. The shares subscribed will be preference  shares  in the distribution 
of dividends and will carry the option to subscribe for new shares.In 
addition, those shares will give voting powers over general meeting 
resolutions relating  to the modification of any rights attached to the shares 
or the liquidation of the institution. 
 However, the Government’s rights would be restricted  if it were to 
it decide to convert its preference  shares into ordinary shares: in this case it 
could only exercise its voting rights if the total percentage of votes held 
exceeded  75% of the total amount of those needed to adopt the resolution, 
In the second case, the Government would “protect” the assets of the 
institution  up to a total of total £325bn, in return for a commission in cash 
of £6.5bn. In case of losses, RBS would cover a first loss equal to £19.5bn: 
should the total loss be more than the amount covered by the bank, the 
State would cover 90% of the remaining part, whereas 10% would stay with 
the bank. See Appendix 1. Summary of the expected terms of the B Shares, 
in RBS Announcement, Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc – HM Treasury 
Asset Protection Scheme, in 
http://www.investors.rbs.com/investor_relations/announcements/ReleaseD
etail.cfm?ReleaseID=367753.    
222 See, RBS Announcement, Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc – HM 
treasury Asset Protection Scheme, 
http://www.investors.rbs.com/investor_relations/announcements/Releas
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4.3.7. The Asset Purchase Facility 
 
In order to increase the total amount of money that banks 
could spend to support the  wider economy, the Bank of 
England – by means of a special fund and under authorisation 
of the Treasury - would purchase banks’ illiquid assets which 
might constrain their normal activity. 
Eligible assets would be bought by the Bank of England Asset 
Purchase Facility Fund Limited, a BoE's 100% subsidiary that 
in turn would operate as an agent of the Fund. The measure 
would be funded by Treasury gilts and funds from the Debt 
Management Office and, although limited to the minimum, 
from BoE reserves. 
The facility has been implemented by 2 sub-measures: the 
Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme and the CGS bond 
secondary market scheme 
By means of the corporate bond secondary market scheme, the 
BoE may purchase small quantities of corporate bonds through 
reverse auctions. Eligible bonds are those issued by companies  
incorporated in UK, that actively contribute to the British 
economy and that carry their main activities there. In principle, 
bonds issued by non- bank financial institutions may be 
considered as eligible, whenever the BoE considers that the 
company significantly contributes to corporate financing in the 
UK. 
Corporate bonds issued by building societies cannot be 
included in the scheme. Hence, eligible bonds must be 
conventional senior unsubordinated debt, with a minimum 
long-term credit rating of BBB-/Baa3, for a minimum amount 
of £100million. Eligible issuers must be market -makers in that 
market to facilitate their support activities. 
Alternatively, by means of the CGS bond secondary market 
scheme – the Fund will stand ready to purchase bonds issued 
                                                                                                                 
eDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=367753.    
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by institutions participating in the Credit Guarantee Scheme 
and might also consider the possibility of purchasing securities 
issued by those institutions. As in the case of the former 
measure, in order to facilitate the activities of market makers in 
supporting secondary market liquidity, eligible BoE 
counterparties would be those intermediaries that are market 
makers in such securities. 
 
To sum up, we can see how the British intervention has 
involved both a direct injection of capital and macro-economics 
tools have been used. Indeed the Government subscribed for 
preference shares and used two out of the three tools of 
monetary policy that central banks have at their disposal: swap 
and purchase of securities and discount lending.    
In this way the BoE aimed to mitigate credit institutions' 
liquidity demand, to allow them to meet their obligations and 
to use as collateral financial instruments that would not have 
been otherwise accepted, given the uncertainty about their 
value. 
 
4.4. Spain: a plan for a country only marginally affected by 
the crisis 
 
The Spanish financial system has not been severely hit by the 
crisis thus far, although banks are restructuring their balance 
sheets through participation in government programs. The 
relative strength and resilience of the system could be due to 
some of the Spanish prudential requirements, namely 
“dynamic provisions” and the rigorous consolidation rules on 
balance sheet vehicles223.  
                                                 
223  Under the dynamic loan-loss provisions, banks are forced to set 
aside a certain amount of capital for any loans granted, weighted both on 
their specific risk and on more general potential losses that might arise. The 
main effect of this buffer should be the mitigation of credit pro-cyclicality, 
because it creates a cushion for bank's losses that exceeds what would be 
“strictly” necessary. As far as the consolidation rules are concerned, banks 
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More generally, the Spanish banks were less dependent for 
funding on securitised products and on the North American 
and British markets than banks located in other member States. 
Nonetheless, a few Spanish banks, i.e. Santander and BBVA, 
are dangerously exposed to such markets, having become 
sophisticated international players through recent expansion224. 
The Spanish government has chosen to intervene with 
measures to sustain banks' capital soundness by increasing 
their access to funding rather than by subscribing for 
preference shares, although this option has not been ruled out. 
 
4.4.1. The Plan Espanol para el Estimulo de la Economia Y el 
Empleo 
 
The Plan for stimulating the Spanish economy and 
employment225 is divided into different areas relating to 
families, firm, employment, credit institutions, budgetary 
measures, and economic modernization. The financial part of 
the plan consists of four measures: the Fondo de Adquisicion de 
Activos financieròs, the Avales del Estado a las nuevas emisiones de 
deuda de las entidades de crédito, the increase of the coverage for 
the Fondo de Garantia de depositos y dè inversiones and finally the 
possibility for the government to order the acquisition of 
bonds issued by some credit institutions . 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
have to apply the same accounting standards on an individual basis and on 
a consolidated basis and the rules are particularly strict in relation to risk 
transfer and  control of SPVs. 
224  The government has recently rescued an ailing savings bank, Caja 
La Mancha. This was due to the fact that, Spain had previously 
experienced a boom in the housing market, a sector where savings 
banks are particularly exposed. Today, there is a decline in that market 
and increasing mortgage defaults, which are threatening the soundness 
of these institutions. As a result, consolidation and concentration are 
expected within the sector. 
225  Available at http://www.plane.gob.es/. 
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4.4.2. Fondo de Adquisicion de Activos financieròs (FAAF) 
 
By means of the Fund226, the government can purchase high 
quality bank assets in order to support credit institutions in 
access to funding. The ultimate objective is the re-
establishment of normal credit flows to families and 
companies. The fund is administered, managed and led by the 
Ministry of the Economy and finance but is governed 
internally by an Advisory Board, an Executive Board227, and a 
technical committee228.  
By virtue of the Real Decreto Ley 6/2008, that created the Fund, 
it has an initial allocation of 30bn euros and operates through 
auctions. Four auctions have been conducted thus far and 54 
institutions (banks and cajas) had access to funding totalling 
more than 19bn euros229. 
The fund purchases only triple A assets for outright purchases 
and double A for repos: these assets are not considered toxic 
because they must have been issued after August the 1st 2007 in 
the first case and after October 15th 2008 in the second case. 
                                                 
226  http://www.fondoaaf.es/SP/index.html. 
227  The Advisory Board, chaired by the Minister, is in charge of the 
establishment of FAAF investment guidelines, the monitoring and 
evaluation of its activities, “deciding the assignment of FAAF asset 
yields, as well the product of its asset maturity or sales, and to approve 
the capital and operational budgets”. Transactions involving the 
acquisitions, disposal, use and management of the financial assets of 
FAAF are the responsibility of the Executive Board as well as the 
preparation of the capital and budget proposal. 
228 The committee is composed by the secretary of state for the 
economy, the director general of the Treasury and financial policy, the 
director general for insurance and pension funds, a representative of the 
State general legal services, a representative of the official credit 
institute, a representative of the state financial controller, with speaking 
privileges but no voting rights, Member of the Treasury and Financial 
Policy General Directorate, acting as Secretary, with speaking privileges 
but no voting rights. 
229  http://www.fondoaaf.es/EN/EntidadesCredito.htm. 
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According to the government, taxpayers’ protection is 
guaranteed because “the FAAF is designed in such a way that 
it is expected to be profitable and therefore it does not 
represent any foreseeable expense whatsoever for taxpayers, 
quite the opposite”. Nonetheless, the provision increasing 
public debt by financing the fund does not seem to provide the 
necessary protection for taxpayers due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the actual value of the assets. 
Eligible institutions are banks, credit cooperatives, and 
financial credit institutions domiciled in Spain, together with 
Spanish branches of foreign institutions.  
Eligible assets include covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias) and 
other types of securitised products rated and traded in 
organised markets. 
The fund purchases the assets through auction mechanisms 
which should promote efficiency and competition in asset 
allocation. The fund should not conduct auctions after the 31st 
of December 2009. 
 
4.4.3. The Avales del Estado a las nuevas emisiones de deuda 
de las entidades de crédito 
 
The Spanish government was ready to guarantee new medium 
term debt issues of credit institutions whose request was 
submitted before the 3rd of December 2008; the issue deadline 
was 14 December 2009. 
Eligible debt instruments are those simple non-subordinated 
bonds not subject to any other type of guarantee, excluding 
options and derivatives. In any case the minimum amount of 
debt issued must be 10 million euros per issuer. The issuer 
should pay a fee in return for the guarantee.  
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4.4.4. The Autorización para reforzar el capital de las 
entidades de crédito 
 
By means of this measure the Minister of economic and 
financial affairs is authorised to order the acquisition of 
instruments issued by those credit institutions domiciled in 
Spain which need to strengthen their resources. Eligible 
securities would be bonds, preference shares and cuotas 
participativas, in case of saving banks. Thus far, no credit 
institution seems to have applied for this measure. 
 
4.5. Italy: on the creation of ad hoc financial instruments 
 
In line with the EcoFin decision, the Italian government has 
intervened with a set of measures aimed at providing a public 
guarantee for banks’ liabilities, an asset-swapping facility and 
government subscription for future capital increases. 
 By virtue of Emergency decrees 155/2008 and 157/2008, 
transposed into law 190/2008, the Minister of Economy and 
finance is authorized to: a) Underwrite or guarantee future 
capital increases of banks in difficulty; b) Guarantee their 
medium term liabilities; c) Swap banks’ securities or 
counterparties’ banks liabilities for treasury bonds; d) 
Guarantee banks’ funding operations on the Euromarket; e) 
Guarantee  the  Bank of Italy’s lending in case of emergency 
liquidity assistance provided to ailing institutions; f) Guarantee 
deposits, beyond the minimum already established  by law. 
However the most controversial measure is without doubt the 
provision included in art. 12 of law 2/2009, which gives the 
Minister of finance the power to subscribe for a particular type 
of financial instrument, known as “Tremonti bonds”, at the 
bank's request. 
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4.5.1. The sottoscrizione e garanzia di aumenti di capitale 
According to art. 1 of law 190/2008, the Minister of finance is 
authorized until 31 December 2009 to subscribe for or 
guarantee a capital increase in case of undercapitalized banks. 
The conditions attached to the subscription are basically 
twofold: 1) the capital increase should not have been 
completed at the date of the decree and 2) the bank has drawn 
up a viable restructuring program lasting at least three years.  
The State intervention must be at arm’s length and is subject to 
the approval of the Bank of Italy, conditional on the suitability 
of the plan and the dividend policy decided by the general 
meeting. In case of subscription, the government will be given 
preference shares, with no voting rights. The bank retains the 
option of redeeming those shares subject to the agreement of 
the Bank of Italy. The approval by the Central Bank is 
conditional on the operation not compromising the solvency of 
the bank or, where the bank is part of a group, of  the group as 
a whole. However, nothing has been stated yet, in relation to 
the rights the Minister could exercise as a shareholder. Should 
the participating bank decide to change the stabilisation 
program, the amendments must be authorized by the 
government and the Bank of Italy.  
The law lays down no provisions  regarding the State’s exit 
options.   
 
4.5.2. The garanzia sulle passività and the asset swap facility 
  
By means of this provision, the Ministry of Finance can 
provide a guarantee for banks’ liabilities, at arm’s length until 
the 31st of December 2009. Eligible liabilities must have a 
maturity date of 5 years and must have been issued after the 
13th of October 2008. In addition, the government can 
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guarantee the reimbursement of instruments traded by banks 
in order to have access to funds in the Euromarket. In both 
cases, State intervention requires the Bank of Italy to certify 
that the applicant bank has sufficient capital. 
The asset swap facility should work as follows: the Treasury 
issues special purpose  bonds called Certificati di scambio del 
Tesoro (CST-Treasury Exchange Certificates) that would be 
swapped for an equal nominal amount of certificates of deposit 
(certificati di deposito, namely a kind of time deposit) issued by 
interested banks. CSTs will have a final maturity date of 30th of 
June 2010, the issue price and the reimbursement price are 
equal to par.  
In the asset swap case the public intervention would expire in 
six months, but can be renewed, without the issue of new 
CSTs. 
As for the capital increase, there seem to be no banks that have 
received those types of government support. 
 
 
 
4.5.3. The so called “Tremonti” Bonds 
 
 By virtue of law 2/2009, the government can, at the request of 
a bank, underwrite a particular kind of financial instrument, 
issued by credit institutions. The main characteristic of the 
instrument is that it is a hybrid subordinated debt instrument 
that carries no voting rights in the general meeting, but one 
which can be converted into ordinary shares and can be 
remunerated by the payment of dividends.  
Credit institutions who are permitted to issue those bonds are 
Italian banks and bank holding companies whose shares are 
listed on the Stock Exchange. Those instruments are 
considered as tier 1 capital and  can be redeemed by the bank, 
subject  to the approval of the Bank of Italy who must be 
satisfied that the redemption would not threaten the stability 
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of the institution. 
The remuneration for the State would be the notional interest 
on the bonds that is supposed to be very high (7-8%)230, in 
order to remove any incentive for banks to abuse the measure 
and to protect taxpayers: however the actual payment is 
subject to the payment of dividends by the bank. 
The government can only subscribe for those bonds if the 
overall operation is cost effective and is conditional on a 
waiver from the Central Bank allowing the inclusion of those 
instruments in tier 1 capital under the prudential rules.  
Furthermore, the issuing bank must sign a MoU with the 
government where it commits: a) not to reduce the level of 
credit to SME’s and households; b) to support homeowners in 
the repayment of their mortgages; c) to guarantee adequate 
levels of liquidity to the Government’s creditors; d) to adopt 
dividend policies in line with their liquidity status; e) to adopt 
a code of practice, containing, inter alia, provisions on 
remuneration policies. 
The final date of subscription by the state is the 31st of 
December 2009 and the State intervention should last no longer 
than 10 years. 
The primary concern relating to Tremonti bonds is the fact that 
the State is seriously exposed to banks’ risk without having 
voting rights, and it is “locked” into the bank because only the 
bank can exercise the redemption rights. 
As in the case of the French TSS and UK preference shares, it 
will be difficult for the State to recoup its investment in the 
absence of dividends. However, contrary to what we have seen 
with the UK provisions, nothing is stated about banks 
purchasing their own shares: this can easily be a scapegoat to 
avoid paying dividends to shareholders (or bondholders in the 
cases under consideration). 
Lastly, no sanctions are provided in case of breach of contract 
                                                 
230  In any case the interest should be 2 bp above that of 3 years 
treasury bills, and the 30% of the total amount of bonds issued by any 
bank should be underwritten by private investors. between those 
investors no more than 1/5 should already be a bank’s shareholder.  
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by the banks. 
 
4.6. Germany: a State deeply involved in saving its ailing 
financial system 
As is well known, the German financial system was in severe 
trouble long before the crisis materialized in other EU member 
states due to severe financial difficulties of some credit 
institutions.  
This article focuses only on the general measures adopted by 
Member States; it does not analyze individual rescue measures 
such as Hypo Real estate, Sachsen, West lb, IKB, some of which 
are still under investigation by the EC commission.    
The first rescue package came into force in October 2008, when 
the German government created the Financial Market 
Stabilisation Fund (Sonderfonds Finanzmarkt Stabilisierung, 
SoFFin)231 under the Financial Market Stabilization Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz, FMStG)232. This also contained 
provisions modifying the German Banking Act, the German 
Insurance Supervision Act and the German Insolvency Code. 
The Act has been supplemented by a subsequent Regulation233. 
In  march 2009 the government emended the Act to introduce 
the possibility for the State to “nationalize” troubled 
institution. Commentators see this as a way to establish a “bad 
bank” in Germany. 
 
 
 
                                                 
231  http://www.soffin.de/index.en.php. 
232
 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_69116/DE/BMF__Start
seite/Aktuelles/Aktuelle__Gesetze/Gesetze__Verordnungen/Finanzmark
tstabi__anl,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf. 
233
 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_1928/DE/BMF__Starts
eite/Aktuelles/Aktuelle__Gesetze/Gesetze__Verordnungen/Finanzmarkt
stabilisierungsfonds__Verordnung__anla,templateId=raw,property=publ
icationFile.pdf. 
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4.6.1. The Financial Market Stabilisation Fund 
 
The fund had an initial endowment of 400bln euros, of which 
100 was funded by public budget. 
It provides facilities for guarantees, recapitalisation and 
assumptions of risk positions. Where a guarantee is provided, 
the Ministry of finance can take out from the public budget 
credits up to 20bln euros, whereas 70 bln can be used for 
recapitalisation and assumption of risk positions. If the budget 
committee consents, an additional  amount of 10 bln euros can 
be taken out..  
SoFFin is a public agency which is not legally independent, 
established within the Central Bank, albeit supervised by the 
Federal Ministry of Finance and managed by a management 
committee composed of  3 members appointed by the Ministry 
of Finance in consultation with the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
The managing committee submits proposals to the Steering 
committee, composed of representatives of the main 
Authorities in the area234.  
 
                                                 
234 The managing committee submits proposals to the Steering 
committee, composed of representatives of the main Authorities in the area 
namely the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the 
Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of economics and 
technology, and one representative of the federal states. One member of the 
central bank can attend the assemblies, with consultative functions only. 
The Steering Committee decides on stabilisation measures, questions of 
principle, matters of special importance, as well as on conditions to be 
imposed on the business activities of participating enterprises. Obviously, 
the Minister of Finance is politically responsible for the decisions of the 
Committee and is responsible for preparing the accounts .It is required to 
inform the board of the fund of all relevant facts. The board of the Fund can 
consult on fundamental and strategic questions as well as about long term 
developments in financial market policy. It is composed of members of the 
parliamentary budgetary committee. Decisions taken by the steering 
committee are based on the importance of the entity to the stability of the 
financial market, the urgency and the principle of effective and economic 
use of the fund. 
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4.6.2. The guarantee for new debt 
 
The Fund can guarantee newly issued debt securities and other 
liabilities of financial sector and other enterprises which the 
government deems relevant. Eligible instruments (s.c. Notes) 
might have a maturity date of 5 years, but the guarantee 
expires on December 31, 2012. The maximum amount of the 
guarantee is determined by bank’s capitalisation.  
Eligible institutions are credit institutions, investment firms, 
investment companies, insurance companies, pension funds, 
operators of stock or derivatives exchanges and certain 
financial holding companies incorporated in Germany, 
provided they have sufficient capital.. German subsidiaries of 
foreign financial institutions are included. The decision to 
grant the guarantee is subject to the approval of the BaFIN ( the  
Financial Supervisory Authority ). 
The guarantee is intended as unconditional, irrevocable and 
unsubordinated.  Moreover according to the wording of the 
guarantee: “the guarantor may not set off any claims against its 
obligations under the guarantee and shall have no right of 
retention in respect of its obligation”235. 
From January 2009 to May 2009, 8 tranches of guaranteed debt 
have been issued, all of them with high quality ratings, since 
the major rating agencies have assessed positively the 
willingness of the German government to honour its 
obligations under the guarantee. 
The provision of the guarantee will be remunerated at market 
rate and is also subject to the assumption by the bank of a 
viable business plan. 
 
4.6.3. The recapitalisation measure 
 
The fund can also intervene to bolster bank capital, subject to 
the same conditions. The sum of 70 billion (at aggregate level 
                                                 
235 See http://www.soffin.de/downloads/garantievertrag_muster.pdf. 
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for recapitalisation and assumption of risks) has been made 
available for the purpose of  investing in any type of share, 
“silent participations” or other instruments, preferably 
included in  tier 1 capital. 
The maximum sum that can be granted amounts at 10 bln per 
institution, subject to the approval of the steering committee. 
The fund may hold and sell participations beyond  2012236. 
Acquired shares, silent participation rights and other rights 
must be sold in a manner which avoids distorting the market. 
The guarantee is conditional on the meeting of certain criteria 
by the bank: a) the bank should be sufficiently capitalized; b) it 
must have a sound business plan; c) it must undertake to grant 
loans to small and medium-sized enterprises; d) it must adopt 
provisions on remuneration, including a prohibition on 
severance payments; e) no dividend payments must be made. 
As far as remuneration is concerned, its validity should be 
assessed in terms of incentives and adequacy and has to be 
restricted to a level which is deemed “adequate”: a salary of 
500.000euros p.a. to any managing director or board member is 
deemed excessive. During the term of the stabilization 
measures, no incentives or other voluntary remuneration 
payments are permitted, unless these payments are 
compensated by a lower fixed remuneration and the overall 
remuneration is adequate.  
Performance targets and remuneration based on economic 
performance may not be subsequently amended to the 
detriment of the enterprise. The financial institution seeking 
guarantees or the transfer of risk positions must have sufficient 
own funds which ensures that individual institutions are 
restricted in their use of the funds. 
The institution that has mostly benefited from the funds is 
without doubt HypoReal Estate237. 
                                                 
236  http://www.soffin.de/leistungen_rekapitalisierung.en.php?sub=3. 
237  On May 2009 the fund held the 47.31% of HRE and aimed to take it 
over completely by the end of June: on the 2nd of June, after an 
extraordinary  shareholders meeting, an increase in  capital of 2.96bln euros 
was approved. The increase has been subscribed by the Fund that today 
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Even if the HRE case is not seen as unique it is clear that the 
Fund can underwrite ordinary shares in a credit institution. 
Furthermore, although it was stated that the Fund would be 
active until the 31st of December 2009, we must recall that it can 
actually hold and sell its participations beyond 2012. Those 
circumstances make possible the involvement of the State in 
banks’ capital for long time.  
 
4.6.4. The assumptions of risks  
  
The last option the fund can consider is the possibility of 
assuming risk positions (i.e. receivables, securities) from 
financial sector enterprises acquired before the 13th of October 
2008. The fund would then transfer  Government  bonds to the 
institution.  
The purchase price would be at book  value and in any case the 
interest charged for the assumption of risk should cover the 
cost of funding by the Fund. Moreover the enterprise may still 
assume part of the risk where the creation of put and call 
options are involved.. 
The conditions for the fund to take over the risk are the same 
as for the provision of the guarantee except for two differences: 
1) no commitment on the financing of SMEs is required and 2) 
the maximum amount of assumption of risk in any single 
entity is 5bln euros 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
holds 90% of Hypo real estate holding. The government now stands ready 
to squeezing out the shareholders in order to proceed with its restructuring. 
Although the fund said it would offer 1.39 euros per share, the new shares 
must be issued at a nominal value of 3 euros. As can be seen in this case, the 
state is a “real” shareholder of the company; there are no provisions 
limiting its powers, nor obliging it to operate as a private market player. 
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4.7. Some critical reflections  
 
As we have seen from the analysis of the bail out plans, they all 
tend to focus on rescuing the ailing institutions rather than 
allowing them to fail. In this respect, there is a major dispute 
between commentators as to whether it would have been 
preferable to set up a “bad bank” rather than to inject 
taxpayers' money into institutions whose true value is difficult 
to assess. Likewise there is no consensus on whether the final 
outcome of those plans will be the de facto nationalisation of the 
banks, whether it was in taxpayers' interests establishing 
temporary nationalisation plans or breaking up bigger 
financial institutions into smaller entities. But this debate is 
outside the scope of the article. 
We would rather focus on the consequences for enforcement of 
the EU competition and State aid rules, and the incentive for 
the State and for the beneficiary banks to return to 
“normality”.  
It is well known that in “normal times” States would not have 
been able to help distressed institutions with such massive 
injections of aid without incurring the wrath of the European 
Commission. In fact, it is no surprise that the Commission in 
the so-called Banking Communication238 allowed for a 
temporary exceptional regime relating to the application of 
State aid rules to measures taken in the context of global crisis. 
The Communication (hereinafter BC) raises no objection to the 
implementation of all the national bail out plans submitted for 
the Commission’s attention.  
Nonetheless, the approval by the EC is hardly unexpected 
given the circumstances: without State intervention, the crisis 
in the financial markets would have had a more serious and 
systemic impact on the real economy.  
A brief description of the new temporary framework is 
                                                 
238 Communication from the Commission, The application of State aid 
rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the 
current global financial crisis, 2008/C 270/02 in OJ C 270/8 of 25/10/2008. 
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therefore needed239.  
The scope of the BC is pretty broad, given that it focuses on 
guarantees covering liabilities of financial institutions, 
recapitalisation measures, controlled winding up and other 
forms of liquidity assistance. The main principles expressed, 
                                                 
239 Other three EC documents are worth mentioning in order to have a 
clear idea of the new framework on State Aid: Communication from the 
Commission, The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitations of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortion s of competitions, C(2008) 8259, in OJ C 10, 15/01/2009 so called 
“Recapitalisation Communication”, the Communication from the 
Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of impaired 
assets in the Community banking sector, 2009/C 72/01 in OJ C 72/1 of 
26/03/2009 also known as “Impaired Asset Communication”, and lastly the 
Commission Communication, The return to viability and the assessment of 
restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State 
aid rules, in http//ec.europa.eu/competition, called the Restructuring 
Guidelines. The first is a document where the EC provide guidance for new 
recapitalisation scheme and opens the possibility for adjustment of existing 
recapitalisation schemes, following Member States', Ecofin Council and 
beneficiary institutions' requests on more detailed explanations on the 
compatibility of certain type of recapitalisation under art.87. Two main 
principles are spelt out: remuneration should be fixed close to market prices 
(“remuneration for State recapitalisations cannot be as high as current 
market levels (about 15%) since these may not necessarily reflect what 
could be considered as normal market conditions”), see Recapitalisation 
Communication, point (24), as a way to limit distortion on competition and 
the plans should contain incentives for State capital redemption such as to 
require an adequately high remuneration for the state and a pricing 
structure including increase over time and step-up clauses. See 
Recapitalisation Communication, point (31). The second one is a set of 
principles applicable to the asset relief measures. Basically they emphasize 
the need of full transparency and disclosure of impairments, of a 
coordinated approach to the identification of a basket of assets eligible and 
to their ex ante valuation, an adequate burden sharing of the costs related to 
the impaired assets between the shareholders, the creditors and the State 
and of coverage of losses incurred from the valuation of the assets at real 
economic value by the beneficiary bank. The Restructuring Guidelines are 
based on three principles: 1) return to viability of the bank in the long term 
without further aid from the State, 2) there has to be a fair burden sharing 
of the restructuring costs between bank and shareholders, 3) measures must 
be taken to limit distortion on competition in the member States.  
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that mutatis mutandis are applicable to all the above areas, are 
the following:  
4) the aid must be non discriminatory, and  
5) limited in time 
6) the State support must be clearly defined and limited to 
what is strictly necessary 
7) it must be appropriately remunerated by the private 
sector, in the form of fees, interest rates and 
commissions, 
8) institutions must adopt rules of behaviour, relating to 
managers' remuneration, avoidance of undue  distortion 
of competition, limitation on the size of balance sheets 
etc. 
9)  concrete support must be provided  to the real 
economy. 
   
If we go through the justification for these principles, we can 
observe how the main concern is the necessity to avoid moral 
hazard. This is perfectly comprehensible and justifiable: when 
the State intervenes to help institutions, the moral hazard 
problem is greatest.  
However in our opinion there are two “small” details missing 
in the EC Commission communications: the rigorous 
expression of the “one time, last time” principle and the 
establishment of severe sanctions coming into force on the 
expiry of the plans, where there has been no exit from the 
share participations or from the guarantee. 
According to the “one time, last time” principle, stated in the 
Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and 
Restructuring firms in difficulty240, both rescue and 
restructuring aid should be granted only once, “in order to 
prevent firms from being unfairly assisted when they can only 
survive thanks to repeated State support” and because rescue 
                                                 
240  Communication from the Commission, Community guidelines on 
State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, in OJ 244, 
01/10/2004, p. 002-0017. 
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aid is a “one-off operation primarily designed to keep a 
company in business for a limited period, during which its 
future can be assessed”. Moreover “it should not be possible to 
allow repeated granting of rescue aids that would merely 
maintain the status quo, postpone the inevitable and in the 
meantime shift economic and social problems on to other, 
more efficient producers of other member states”241. This 
condition would not change in case of transfer of property of 
the recipient firm, or in the event of any judicial or 
administrative procedure shifting the ownership or part of the 
balance sheet. 
Although it is likely that this principle applies in our case, 
because it is part of the general rules on rescue aid, nonetheless 
the Commission has left a door open to the risk of future moral 
hazard and protectionism problems, especially if we consider 
that such a rule, even when there where few doubts on its 
applicability, has been ignored by the Commission itself (i.e. in 
the Alitalia case).  
The other condition lacking is that the Commission should 
have clearly stated that in order for a measure to be declared 
compatible with State Aid rules, there should be enforcement 
mechanisms both for breach of contract by the beneficiary 
institution and where an institution was unable to return to 
normal activity without the maintenance of public funds. In 
fact, the establishment of time limits for the availability of state 
aid is of little value when there is no specification of any kind 
of consequence following the expiring date.  
This, coupled with the omission of the “one time, last time” 
principle, might, on the one hand nullify the Commission’s 
efforts of avoiding moral hazard, and on the other hand cast a 
shadow over the future of competition in the banking sector 
across the EU. Two types of bank could emerge: banks that 
were able to survive on their own at the expiry date of the plan 
and were able to repay the aid, and others that continue to rely 
on public support without threat of sanction.  
                                                 
241  See R&R Guidelines, (nt.59), § 3.3. 
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Should this be the case, we would observe that, paradoxically, 
the most efficient banks risk being penalised, in terms of public 
confidence (would you prefer to go to a bank that is 
“guaranteed” by the State or instead to a “private” bank?), 
access to funding (would you prefer to lend money to a 
“public” bank or to a private one etc). In addition, the 
requested commitment to support the real economy does not 
seem to be particularly arduous, which, again, poses moral 
hazard problems242.  
Those conclusions might be more understandable if we recall 
the main features of the described plans and if we make some 
basic economic policy reflections.  
In fact, the main conclusion is that in principle there is the will 
and the awareness by the State that support for any institution 
should be limited to what is strictly necessary and for a limited 
period in time. Nonetheless the plans are not designed for 
temporary use because in some cases the minimum period of 
guarantee is 5 years and any time limit always applies to the 
validity of the public measure: this does not mean that by that 
date the bank must repay the measure.  
In addition, the asset swapped or protected stays in the bank’s 
ownership (though this was inevitable). The problem is that, 
given that there is no concrete possibility of the true valuation 
of those asset in the medium-short term, the financial 
involvement of the State could last even longer than the time 
agreed upon.  This in turn might provide the State with an 
incentive to act as if it were a private market actor, to bargain 
an additional form of remuneration for the guarantee, or, in 
case of subscription of bonds, to renegotiate the debt in case 
the bank is not able to repay the loan.  
This remuneration/renegotiation might not necessarily be 
                                                 
242  If we look at the conditions attached to most plans, we see that 
hardly ever there is a benchmark over which the increase in lending 
activities should be calculated. In fact, we must consider that in the 
previous 2 years banks had already restricted access to funding. This 
basically means that banks should restore the amount of lending 
existing before the credit crunch. 
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represented by extra commissions or fees243, but might be in 
the form of voting rights, which eventually could affect bank’s 
governance and business decisions (i.e. on lending conditions). 
Should this happen, the State would have no incentive to leave 
the bank since it could exercise a form of control over the credit 
institution. 
Conversely, where it proved impossible for the bank to repay 
the interest on the preference shares or to redeem them, the 
renegotiation would result, as has already happened with RBS, 
in the conversion of such preference shares into ordinary 
shares. As a shareholder, the State would have even less 
incentive to exit the bank and sell its participation. 
Moreover, we must consider that where a high interest rate 
(e.g. 8%) has been fixed by the State it might be even more 
difficult for a bank to fulfil all its duties as paying the interest, 
paying dividends to its own shareholders and finally comply 
with regulatory capital requirements.   
In addition, the uncertainty surrounding the restoration of 
normal credit conditions in the markets makes it even more 
difficult to assume that the State will not need to intervene 
again or continue to support the sector. That is why it would 
have been essential for the regular establishment of the status 
quo ante conditions, for the Commission to stress the “one time, 
last time” principle: if the State cannot exit “spontaneously”, 
because of EC imposition it might be forced to leave the bank, 
though at bank’s own risk: this in turn would mean 
introducing a market oriented criteria on which bank should 
survive on the market and which should not.  
In such a case, two main concerns might arise: depositor 
protection and protection of taxpayers. As far as depositor 
protection is concerned, guarantee schemes are in place across 
                                                 
243 This comes from the assumption that renegotiation is a 
consequence of the banks’ inability to repay the loan at Government’s 
request or –should this condition be added in future reviews of the 
schemes –when it falls due. Hence it would be inefficient for the State 
impose extra fees, which would simply result in a further deterioration 
in the liquidity of the institution.   
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all the Member States. Taxpayers’ protection is obviously a 
most sensitive issue, but if we assume that the State can 
participate in liquidation proceedings, ranking as a preferred 
creditor, we might consider this as a form of taxpayers’ 
remuneration.   
The actual enforceability of the plans seems to be unclear, 
because the powers given to the State to evaluate the true 
quality of banks balance sheet are not spelt out. In the US the 
Government is carrying out stress tests on the balance sheet of 
institutions participating in the State aid programme. By 
means of a stress test we can envisage the possibility for the 
Government to assess its real involvement in terms of money 
and time and to judge which bank should be saved and which 
should not, besides it might limit to the minimum the 
possibility a bank has, of cheating on its actual needs. In 
Europe, no such measure exists either at EU, or at national 
level.  
Furthermore, the right of access to the necessary information 
relating to “protected” assets provided by a few Member States 
may not prove sufficient to evaluate the health of the company 
as a whole. This would carry the risk that, in the long run, 
those institutions will keep on operating in the market but 
there would be no real confidence in the reliability of their 
accounts. The enforceability of the conditions attached seems 
to be at stake as well. To give one example, consider the 
commitment to increase lending to the real economy, where 
two options seem likely:  
i) the bank cannot  in fact  give loans to new borrowers 
because of legal constraints relating  to the 
“creditworthiness of the borrower”: in fact it is likely 
that new borrowers might not have high quality credit 
profiles while existing borrowers have seen a 
deterioration in their credit history; in this case the State 
cannot realistically enforce the commitment. 
ii) Despite the above, the bank is forced by the State to 
grant additional loans: this would be likely to result in 
 187  
loans given to low quality borrowers, which might in 
turn increase the possibility of future defaults.  
Consider also the incentive for the bank to repay the loan: first, 
no sanctions are in place (e.g. liquidation of the bank, 
compulsory sell of some assets, spin off of some activities, 
managers’ substitution, transfer of property to a private buyer, 
etc.). Second, the hybrid instruments subscribed (as TSSs and 
Tremonti bonds) give the State no voting rights or intervention 
rights in the general assembly, they may perpetual and early 
redemption is left to issuers’ solo discretion. Those two 
features give the participating banks none or poor incentive to 
“behave” and repay the State. 
Conversely, the conversion of preference shares may not be a 
big threat as well since it might not be so easy to realise: States 
should derogate to some basic company law rights, such as 
pre-emption rights and granting of exit rights to the old 
shareholders. Furthermore, the State might be forced to go to 
the market and launch a takeover in case the amount of shares 
resulting from the conversion would imply the control of the 
bank and the State had not a provision in place related to the 
nationalisation of financial institutions. 
Lastly, as for the economic policy concerns, history teaches us 
that States have always been tempted to exercise control over 
financial institutions. The reasons are obvious, but are even 
more apparent today when State sovereignty is being 
undermined by the centralisation of financial regulatory 
powers in the European Commission’s hands244. So it would 
not be surprising if we were to see interventionist covenants 
attached to guarantee provisions or share subscription 
contracts.  
This is why the Commission should have been stricter in 
relation to banks behavioural rules, State involvement, 
enforcement and sanctions. 
                                                 
244  The supervisory architecture suggested in the De Larosiere report 
and the prospected changes to the Capital Requirement Directive are 
recent examples of this trend. 
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